The demography of the unrelated individual: 1900–1950

This article is an analysis of the frequency and characteristics of unrelated individuals between 1900 and 1950. The much-heralded rise of the primary individual during the 20th century has been offset by a decline in the frequency of secondary individuals. The overall percentage of persons residing without family did not exceed turn-of-the-century levels until the 1970s. Using data from national micro data samples of the census for 1900, 1940, and 1950, the study applies decomposition techniques and life-course analysis to investigate these patterns. The results show that the decline of the secondary individual from 1900 to 1950 was largely a function of changing demographic composition, but the increase of primary individuals is linked to changing residential preferences.     

The rise of divorce and separation in the United States, 1880–1990

I use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series to assess the potential effects of local labor-market conditions on long-term trends and race differences in marital instability. The rise of female labor-force participation and the increase in nonfarm employment are closely associated with the growth of divorce and separation. Moreover, higher female labor-force participation among black women and lower economic opportunities for black men may account for race differences in marital instability before 1940, and for most of such differences in subsequent years. However, unmeasured intervening cultural factors are probably responsible for at least part of these effects.     

Intergenerational Coresidence and Family Transitions in the United States, 1850 - 1880

This study uses a new source of linked census data (N = 6,734) to test theories proposed to explain the high intergenerational coresidence in 19th‐century America. Was it a system of support for dependent elderly, or did it reflect intergenerational interdependence? I focus on transitions from middle age to old age, and I assess key predictors of family transitions, including widowhood, retirement, disability, migration, and wealth. The results show that adverse events precipitated changes in the headship of intergenerational families but did not increase the likelihood of residing in an intergenerational family. The findings suggest that 19th‐century intergenerational coresidence was not principally a means of old‐age support; more often, probably, there was a reciprocal relationship between generations.     

Stem families and joint families in comparative historical perspective

This note revisits the author's June 2009 PDR article, "Reconsidering the Northwest European family system." Using an array of contemporary and historical census microdata from around the world with simple controls for agricultural employment and demographic structure, I detected no significant differences in complex family structure between nineteenth-century Western Europe and North America and twentieth-century developing countries. This article adds two new measures designed to detect stem families and joint families. The results suggest that Western Europeans and North Americans have had a long-standing aversion to joint family living arrangements, and that this pattern cannot be easily ascribed to demographic and economic conditions.     

Breaking Up Is Hard to Count: The Rise of Divorce in the United States, 1980–2010

This article critically evaluates the available data on trends in divorce in the United States. We find that both vital statistics and retrospective survey data on divorce after 1990 underestimate recent marital instability. These flawed data have led some analysts to conclude that divorce has been stable or declining for the past three decades. Using new data from the American Community Survey and controlling for changes in the age composition of the married population, we conclude that there was actually a substantial increase in age-standardized divorce rates between 1990 and 2008. Divorce rates have doubled over the past two decades among persons over age 35. Among the youngest couples, however, divorce rates are stable or declining. If current trends continue, overall age-standardized divorce rates could level off or even decline over the next few decades. We argue that the leveling of divorce among persons born since 1980 probably reflects the increasing selectivity of marriage.     

Drawing statistical inferences from historical census data, 1850–1950

Virtually all quantitative microdata used by social scientists derive from samples that incorporate clustering, strati cation, and weighting adjustments (Kish 1965, 1992). Such data can yield standard error estimates that differ dramatically from those derived from a simple random sample of the same size. Researchers using historical U.S. census microdata, however, usually apply methods designed for simple random samples. The resulting p values and confidence intervals could be inaccurate and could lead to erroneous research conclusions. Because U.S. census microdata samples are among the most widely used sources for social science and policy research, the need for reliable standard error estimation is critical. We evaluate the historical microdata samples of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) project from 1850 to 1950 in order to determine (1) the impact of sample design on standard error estimates, and (2) how to apply modern standard error estimation software to historical census samples. We exploit a unique new data source from the 1880 census to validate our methods for standard error estimation, and then we apply this approach to the 1850–1870 and 1900–1950 decennial censuses. We conclude that Taylor series estimation can be used effectively with the historical decennial census microdata samples and should be applied in research analyses that have the potential for substantial clustering effects.     

The Decline of Intergenerational Coresidence in the United States, 1850 to 2000

In the mid-nineteenth century, almost 70 percent of persons age 65 or older resided with their adult children; by the end of the twentieth century, fewer than 15 percent did so. Many scholars have argued that the simplification of the living arrangements of the aged resulted primarily from an increase in their resources, which enabled increasing numbers of elders to afford independent living. This article supports a different interpretation: the evidence suggests that the decline of coresidence between generations had less to do with the growing affluence of the aged than with the increasing opportunities of the younger generation. Using data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), I examine long-run trends in the characteristics of both the older and the younger generations to gain insight into changing motivations for coresidence. In particular, I investigate headship patterns, occupational status, income, and spatial coresidence patterns. I also reassess the potential impact of the Social Security program. I conclude that the decline of intergenerational coresidence resulted mainly from increasing opportunities for the young and declining parental control over their children.     

Intergenerational Coresidence in Developing Countries

Newly available census microdata from IPUMS‐International are used to assess trends in intergenerational coresidence in 15 developing countries. Contrary to expectations, we find no general decline in intergenerational coresidence over the past several decades. There have been, however, significant changes in the configuration of intergenerational coresidence. Families in which a member of the older generation is household head—a configuration consistent with traditional patriarchal forms in which the older generation retains authority—are becoming more common in most of the countries. Intergenerational families headed by a member of the younger generation—the configuration one would expect if intergenerational coresidence were motivated by a need for old‐age support—are on the decline in most of the countries. Multivariate analysis reveals that intergenerational families headed by the older generation are positively associated with measures of economic development. These findings are at variance with widely accepted social theory. We hypothesize that housing shortages, economic stress in the younger generation, and old‐age pensions may contribute to the change. More broadly, in some developing countries rising incomes may have allowed more people to achieve their preferred family structure of intergenerational coresidence following traditional family forms.