OVERSEAS MARKET INFORMATION AND FIRMS' EXPORT DECISIONS

This paper examines how firms' decision to start exporting is affected by the availability of information on export markets. Unlike existing studies that focus on information sharing among firms, we are interested in the information provided by firms' main bank. Specifically, using a unique data set containing information on both Japanese firms' export activities and the experience of their main bank (i.e., their top lender bank) in transacting with other exporting firms, we examine whether main banks act as a conduit of information on export markets. We find that information spillovers through main banks positively affect client firms' decision to start exporting (extensive margin), implying that information on foreign markets provided by banks substantially reduces the fixed entry cost of exporting. On the other hand, we do not find any evidence that information provided by banks has an effect on the export volume or on the growth rate of exports (intensive margin). Our results highlight that channels of information spillovers other than those examined in the literature so far may be of considerable importance. (JEL F10, F14, G21)     

Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences

This article considers a legislative bargaining model in which the rejecter in the previous round becomes the proposer in the current round. We allow the time and risk preferences to differ across players and the voting quota to be a supermajority or submajority. We show that there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and that each player’s equilibrium payoff conditional on being a proposer is unique, and we explicitly derive the equilibria and equilibrium payoff. We compare a proposer’s equilibrium payoff when the time interval between two consecutive rounds tends to zero with respect to the protocols of the selection of proposers and the voting quota: we show that a proposer’s equilibrium payoff can be greater in this article’s rejecter-proposer model than in the Baron–Ferejohn random-proposer model; even though the voting quota increases, a proposer’s equilibrium payoff can increase.