The vegetarian option: varieties, conversions, motives and careers

This paper reports the findings of a qualitative study of the dietary beliefs and practices of a ‘snowball sample’ of seventy-six vegetarians and vegans. The dynamics of the process of conversion are examined, along with respondents'accounts of their motives and of the impact of their dietary stance upon their relationships with kin, friends and colleagues. The study's findings, which appear to indicate the central importance of ethical considerations for this particular response group, are set in the context of broader debates concerning the sociological dimensions of the selection or avoidance of specific food items.     

Erfolgsfaktoren beim Einzel-Coaching

Success factors of executive coaching. A screening of the coaching scenery from the client’s point of viewThis survey, based on questionnaires, examines the success factors of one-to-one coaching from the client point of view. Firstly, ten success factors in coaching were established by means of factor analysis. Secondly, more extensive analysis shows that, contrary to previous research in this field, the “professional system” is not necessarily a determining success factor in coaching. As an exclusive instrument of staff development, coaching seems to be effective even without support from the professional system. The analysis also indicates that the clients perceive their coach as an advisor and confidant as regards role expectations. Furthermore, multiple regression analysis discloses the predictive effects of the two success factors “the coach’s qualification” and “the coach’s involvement” for the overall success of coaching from the client’s point of view. The overall success of coaching itself is established through three items: the clients’ attitudes towards coaching, their attitude concerning further coaching, and the extent to which their objectives were met in coaching.     

Organizational Silence and Whistle‐Blowing on IT Projects: An Integrated Model*

An individual's reluctance to report bad news about a troubled information technology (IT) project has been suggested as an important contributor to project failure and has been linked to IT project escalation as well. To date, information systems researchers have drawn from the mum effect and whistle‐blowing literature to gain a better understanding of the factors that influence bad news reporting. More recent theoretical work in the area of organizational silence offers a promising new conceptual lens, but remains empirically untested. In this research note, we integrate key elements of Morrison and Milliken's (2000) model of organizational silence, which has never been empirically tested, with the basic whistle‐blowing model adapted from Dozier and Miceli (1985) . Using a role‐playing experiment, we investigate how organizational structures/policies, managerial practices, and degree of demographic dissimilarity between employees and top managers create a climate of silence and how this climate, in turn, affects an individual's willingness to report. Our results show that all three types of factors contribute to a climate of silence, exerting both direct and indirect influence on willingness to report, as hypothesized. The implications of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.     

Information Technology Project Escalation: A Process Model*

Information technology (IT) a common and costly problem. While much is known about the factors that promote escalation behavior, little is known about the actual escalation process. This article uses an in‐depth case study to construct a process model of escalation, consisting of three phases: drift, unsuccessful incremental adaptation, and rationalized continuation. Each phase encompasses several within‐phase escalation catalysts and the model also identifies triggering conditions that promote transition from one phase to the next: project framing (antecedent condition), problem emergence, increased problem visibility, and imminent threat to project continuation (triggering the outcome deescalation). The results show that escalation is not necessarily the result of collective belief in the infallibility of a project. Rather, escalation results from continued unsuccessful coping with problems that arise during a project. Furthermore, the results suggest that the seeds of escalation are sown early: the very manner in which a project is framed contributes to whether or not the project will become prone to escalation. As problems ensue, repeated mismatches between attempted remedies and underlying problems contribute to fueling the escalation process. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Escalation: The Role of Problem Recognition and Cognitive Bias

Escalation of commitment to a failing course of action is an enduring problem that remains central to the study of managerial behavior. Prior research suggests that escalation behavior results when decision makers choose to ignore negative feedback concerning the viability of a previously chosen course of action. Previous work has also suggested that certain cognitive biases might promote escalation behavior, but there has been little attempt to explore how biases other than framing affect escalation. In this article, we explore the extent to which decision makers actually perceive negative feedback as indicative of a problem and how this influences their decision to escalate. Although problem recognition and cognitive biases have been intensively studied individually, little is known about their effect on escalation behavior. In this research, we construct and test an escalation decision model that incorporates both problem recognition and two cognitive biases: selective perception and illusion of control. Our results revealed a significant inverse relationship between problem recognition and escalation. Furthermore, selective perception and illusion of control were found to significantly affect both problem recognition and escalation. The implications of these findings for research and practice are discussed. To improve problem recognition and reduce the incidence of escalation, practicing managers should implement modern project management practices that can help to identify and highlight potential problems while guarding against these two key cognitive biases that promote the behavior.     

Comparison of Standard Radiological Risk Models and Using RESRAD to Derive Generic Risk-Based Area Factors for Final Status Surveys

The RESidual RADioactivity (RESRAD) computer code has been used for years to calculate carcinogenic risk and radiological dose from exposure to radionuclides. The basic ingestion, inhalation, and direct gamma intake equations used by RESRAD, Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (RAGS), and the Soil Screening Guidance for Radionuclides (SSG) are similar and can produce similar results, but there are some notable differences. Of particular interest is the fact that RESRAD incorporates sophisticated environmental transport models. Associated environmental parameters allow risk assessors to consider, among other variables, the size (i.e., surface area) of the contaminated zone, a variable not typically addressed quantitatively under the RAGS/SSG paradigm. Considering the similarities between basic RESRAD, RAGS, and SSG intake equations and given the broad acceptance of RESRAD, it stands to reason that RESRAD-derived area factors may be used to supplement RAGS/SSG human health risk calculations. This would allow risk assessors to retrofit existing results or otherwise modify standard RAGS/SSG equations for use in site closeout planning under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM), given a key component of the MARSSIM method is the consideration of small areas of elevated activity or "hot spots" through the use of area factors.