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Greer Alex Binder Sherri Brokopp Thiel Alexis Jamali Mehdi Nejat Ali 《Population and environment》2020,41(3):306-329
Population and Environment - Place attachment has gained considerable attention in disaster studies, though there is little consensus on how to conceptualize or measure this construct in... 相似文献
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Nejat Anbarci 《Theory and Decision》2006,61(1):21-50
We start by considering the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, a real-life arbitration scheme where two parties select an arbitrator
by alternately crossing off at each round one name from a given panel of arbitrators. We find out that the AS scheme is not
invariant to “bad” alternatives. We then consider another alternating-move scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes
(VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. We fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome sets
of these above two schemes in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only. We also identify some of the
typical equilibria of these above two schemes. We then analyze two additional alternating-move schemes in which players’ current
proposals have to either honor or enhance their previous proposals. We show that the first scheme’s equilibrium outcome set
coincides with that of the AS scheme, and the equilibrium outcome set of the second scheme coincides with that of the VAOV
scheme. Finally, it turns out that all schemes’ equilibrium outcome sets converge to the Equal Area solution’s outcome of
cooperative bargaining problem, if the alternatives are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possibility set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. 相似文献
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In the Divide-the-Dollar (DD) game, two players simultaneously make demands to divide a dollar. Each player receives his demand
if the sum of the demands does not exceed one, a payoff of zero otherwise. Note that, in the latter case, both parties are
punished severely. A major setback of DD is that each division of the dollar is a Nash equilibrium outcome. Observe that,
when the sum of the two demands x and y exceeds one, it is as if Player 1's demand x (or his offer (1−x) to Player 2) suggests
that Player 2 agrees to λx < 1 times his demand y so that Player 1's demand and Player 2's modified demand add up to exactly one; similarly, Player
2's demand y (or his offer (1−y) to Player 1) suggests that Player 1 agrees to λyx so that λyx+y = 1. Considering this fact, we change DD's payoff assignment rule when the sum of the demands exceeds one; here in this
case, each player's payoff becomes his demand times his λ; i.e., each player has to make the sacrifice that he asks his opponent
to make. We show that this modified version of DD has an iterated strict dominant strategy equilibrium in which each player
makes the egalitarian demand 1/2. We also provide a natural N-person generalization of this procedure.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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In this study we introduce two new properties, the Midpoint Outcome on a Linear Frontier (MOLF) and Balanced Focal Point (BFP) properties, to replace the Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Symmetry (SYM) and Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations (IEUR) properties in the axiomatic characterizations of the two most prominent solution concepts, namely the Nash and Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions, respectively. 相似文献
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We propose a new axiom, weakest collective rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both weak Pareto optimality (WPO) in Nash’s
(Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) original characterization and strong individual rationality (SIR) in Roth’s (Math Oper Res
2:64–65, 1977) characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by symmetry (SYM),
scale invariance (SI), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and our weakest collective rationality (WCR) axiom. 相似文献
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Suppes-Sen dominance or SS-proofness (SSP) is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (Review of Economic Studies, 66, 733–741, 1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash’s (Econometrica, 18, 155–162, 1950) scale invariance (SI) axiom and SSP. In this article, we introduce equity dominance (E-dominance). Using the intersection of SS-dominance and E-dominance requirements, we obtain a weaker version of SSP (WSSP). In addition, we consider α ? SSP, where α measures the degree of minimum acceptable inequity aversion; α ? SSP is weaker than weak Pareto optimality (WPO) when α = 1. We then show that it is still possible to characterize the Nash solution using WSSP and SI only or using α -SSP, SI, and individual rationality (IR) only for any \({\alpha \in [0,1)}\). Using the union of SS-dominance and E-dominance requirements, we obtain a stronger version of SSP (SSSP). It turns out that there is no bargaining solution that satisfies SSSP and SI, but the Egalitarian solution turns out to be the unique solution satisfying SSSP. 相似文献
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