LABOR SUPPLY OF POLITICIANS

Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences‐in‐differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re‐election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.     

Intensive management reduces butterfly diversity over time in urban green spaces

Urban Ecosystems - Loss and fragmentation of semi-natural grasslands have had negative consequences for grassland biodiversity, such as butterflies. Urban parks and other urban green spaces have so...     

A polynomial equation to predict low back compression force: accounting for the effects of load height on instability

The purpose of this study was to develop a regression equation that, incorporating the potential energy of the load in the hands, was capable of improved predictions of spinal compression forces. A stepwise polynomial equation was developed from EMG profiles of 15 muscles, and its spinal joint loading predictions at L4/L5 were compared to current methods of calculating spinal compression. Absolute muscle activation was shown to increase with increased loading height, indicating that the central nervous system responds to changes in spinal stability. The inclusion of potential energy into the calculation of spinal disc compression at L4/L5 improved estimates of the compressive forces acting on the spine. This is the first model to incorporate potential energy into a predictive model for lumbar spine compression without the use of electromyography. It was concluded that potential energy plays a vital role in dictating the recruitment patterns of the trunk.     

Expanding and Diversifying South Mediterranean Exports through Trade Facilitation

This article explores whether trade facilitation – i.e. improved and simplified trade procedures – could be an important part of the reform agenda of the Barcelona Process. Adopting a Southern perspective by focusing on exports to the European Union (EU) from non‐EU Mediterranean countries, it tests whether the efficiency of trade procedures affects (i) bilateral volumes of exports and (ii) the number of products exported. The findings suggest that trade facilitation could lead to substantially increased export volumes and export diversification.     

A time-varying measurement error model for age of onset of a psychiatric diagnosis: applied to first depressive episode diagnosed by the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI)

A substantial degree of uncertainty exists surrounding the reconstruction of events based on memory recall. This form of measurement error affects the performance of structured interviews such as the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI), an important tool to assess mental health in the community. Measurement error probably explains the discrepancy in estimates between longitudinal studies with repeated assessments (the gold-standard), yielding approximately constant rates of depression, versus cross-sectional studies which often find increasing rates closer in time to the interview. Repeated assessments of current status (or recent history) are more reliable than reconstruction of a person's psychiatric history based on a single interview. In this paper, we demonstrate a method of estimating a time-varying measurement error distribution in the age of onset of an initial depressive episode, as diagnosed by the CIDI, based on an assumption regarding age-specific incidence rates. High-dimensional non-parametric estimation is achieved by the EM-algorithm with smoothing. The method is applied to data from a Norwegian mental health survey in 2000. The measurement error distribution changes dramatically from 1980 to 2000, with increasing variance and greater bias further away in time from the interview. Some influence of the measurement error on already published results is found.     

Young Children's Prosocial and Aggressive Behaviors and Their Experiences of Being Targeted for Similar Behaviors by Peers

Children's target experiences (as recipients of prosocial peer acts and victims of peer aggression) were investigated for their concurrent and longitudinal associations with prosocial and aggressive behavior. Forty‐four children (initially 22–40 months) were observed in naturalistic interactions with peers during a two‐month period for each of three consecutive years. Results revealed no consistency over time in children's experiences as targets for aggressive or prosocial peer acts, although there was some indication that altruistic target experiences may be stable from the end of the preschool period. Early behavior appeared to affect the way children were later treated by peers, but no support was found for the idea that early target experiences influence later behavior. Prosocial behavior was concurrently and longitudinally associated with prosocial target experiences. Aggressive behavior reduced the likelihood of children being targets of prosocial peer behavior and, over time, also of their being targets of peers’ aggression.     

Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?

Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic effects of electoral rules and political regimes on the size and composition of government spending. Results from ongoing empirical work indicate that such effects are indeed present in the data. Some empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions: presidential regimes have smaller governments and countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare‐state programs and less corruption. Other results present puzzles for future research: the adjustment to economic events appears highly institution‐dependent, as does the timing and nature of the electoral cycle.     

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INNOVATION INDUSTRY: ENTREPRENEURS,VENTURE CAPITALISTS,AND OLIGOPOLISTS

We construct a model where incumbents can either acquire basic innovations from entrepreneurs, or wait and acquire developed innovations from entrepreneurial firms supported by venture capitalists. We show that venture‐backed entrepreneurial firms have an incentive to overinvest in development vis à vis incumbents due to strategic product market effects on the sales price of a developed innovation. This will trigger preemptive acquisitions by incumbents, thus increasing the reward for entrepreneurial innovations. We also show that venture capital can emerge in equilibrium if venture capitalists have cost advantages, or if development is associated with double moral hazard problems. (JEL: G24, L1, L2, M13, O3)