Behavioral responses of rural and urban greater white-toothed shrews (Crocidura russula) to sound disturbance

Urban Ecosystems - The development of urban areas imposes challenges that wildlife must adapt to in order to persist in these new habitats. One of the greatest changes brought by urbanization has...     

Determinants and Consequences of Social Trust*

This article provides an overview of social trust, examining its various aspects and components. Trust is best understood in a sociological sense by focusing on its important relational characteristic. Following this lead, the article discusses briefly how social trust relates to social capital and examines factors that shape the development of social trust, along with outcomes related to variations in trust, classifying them by analytical level (i.e., individual, community, group, organizational, and societal). The article concludes by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of existing research and by identifying some important questions that have not yet been adequately addressed.     

Maximum Likelihood Inference for Log-linear Models Subject to Constraints of Double Monotone Dependence

To model an hypothesis of double monotone dependence between two ordinal categorical variables A and B usually a set of symmetric odds ratios defined on the joint probability function is subject to linear inequality constraints. Conversely in this paper two sets of asymmetric odds ratios defined, respectively, on the conditional distributions of A given B and on the conditional distributions of B given A are subject to linear inequality constraints. If the joint probabilities are parameterized by a saturated log-linear model, these constraints are nonlinear inequality constraints on the log-linear parameters. The problem here considered is a non-standard one both for the presence of nonlinear inequality constraints and for the fact that the number of these constraints is greater than the number of the parameters of the saturated log-linear model.This work has been supported by the COFIN 2002 project, references 2002133957_002, 2002133957_004. Preliminary findings have been presented at SIS (Società Italiana di Statistica) Annual Meeting, Bari, 2004.     

Workgroup interdependence and satisfaction from a developmental perspective: the moderating role of the group’s life cycle stage / Interdependencia y satisfacción en el grupo de trabajo desde la perspectiva del desarrollo: el rol moderador de la fase del ciclo de vida grupal

From a developmental perspective, workgroups adjust and modify the way they function over time. The present study aims to test, at the group level, the moderating role of the group’s life phase in the relationship between workgroup interdependence ties in terms of task, outcome and functions, assessed by social network density and group satisfaction. A sample of 84 teams from various companies participated in this research. The results showed that the group’s development phase determines the way that outcome interdependence density in teams is associated with satisfaction and reveal the existence of differences between the second and fourth development stages. Therefore, the group’s life cycle stage should be considered as a relevant variable in research and intervention with groups in the workplace.     

Are there electoral cycles of emigration? An empirical investigation based on European data

Economic literature suggests that economic factors and the availability of amenities act as determinants of migration choices together with socio‐demographic factors. Migration has also been found to be the consequence of political instability. This article argues that specific political events, i.e., democratic elections, may be linked to migration flows. By using European data over the 1999‐2012 time period, our system GMM estimations reveal that there is an emigration political cycle across European democracies and across the young democracies of Central and Eastern European countries. We observe that regular elections tend to diminish emigration ratios, whereas endogenous elections have the opposite effect. These results suggest special challenges for governments and oppositions, which are also discussed.     

Demand for contract enforcement in a barter environment

Do greater potential gains from trade enhance or erode contracting institutions? In an anonymous exchange environment traders can sign a contract, hence agreeing to interact with the assigned partner, or wait till the next match. Any contract can be endorsed (for a payment) by the enforcement agency, which then observes the interaction with a positive probability known to the traders and punishes any detected infractors. Demand for contract enforcement is the highest amount a proposer of a contract is ready to pay to the agency, in a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. It may be strictly positive, as we show, even when contracts are broken. Surprisingly, larger potential gains from exchange may dampen the demand, but not always: the demand is boosted under agencies that oversee the interactions frequently.     

A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats

This paper concerns the two‐stage game introduced in Nash (1953). It formalizes a suggestion made (but not pursued) by Nash regarding equilibrium selection in that game, and hence offers an arguably more solid foundation for the “Nash bargaining with endogenous threats” solution. Analogous reasoning is then applied to an infinite horizon game to provide equilibrium selection in two‐person repeated games with contracts. In this setting, issues about enforcement of threats are much less problematic than in Nash's static setting. The analysis can be extended to stochastic games with contracts.