Die politisierte Sozialstruktur als mittelfristig stabile Basis einer deutschen Normalwahl

A normal vote is a hypothetical election result following exclusively from predispositions of voters towards political parties which result from long-term or middle-term influences. The influence of short-term factors like attractive candidates or issues from the recent campaign have to be eliminated within the abstract model. As an operationalization for German Bundestag elections for this purpose the average vote intentions of population groups are used which are part of the politicized German social structures such as catholics, especially when they attend church frequently, or employees (Arbeitnehmer) and union members who have formed enduring coalitions with a political party. This operationalization is compared with a model originally developed for the United States. According to this model, the long-term factor is measured by party identification. All Bundestag elections of the Kohl era are analyzed, for which the Politbarometer surveys of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim, immediately before the Bundestag elections are used as a data basis. The vote intentions which can be derived from the politicized social structure are shown to be a stabile basis for a German normal vote so that it makes sense to compute normal vote results from 1983 to 1998.     

朝鲜洪大容《乾净会友录》与清代文人

燕行录是研究前近代中韩关系的重要史料,其中18世纪朝鲜文人洪大容所著《乾净笔谭》的价值尤为贵重。洪大容于1765年随朝鲜使节团来到北京,与数名中国文人进行笔谈,回国后将这一经历写成《乾净衕会友录》,两年之后改编为《乾净笔谭》,主要内容均为笔谈记录。前后两个版本之间进行的删改修订,反映出当时两国文人在不同的大环境下有着政治、学术、女性观等认知上的差异。     

Major arms imports and the onset of civil and ethnic wars in the postcolonial world, 1956–1998: A preliminary reassessment

This study examines the effects of states’ major arms imports from major powers on the likelihood of civil and ethnic wars in the postcolonial world. Focusing on civil and ethnic wars, respectively, in postcolonial states from 1956 through 1998, this investigation reveals that major arms imports from major powers have no statistically significant effect on either civil or ethnic war onset, considering political, economic, demographic, and geographic factors. The results also demonstrate that there are some different causal mechanisms between the onset of civil and ethnic wars. Finally, this article discusses policy implications and suggests some directions of the further research.     

Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided.     

Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited

This paper aims to reexamine the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of social choice. A generalized notion of independence is introduced to clarify an informational requirement of binary independence which is usually imposed in the Arrovian framework. We characterize the implication of binary independence.     

Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications.     

Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems

Since Kenneth Arrow showed the general possibility theorem, a number of social choice theorists have provided alternative proofs of it. In a recent article, Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 26:211–215, 2005) has constructed a new proof of the theorem. The present article provides alternative proofs of various Arrovian impossibility results from the 1960s to the 1970s by utilizing Geanakoplos’s method. We prove semi-order impossibility theorems, the quasi-transitive veto theorem, the quasi-transitive dictatorship theorem, the triple acyclic veto theorem, and the impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle.