The impact of managerial political ties on corporate governance and debt financing: Evidence from Ghana

In this study, we draw upon insights from agency theory to examine the impact of managerial political ties on cost of debt and also to explore whether corporate governance mediates this impact. We hypothesize that political ties reduce financial reporting quality, disclosure of non-financial information and board independence, and are therefore associated with higher interest rates. We also hypothesize that the negative effect of political ties on the cost of debt will be stronger if firms borrow from privately-owned banks versus government-owned banks. Using data from Ghana, we find support for our direct and moderation hypotheses; political ties are associated with high interest rates and poor corporate governance. However, we do not find evidence of mediation. Altogether, the findings reveal the dark side of political connections and highlight the cost of political embeddedness in emerging credit markets.     

Corporate Political Activity: A Literature Review and Research Agenda

This paper reviews the diverse literature on corporate political activity (CPA) and develops a framework that details and integrates existing research in this field. A systematic analysis of extant CPA literatures is conducted to order them into domains that have implications for organizational performance. The paper is structured into three such domain emphases, which require further research investigation: resources and capabilities focus; institutional focus; and political environment focus. The contribution of each to an understanding of CPA in pursuit or defence of corporate competitive advantage is discussed. The authors also suggest that the internationalization of business, including the more recent emergence of developing country economies and companies, presents scholars with the challenge of understanding CPA in more varied institutional settings. CPA practices continue to expand as commerce goes increasingly global and, consequently, involves a wider array of political actors and institutions. The paper contributes by increasing the clarity of CPA classification, reflecting on the implications of a multi‐polar world for CPA research and advancing future agendas for scholars in this research community.     

Antecedents and Outcomes of Political Tie Intensity: Institutional and Strategic Fit Perspectives

Although international nonmarket strategy research has highlighted the importance of political ties, it is still unclear why some foreign subsidiaries are more politically active than others and what conditions may render political practices beneficial in a host country. We argue that foreign subsidiary political tie intensity—the extent to which senior managers provide time and resources in informally dealing with government officials for nonmarket purposes—will be influenced by political institutions in their parent's home country, especially when the MNE parent attempts to protect foreign subsidiary resources. Additionally, we assert that fit between a parent's home country political institutions and foreign subsidiary political tie intensity will positively affect subsidiary performance. We employ primary data collected from 181 foreign subsidiaries in the Philippines and find support for our hypotheses. This study advances international nonmarket strategy research by highlighting how an MNE's home country political institutions shape subsidiary political networking and strategic performance outcomes in host country environments.     

Solutions to the Exploration/Exploitation Dilemma: Networks as a New Level of Analysis

This paper reviews the extant literature on the exploration/exploitation dilemma. Based on a systematic analysis of structural, behavioural, systemic and temporal solutions, the authors are able to show that the learning literature continues to struggle with the question of how exactly an organization can separate exploration and exploitation and at the same time enable necessary knowledge exchange and cooperation between these two notions. Paying closer attention to networks might enable future research to answer this question. In particular, a combination of structural aspects of networks and social ties has the potential to explain how the solutions currently on offer can be implemented successfully, how organizations can combine several of them, and how they can shift between them.     

Seeds of Corruption? The Contingent Role of Ties to Politicians and Foreign Subsidiary Relations with Government-Sponsored Financial Institutions

In drawing from transaction cost economics and social network theories, this study examines the influence of corruption as a determinant of foreign subsidiary formal contracting practices with government-sponsored financial institutions. We hypothesize that lower corruption distance (between parent home and host countries) and higher perceived corruption (in host country) are positively related, and mutually reinforcing, when considering a foreign subsidiary's propensity to formally contract with government-sponsored financial institutions. We also suggest that these relationships strengthen with the intensification of political ties to government officials who can offer preferential political services via contractual agreements, changing the nature of market transactions in favour of a foreign subsidiary. We found support for our hypotheses using data from a sample of over 350 subsidiaries located in the Philippines and Thailand.