Film Games*

This paper presents data on how film students practice filmmaking skills by devising and playing games. In their games film students suggest images for films and correct one another's notions about the methods for or appropriateness of realizing these images on film. By using increasingly complex games as a series of exercises, students develop greater skill in anticipating programs in making films they imagine. The apparent effectiveness of these games suggests playful behaviors which may seem insignificant because they are not “serious” could be important mechanisms for socializing people's imaginations, tailoring them for a particular kind of problem and problem-solving.     

The Archives Made Me Do It

Qualitative Sociology - This paper is a reflection on the power of archives in driving research. Just as much as informants draw the attention of researchers to social patterns, archives do, too....     

Recursive expected utility and the separation of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity: an experimental study

We use the multiple price list method and a recursive expected utility theory of smooth ambiguity to separate out attitude towards risk from that towards ambiguity. Based on this separation, we investigate if there are differences in agent behaviour under uncertainty over gain amounts vis-a-vis uncertainty over loss amounts. On an aggregate level, we find that (i) subjects are risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses, displaying a “reflection effect” and (ii) they are ambiguity neutral over gains and are mildly ambiguity seeking over losses. Further analysis shows that on an individual level, and with respect to both risky and ambiguous prospects, there is limited incidence of a reflection effect where subjects are risk/ambiguity averse (seeking) in gains and seeking (averse) in losses, though this incidence is higher for ambiguous prospects. A very high proportion of such cases of reflection exhibit risk (ambiguity) aversion in gains and risk (ambiguity) seeking in losses, with the reverse effect being significantly present in the case of risk but almost absent in case of ambiguity. Our results suggest that reflection across gains and losses is not a stable individual characteristic, but depends upon whether the form of uncertainty is precise or ambiguous, since we rarely find an individual who exhibits reflection in both risky and ambiguous prospects. We also find that correlations between attitudes towards risk and ambiguity were domain dependent.      

A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity

We propose and characterize a model of preferences over acts such that the decision maker prefers act f to act g if and only if 𝔼_μφ(𝔼_πu○f) 𝔼_μφ(𝔼_πu○g), where 𝔼 is the expectation operator, u is a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, φis an increasing transformation, and μis a subjective probability over the set Πof probability measures πthat the decision maker thinks are relevant given his subjective information. A key feature of our model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes. We show that attitudes toward pure risk are characterized by the shape of u, as usual, while attitudes toward ambiguity are characterized by the shape of φ. Ambiguity itself is defined behaviorally and is shown to be characterized by properties of the subjective set of measures Π. One advantage of this model is that the well‐developed machinery for dealing with risk attitudes can be applied as well to ambiguity attitudes. The model is also distinct from many in the literature on ambiguity in that it allows smooth, rather than kinked, indifference curves. This leads to different behavior and improved tractability, while still sharing the main features (e.g., Ellsberg's paradox). The maxmin expected utility model (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) with a given set of measures may be seen as a limiting case of our model with infinite ambiguity aversion. Two illustrative portfolio choice examples are offered.     

Jurisdiction,inscription, and state formation: administrative modernism and knowledge regimes

In seventeenth-century France, Colbert built a more effective state administration not by rationalizing state offices but by using public documents to increase the government’s intellectual capacity to exercise logistical power and engage in territorial governance. This pattern calls into question Weber’s model of the genesis of “modern officialdom,” suggesting that its source was not social rationalization, but rather the identification and management of expertise. Colbert recruited into government nascent technocrats with knowledge useful to territorial politics, using contracts and other documents to limit their independence and subordinate them to patrimonial authorities. They exercised specific duties and impersonal powers in jurisdictional areas—much like modern technocrats. Their expertise enhanced the intellectual capacity of the administration to exercise territorial power and made the state less dependent on patrimonial clienteles without challenging the patrimonial culture of power/knowledge.     

The state of things: state history and theory reconfigured

This article looks at the relationship between logistical power and the assemblages of sites that constitute modern states. Rather than treating states as centralizing institutions and singular sites of power, we treat them as multi-sited. They gain power by using logistical methods of problem solving, using infrastructures to enforce and depersonalize relations of domination and limit the autonomy of elites. But states necessarily solve diverse problems by different means in multiple locations. So, educating children is not continuous with governing colonies even though both are necessary to nineteenth-century states. For this reason, states use logistical means of coordination to link sites, and they make the power of the state seem unitary even though the exercise of state power is not.