Can Children Recognize Bodily Expressions of Emotion?

Journal of Nonverbal Behavior - Past research has demonstrated that children understand distinct emotion concepts and can accurately recognize facial expressions of distinct emotions by a young...     

Alcohol Consumption and Self-Control of Gambling Behaviour

This paper reports the results of a preliminary investigation into whether the drinking of alcohol contributes to impaired control of gambling behaviour. The sampling method consisted of a two-phase survey design, collecting data both prospectively within session and retrospectively via a take-home questionnaire. One hundred sixteen people were interviewed while in a gaming venue playing on an electronic gaming machine (egm) of whom 34 men and 11 women also returned take-home surveys. Comparisons of the sample to previous studies suggested that the sample was representative of the population of egm players. Results indicated a consistent theme of alcohol use contributing significantly to impaired control of gambling behaviour, with level of involvement (Corless & Dickerson, 1989) contributing the most significant variance in the independent variables. Limitations of the study are discussed, but the case is argued that this type of process research is essential in better understanding how these two types of popular leisure activities may interact, possibly leading to the previously recorded chronic, excessive alcohol intake and problematic gambling (e.g. McCormick, Russo, Ramirez & Taber, 1984).     

Street Youth Labour Market Experiences and Crime*

Dans le cadre de notre recherche, nous étudions la façon dont les expériences dans le marché du travail des jeunes sans‐abri et l'inter‐prétation qu'ils font du chômage sont liées à leur comportement criminel. À partir d'entretiens réalisés auprès d'un échantillon de 200 jeunes homines vivant dans la rue, les données recueillies indiquent que ces jeunes se sentent exclus du marché du travail du fait des expériences négatives qu'ils ont vécues. Ce phénomène est exacerbé par le chômage à long terme, qui détruit la motivation et conduit les jeunes à rechercher d'autres exutoires matériels. En outre, les jeunes en viennent à considérer le système social comme injuste et se sen‐tent inaptes à l'emploi, ce qui augmente le risque qu'ils participent à des activités criminelles. Les jeunes qui restent lies à la société tradi‐tionnelle et continuent de croire à l'idéologie dominante du mérite réagissent par la dépression ou la culpabilité menant à une fuite passive et favorisant le comportement criminel. En revanche, les jeunes qui refusent l'idéologie font étant d'un affect négatif minimal et met‐tent en valeur la supérioritý matérielle et sociale qu'ils accordent aux activités criminelles par rapport à l'emploi qu'ils ont pu occuper avant et qui leur était offert. Les conclusions de cet article s'appuient sur les théories de la contrainte, du contrôle et de la sous‐culture. The research explores how homeless street youths' labour market experiences and interpretations of unemployment are linked to criminal behavior. Using interviews with a sample of 200 male street youth, the data suggest that these youths become alienated from the labour market because of negative experiences in their jobs. This is exacerbated by long‐term unemployment that destroys motivation and leaves the youths looking for other material opportunities. Further, the youths come to see the social system as unfair and themselves as unemployable, making it more likely they will become involved in criminal activities. Those youths who remain bonded to the conventional society and continue to believe in the dominant meritocratic ideology respond with depression and guilt, which lead to a passive withdrawal and inhibit criminal behavior. In contrast, those youth who dismiss the ideology display minimal negative affect and reveal that criminal activities are superior both materially and socially to previous and available employment. Findings are discussed in terms of strain, control and subcultural theories.     

THE STRENGTH OF WEAK INDICATORS: A Response to Gilles, Brown, Geletta, and Dalecki

This article responds to Gilles, Brown, Geletta, and Dalecki's (1990) claim that the Legitimate Violence Index (LVX) is invalid because of problems with eight of its twelve indicators and because it is confounded with region and population density.     

CURRICULUM CHANGES TO MEET CHALLENGES: PREPARING MFT STUDENTS FOR MANAGED CARE SETTINGS

Fledgling therapists who graduate from family therapy traning programs will have to navigate the world of managed care. In this article, faculty of University of San Diego share changes in its accredited training program that prepare students for practice in an increasingly multidisciplinary world where health maintenence organizations and other versions of managed care predominate. The paper touches on contextual issues, provides a detailed outline of coursework presenting basic knowledge and skills involved in clinical pracice in a managed care environment, and comments on clinical placements and the challenge of helping the next generation of clinicans "fit" into the future of health care delivery while maintaining their unique identity as family therapists.     

