This paper studies optimum designs for linear models when the errors are heteroscedastic. Sufficient conditions are given
in order to obtainD-, A- andE-optimum designs for a complete regression model from partial optimum designs for some sub-parameters. A result about optimality
for a complete model from the optimality for the submodels is included.
Supported by Junta de Andalucía, research group FQM244. 相似文献
Journal of Management and Governance - In the original publication of the article the following text and tables were published incorrectly. The correct text and tables have been provided with this... 相似文献
We introduce and axiomatize a class of single‐winner contest success functions that embody the possibility of a draw. We then analyze the game of contest that our success functions induce, having different prizes delivered in the occurrence of a win and a draw. We identify conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric interior Nash equilibrium and show that equilibrium efforts and equilibrium rent dissipation can be larger than in a Tullock contest (with no possibility of a draw) due to increased competition even if the draw‐prize is null. These results suggest that a contest designer may profit from introducing the possibility of a draw. Finally, we show that this approach naturally extends to multiprize contests with multiple draws across different subsets of the set of players. (JEL C72, D72, D74) 相似文献
Social Indicators Research - In this paper, we present a multidimensional fuzzy analysis of the levels and the patterns of poverty and social fragility of migrants’ families, in the Italian... 相似文献
The literature on altruism and monetary transfers in the household is here extended with new and recent evidence on different approaches with the final aim being to provide policy recommendations in order to reduce socio-economic inequality among households, from both inter- and intra-generational perspectives. Thus, we include issues which deal with transfers from parents to kids (downstream transfers), and with transfers from kids to parents (upstream transfers). On the other hand, we also include issues from intragenerational transfers beyond the household, studying such phenomena as charitable donations and remittances from migrants. 相似文献
This paper details a semi-structured interview protocol that evaluators can use to develop a logic model of a program's services and outcomes. The protocol presents a series of questions, which evaluators can ask of specific program informants, that are designed to: (1) identify key informants basic background and contextual information, (2) generate logic model elements, (3) model program inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes, (4) build a rational theory, (5) develop a program theory, (6) prioritize logic model elements, and (7) build a graphical or tabular logic model. The paper will also provide an example of how this approach was used to develop a logic model for a youth mentoring program. It is our hope and belief that with this interview protocol, novice evaluators will be able to generate comprehensive logic models like seasoned professional evaluators. 相似文献
This paper first identifies the determinants of spouses’ satisfaction levels within the household with respect to their leisure
time and, secondly, characterizes whether their preferences have some degree of altruistic or egoistic character in regard
to this particular satisfaction. To that end, it formulates a theoretical framework from the collective family model whose
stochastic formulations are estimated for 14 EU countries. The general empirical results first reveal that the presence of
children has a significantly negative impact on the leisure satisfaction of both spouses. Then, increases in individual incomes
lead to lower own leisure satisfaction levels. Both husbands and wives show egoistic behavior with respect to the labor and
non-labor incomes (wage rate) of their respective spouses’ satisfaction levels.
We analyze cooperation of individuals in a family context, using a Public Good game. In a lab experiment, 165 individuals from 55 three-generation families (youth, parent, and grandparent) play a repeated Public Good game in three different treatments: one in which three members of the same family play each other (family), a second with the youth and two non-family members, while preserving the previous generational structure (inter-generational), and a third in which three randomly-selected players play each other (random). We find that all the age groups cooperate more when playing with relatives, indicating that family ties may have a positive relationship to contributions to the Public Good. We also find that this trend is more evident for the youths and the parents than for the grandparents. Furthermore, young individuals tend to cooperate less than older generations, especially in non-family treatments. Our results serve as evidence of the relationship between family ties and inter-generational cooperative behaviors.