Aggregating Political Dimensions: Of the Feasibility of Political Indicators

Political indicators are widely used in academic writing and decision making, but remain controversial. This paper discusses the problems related to the aggregation functions they use. Almost always, political indicators are aggregated by weighted averages or summations. The use of such functions is based on untenable assumptions (existence of homogeneous substitution rates, total compensation, and strict monotonicity). We show through concrete examples how these hidden assumptions are likely to produce results that are basically an artifact of ad hoc decisions, which additionally contradict very fundamental notions common to all credible political theories. We suggest, also through example, that some—necessarily partial—solutions are possible.     

On the relation between impulses to help and causes of neediness: An experimental study

A novel two-person “charity game”, related to the “Samaritan’s Dilemma” [Buchanan, J.M., 1975. The samaritan’s dilemma. In: Phelps, E.S. (Ed.), Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory. Russel Sage Foundation, New York, pp. 71–85], is used to experimentally investigate the relation between helpers’ behavior and poor recipients’ reaction to aid. We distinguish two treatments differing in whether the causes of neediness are verifiable or not. Helping behavior does not vary significantly between treatments, but is positively correlated with dictator giving, suggesting idiosyncratic attitudes to help. Needy subjects are unaffected by anticipated help, but react optimally to chance.