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We have not yet had sufficient theoretical explanation for successful biological control in which a key pest is controlled after an introduction of natural enemies. I compare here real features of successful biological control and theoretical host–parasitoid population models to reduce the gap between theory and practice. I first review the historical interaction between classical biological control projects and theoretical population models. Second, I consider the importance of host refuges in host–parasitoid population dynamics as concerns the mechanisms of low and stable host density. The importance of density–dependent parasitism through parasitoid reproduction in multivoltine host–parasitoid systems and supplemental generalist natural enemies are also discussed. Finally, I consider the difference in tactics for classical biological control and for augmentation of natural enemies in annual crop systems. Received: December 20, 1998 / Accepted: January 15, 1999  相似文献   
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This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems. Alcalde and Barberá (Econ Theory 4:417–435, 1994) and Sönmez (Econ Des 1:365–380, 1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of respect for unanimity. First, we prove that a strategy-proof rule exists that is individually rational and respects unanimity. However, this rule is unreasonable in the sense that mutually best pairs of agents are matched on only rare occasions. In order to explore the possibility of better matching rules, we introduce a natural condition of “respect for 2-unanimity.” Respect for 2-unanimity states that a mutually best pair of agents should be matched, and an agent wishing to being unmatched should be unmatched. Our second result is negative. Secondly, we prove that no strategy-proof rule exists that respects 2-unanimity. This result implies Roth (Math Oper Res 7:617–628, 1962; J Econ Theory 36:277–288, 1985) showing that stable rules are manipulable.  相似文献   
3.
Y. Takagi 《Statistics》2013,47(6):571-581
Our main concern is on the second-order asymptotic optimality problem of estimators. The φ-divergence loss is used as a criterion for evaluating the performance of estimators. In the comparison problem of any two estimators, the condition that one estimator dominates another estimator under the φ-divergence risk is given by evaluating the second-order term in the difference between the risks. As a result, it is proved that the condition is characterized by a peculiar value of the φ-divergence loss, which is called the divergence-loss coefficient. Furthermore, it is shown that the comparison based on the φ-divergence loss does not correspond with that based on any standard loss functions including the mean squared error, the absolute loss and the 0-1 loss. In addition, a necessary and sufficient condition for an estimator to be second-order admissible is derived.  相似文献   
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The main purpose of this paper is to formulate theories of universal optimality, in the sense that some criteria for performances of estimators are considered over a class of loss functions. It is shown that the difference of the second order terms between two estimators in any risk functions is expressed as a form which is characterized by a peculiar value associated with the loss functions, which is referred to as the loss coefficient. This means that the second order optimal problem is completely characterized by the value of the loss coefficient. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of change of the loss coefficient, the relationship between two estimators is classified into six types. On the basis of this classification, the concept of universal second order admissibility is introduced. Some sufficient conditions are given to determine whether any estimators are universally admissible or not.  相似文献   
5.
Some sufficient conditions for an estimator to be universally second order admissible are derived. Those sufficient conditions consist of the elementary integrals with respect to the Fisher information and the limits of some functions characterized by the dealt statistical model, and thus can be checked with comparative ease. In location model and scale model, the sufficient condition for the linear estimator with respect to the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) to be universally second order admissible is given. Furthermore, a guide for classifying any estimator into either the universal admissibility or the non-universal admissibility is proposed.  相似文献   
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In two-parameter family of distribution, conditions for a modified maximum likelihood estimator to be second-order admissible are given. Applying these results to two-parameter logistic regression model, it is shown that the maximum likelihood estimator is always second-order inadmissible and the Rao-Blackwellized minimum logit chi-squared estimator is second-order admissible if and only if the number of the doses is greater than or equal to 6.  相似文献   
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We consider the general one-sided hypotheses testing problem expressed as H0: θ1 ? h2) versus H1: θ1 < h2), where h( · ) is not necessary differentiable. The values of the right and the left differential coefficients, h?( · ) and h+( · ), at nondifferentiable points play an essential role in constructing the appropriate testing procedures with asymptotic size α on the basis of the likelihood ratio principle. The likelihood ratio testing procedure is related to an intersection–union testing procedure when h?2) ? h+2) for all θ2, and to a union–intersection testing procedure when there exists a θ2 such that h?2) < h+2).  相似文献   
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9.
Takagi E  Silverstein M 《Demography》2011,48(4):1559-1579
We investigated the conditions under which married children live with their older parents in Japan. We focused on how needs and resources in each generation are associated with whether married couples live with their parents in parent-headed and child-headed households, and we also investigated difference in power relations between older and younger generations and between children and their spouses. We analyzed a nationally representative sample of older parents (n = 3,853) and their married children (n = 8,601) from the 1999 Nihon University Japanese Longitudinal Study of Aging (NUJLSOA). Mutinomial regression revealed that married children with relatively affluent parents tended to live with them in parent-headed households and that married children with parents who are in relatively poor health or who are widowed tended to live with them in child-headed households. We also found that less-educated married children tended to live in the households of their higher-income parents, suggesting that parents may be "purchasing" traditional arrangements with less-affluent children. In addition, children with an educational advantage over their spouses were more likely to have parents living with them in child-headed coresident households. We conclude that traditional multigenerational coresidence has become a commodity negotiated within families based on relative resources and needs within and across generations.  相似文献   
10.
Assume that we have a random sample of size n from p-variate normal population and we wish to estimate the mean vector under quadratic loss with respect to the inverse of the unknown covariance matrix, A class of superior estimators to James-Stein positive part estimator is given when n>max{9p+10,13p-7}, based on the argument by Shao and Strawderman(1994).  相似文献   
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