Reasoning With Partial Knowledge

We investigate how sociological argumentation differs from classical first–order logic. We focus on theories about age dependence of organizational mortality. The overall pattern of argument does not comply with the classical monotonicity principle: Adding premises overturns conclusions in an argument. The cause of nonmonotonicity is the need to derive conclusions from partial knowledge. We identify metaprinciples that appear to guide the observed sociological argumentation patterns, and we formalize a semantics to represent them. This semantics yields a new kind of logical consequence relation. We demonstrate that this new logic can reproduce the results of informal sociological theorizing and lead to new insights. It allows us to unify existing theory fragments, and it paves the way toward a complete classical theory.     

Academic economists behaving badly? A survey on three areas of unethical behavior

This article measures the degree to which academic economists have engaged in unethical behavior and the degree to which academic economists believe the profession as a whole engages in unethical behavior. Three main types of unethical behavior are examined: (1) falsification of research; (2) expropriation of graduate student research or including an undeserving co-author on a research paper; and (3) exchange of grades for gifts, money, or sex. Using a unique data set gathered at the 1998 American Economic Association (AEA) meetings, we find that there is a significant amount of misconduct, particularly in the second category.     

Social networks and support in social work

Following the recommendations of the Barclay Report for a move on the part of social work towards supporting helping networks in the community, it is necessary to look more closely at the components of ‘social support’ and to be clearer about which social networks social workers are being asked to support. It is suggested that sociology, although criticised for its remoteness from the daily experience of the social worker, could offer through social network analysis some useful measures of the support networks of social work clients.     

A Monte Carlo study of alternative responses to intraclass correlation in community trials. Is it ever possible to avoid Cornfield's penalties?

Strategies to avoid the penalties of extra variation and reduced degrees of freedom in community trials were compared in Monte Carlo simulations. Three conditions were found necessary to ensure nominal Type I and II error rates: (a) Condition variation must be assessed against assignment unit variation, (b) the critical value for the test statistic must be based on the assignment unit degrees of freedom, and (c) estimation of negative intraclass correlations must be allowed in the analysis. Using other test statistics and other degrees of freedom, and fixing negative intraclass correlations at zero often gave Type I and II error rates far from their nominal levels.     

Chivalry and solidarity in ultimatum games

We report the results of ultimatum game experiments designed to test for differences in the behavior of women and men. Women's proposals are on average more generous than men's, regardless of the sex of the partner, and women respondents are more likely to accept an offer of a given amount. A given offer is more likely to be accepted if it comes from a woman; we term this result chivalry . Women paired with women almost never fail to reach an agreement; we term this result solidarity . Age, earnings, and race also significantly affect proposals and the rates of rejection.     

A SIMULATION OF THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE RULE SYSTEMS FOR JAI ALAI*

The inequities of the present system of rules in jai alai are documented on the basis of empirical information and theoretical results from a Monte Carlo simulation model. Some suggestions are made for changing the rules in order to make the game more equitable for both players and bettors. The simulation model is used to compare the effectiveness of the suggested rules with that of the present rules.     

薪酬外部公平性与高管过度在职消费行为后果分析——基于内部薪酬差距的调节作用

基于行为经济学视角分析了高管过度在职消费成因,并以中国沪深A股上市公司2012-2017年数据为样本,实证检验了薪酬外部公平性对高管过度在职消费行为后果的影响以及内部薪酬差距的调节作用.研究发现:薪酬外部劣势不公平会诱发高管过度在职消费,并削弱在职消费"效率观"表现,而内部薪酬差距可以抑制上述影响.在薪酬外部优势不公平状态下,优势不公平程度对高管过度在职消费和在职消费经济效应无显著影响,内部薪酬差距反会诱发高管过度在职消费,削弱在职消费"效率观"表现.