Modeling Multisite Activity from Occupational Surveys: Deducing the Number of Anesthesiologists from a Count of Anesthesiology Posts in France

Reliable data on the total number of physicians practicing in France cannot be obtained from national professional or administrative files which are not kept to date. From a public health standpoint, the total number of physicians' posts in establishments matters more than the actual total number of physicians, although the latter is necessary for demographic projections and to determine training needs. Shared work in the same post is sometimes encouraged to avoid closure of the post or even of the establishment. The relationship between the total number of posts in an occupation and the total number of individuals working in those posts depend on the duration of a reference period for the enumeration. An original model of this relationship is developed and applied to a count of anesthesiology posts in France with different values of the reference period. Instead of the usual question “How many anesthesiologists are currently working in your hospital?” the model suggests that the right question is “How many anesthesiologists have been working in your institute since the last 2.5 weeks?”. The total number of anesthesia and intensive care practitioners estimated by the model is 8,992 which is lower than the direct count of 9,741 posts.     

‘Cukup for me to be successful in this country’: ‘staying’ among left‐behind young women in Indonesia's migrant‐sending villages

By examining the aspirations of young, rural Indonesian women who, unlike their parents, want to stay behind rather than migrate for work, we look at how these women's experiences of feeling left‐behind affect their quests for alternative futures. Using a household relational lens, we employ the mediating concept of enough (cukup) to analyse the aspirations of young women wishing to remain at home. By focusing on their commitment to inter‐generational continuity and care rather than a lack of choice, we are able to offset the discourses associated with the culture of migration and its accompanying remittance euphoria. Our findings showed three main reasons for their choice. First, these young women pursue remittance‐funded higher education as a counter to parental sacrifice. Second, staying allows them both to provide the hands‐on care they themselves were denied as children and to pursue meaningful local careers. Third, the idea that migration has been ‘enough’ is a rational response to the social risks with which migration confronts a family.     

CENTRALIZED OR DECENTRALIZED INFORMATION: WHICH IS BETTER FOR PROVIDING INCENTIVES?

A risk‐neutral ruler must invest in improving the quality of his country's infrastructures. Higher quality infrastructures increase the profitability of capital investment by foreign entrepreneurs. The ruler wishes to maximize the amount of capital investment that flows into the country. Before selecting their investment, entrepreneurs receive a signal on the quality of infrastructures. We consider two cases. First, all entrepreneurs observe the same signal (centralized information). Second, each entrepreneur receives an independently drawn signal (decentralized information). We compare the effectiveness of these two scenarios for incentivizing the ruler. We find remarkably clear‐cut results. When the entrepreneurs’ investments are strategic complements, centralized information does a better job in incentivizing the ruler. The opposite holds when investments are strategic substitutes. This may help understand the role of media, rating agencies, public announcements, and ambiguity. (JEL D82, D62)