Bargaining within the Supply Chain and Its Implications in an Industry

Our main objective is to investigate the influence of the bargaining power within a chain on its industry. As a building block, we first discuss the implications of bargaining within a single chain by considering an asymmetric Nash bargaining over the wholesale price (BW). We show that both Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) and vertical integration (VI) strategies are special cases of the BW contract. We then develop the Nash equilibrium in an industry with two supply chains that use BW. We identify the profit‐maximizing (coordinating) bargaining power within this industry. We show that when a chain is not monopolistic, VI does not coordinate the chain and that the MS contract, where the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, is coordinating when competition is intense. We find that the main determinant of the equilibrium in mature industries is to respond well to the actions of the competing chain rather than to directly maximize the profit of each chain. That is, the equilibrium does not necessarily maximize the profit of the entire industry. While a coordination of the industry could then increase the profitability of both chains, such a coordination is likely against antitrust law. Moreover, if one chain cannot change its actions, the other chain may unilaterally improve its profitability by deviating from the equilibrium. Our results lead to several predictions supported by empirical findings, such as that in competitive industries chains will work “close to” the MS contract.     

Barriers to Training for Disabled Social Work Students

Disabled people wishing to enter Higher Education are confronted with a number of barriers, yet relatively little research has been carried out to identify the level and nature of such obstacles. The short study reported here was designed to examine policy and practice within a number of social work training institutions in Scotland. Interviews were held with disabled students and ex-students, course tutors and practice teachers. Barriers to training are identified in five main areas: first, the disabling physical environment; secondly, problems of typification (whereby global assumptions of impairment are made about individuals); thirdly, failure of equal opportunities policies; fourthly, the practice of treating all students in the same way, resulting in discrimination against a few; and, finally, self-censorship on the part of students. It is argued that the reluctance of some students to 'declare' an impairment is a rational response to the disabling policies pursued, albeit inadvertently, by institutions. The implications of these findings for policy and practice are discussed.     

St. Wolfgang College's Health

St. Wolfgang College recently decided to change its health care plan. The administration took this action after just minimum consultation with the faculty. Consequently, the faculty is disheartened, seeing the action as a reflection of the college's top down decision making process and command culture. Faculty are in a quadary as to what they can do. Further, the administration of the college has largely rebuffed the faculty's efforts to increase its involvement in governance, rejecting a faculty reform effort. The college's president has a background primarily in administration at the secondary school level. Since assuming leadership he has focused on improving physical plant. He avows a mission of enhancing the college's academic reputation and has taken actions that he and the administration believe will achieve this goal, such as dismantling two year degree programs that primarily serve disadvantaged and minority students and providing extra funding to flagship programs.     

Beacon Art Center and Institute

The Beacon Art Center and Institute, located in an area of Florida experiencing rapid population growth, has enjoyed increases in membership,revenue and services. The Board of the Corporation and the Director must develop a long range strategic plan for the future of the organization. Ability to function is currently restricted by limited space, limited size of staff, and limited endowment. The center also faces potentially troublesome governance issues. The long run future of the art center must be addressed by the Board and the Director of the organization. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Fully-Revealing Equilibria of Multiple-Sender Signaling and Screening Models

Models of incomplete information have played a major role in the fields of political science and political economy. The models have almost exclusively been signaling models, and their substantive focus is frequently on situations in which the extensive form is not dictated by institutional requirements or procedures. We explore the relation between multiple-sender signaling games and the corresponding screening or mechanism design games without transfers and establish an equivalence result. If there is a fully-revealing equilibrium in the signaling game there is also a full-information optimal mechanism that yields the principal’s optimal policy in every state. The converse, that fully-revealing equilibria exist in the signaling game if a full-information optimal mechanism exists, is true if and only if the mechanism involves only the selection of policies that are optimal for some belief about the state. We also present two straightforward sufficient conditions for the existence of full-information optimal mechanisms. When either holds, fully-revealing equilibria in the signaling and screening games exist. The perceived advantage of the signaling over the screening approach – that no commitment by the principal is assumed – may be over-stated as flexibility in specifying off the path beliefs can mimic commitment.