Demande et emploi dans les chaînes d'approvisionnement mondiales

L'essor des chaînes d'approvisionnement mondiales (CAM) éloigne l'emploi de la demande, géographiquement et sectoriellement. Pour mieux comprendre le phénomène, les auteurs mesurent l'emploi lié aux CAM selon sa localisation et celle de la demande, en se fondant sur les données de la base WIOD et en complétant les estimations déjà présentées par le BIT. L'analyse porte sur la période 1995–2013 et sur 40 économies. Elle montre que la Chine, principale bénéficiaire de la demande liée aux CAM autrefois, contribue maintenant à l'alimenter, tout comme les relations de production entre économies émergentes. En outre, le poids des services liés à une demande manufacturière augmente.     

Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game

Theory and Decision - We study stable strategy profiles in a pure exchange game of bads, where each player dumps his or her bads such as garbage onto someone else. Hirai et al. (Mathematical Social...     

Linking jobs in global supply chains to demand

The expansion of global supply chains (GSCs) has increasingly disconnected the location of jobs from the demand supporting them, both geographically and in terms of sector. Using data from the World Input–Output Database, the authors examine these linkages across 40 countries over the period 1995–2013, expanding on earlier analysis published by the ILO, and provide evidence of the number of GSC‐related jobs in terms of job location–export destination combinations. Their findings point to changing patterns in demand and supply of GSC‐related jobs, increasing the role of China as a demand generator, reinforcing production linkages between emerging economies and increasing the number of service jobs dependent on manufacturing GSCs.     

Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness

The objective of this paper is to study stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games. We assume that players deviate from a coalition structure to another to maximize their power given by the Owen power index. We introduce three myopic core concepts and one farsighted stability concept, the farsighted vNM stable set. Our main result is that the pessimistic core, the largest myopic core, coincides with some farsighted vNM stable set for any number of players. Moreover, we show that a coalition structure belongs to the pessimistic core and the farsighted vNM stable set if and only if it contains an exact majority coalition.