Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining

Rubinstein (1982) considered the problem of dividing a given surplus between two players sequentially, and then proposed a model in which the two players alternately make and respond to each other's offers through time. He further characterized the perfect equilibrium outcomes, which depend on the players time preferences and order of moves. Using both equal and unequal bargaining cost conditions and an unlimited number of rounds, two experiments were designed to compare the perfect equilibrium model to alternative models based on norms of fairness. We report analyses of final agreements, first offers, and number of bargaining rounds, which provide limited support to the perfect equilibrium model, and then conclude by recommending a shift in focus from model testing to specification of the conditions favoring one model over another.     

Expected frequency and mean size of the paradox of new members

The paradox of new members occurs when the addition of one or more new members to a weighted voting body increases, rather than decreases, the voting power of some of the old members. Extending the computational work of Brams and Affuso (1976), the mean size of the paradox and the relative frequency of its occurrence are presented for small and moderate-size weighted voting bodies. Computational results are presented and conclusions are drawn for the two power indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf, three different decision rules, and voting bodies with or without dictator. Although the paradox cannot be dismissed as either contrived or improbable, its mean size in moderatesize voting bodies is sufficiently small to question its practical significance.     

Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values

Summary and Conclusion The present paper addresses the problem of comparison of models ofpayoff disbursement in coalition formation studies which make point,line, or area predictions. A satisfactory solution to this problem is criticalfor model comparison, which has been the major focus of research oncoalition forming behavior during the last decade. The goal of this paperis to devise and subsequently apply a test procedure which, in comparingthe models to each other, offsets the advantage that the less specific modelhas over its competitor. In addition, the test procedure should employmeasures of error which yield intuitive results and are consistent with theprinciples underlying present coalition theories.It was contented that both the error measure of Bonacich and the netrate of success of Selten and Krishker suffer from serious deficiencies.Bonacich's approach allows for degrees of confirmation of a model butemploys an index of error which yields counterintuitive results. Theapproach of Seken and Krischker also defies intuition and commonpractice by treating all payoff vectors that do not fall in the model'sprediction set in exactly the same manner. The test procedure proposedin the present paper allows the prediction set of a model to expanduniformly in all the directions (dimensions) of the outcome space untilit encompasses all the observed payoff vectors which lie in this space. Indoing so it generates a function, called a support function, which relatesthe cumulative proportion of observed payoff vectors within the expand-ed set of predictions against the relative size of this set. By comparing toeach other the cumulative proportions for two different models when therelative sizes of their expanded predictions sets are held equal, theprocedure offsets the advantage possessed by the less specific modelwhich initially prescribes a larger or more dispersed prediction set.Like the index of error E devised by Bonacich, the procedure proposedin the present paper incorporates the intuitive idea that differentoutcomes diffentially confirm a theory if they are not contained in itsprediction set. Error is allowed to be continuous even if the theory underconsideration is algebraic. Statistical tests of algebraic theories in otherareas of psychology are almost always based on this assumption. Theprocedure also incorporates the shortest rather than the mean squareddistance between a payoff vector and a set of predicted payoff vectorsas the appropriate measure of error. The shortest distance is appropriatebecause coalition theories are mute with respect to the degree of importance, representativeness, of 'typicality' of the predictions they make.The procedure seems to yield satisfactory results. When applied to thetwo studies by Rapoport and Kahan (1976) and Kahan and Rapoport(1980) it has not favored models making line predictions over modelsmaking point predictions. It has established either strong or weak domi-nance relations between all pairs of models tested in these two studies.And it has confirmed the major conclusions of the two studies, which hadbeen originally reached by less rigourous tests of a smaller number ofmodels.     

Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown

We examine bargaining behavior in a noncooperative game in which players alternate in making and responding to proposals over the division of a given surplus. Although the number of bargaining periods is unlimited and time is not discounted, the bargaining is subject to exogenous breakdown at each period with a fixed probability which is common knowledge. We manipulate three probabilities of break-down in a between-subjects design that allows comparison with previous studies of two-person bargaining with time discounting. Assuming that subjects maximize expected utility, and this utility is measured by monetary payoffs, our results reject both the subgame perfect equilibrium and equal split solutions. Data analyses reveal that a substantial percentage of subjects behave adaptively in that they systematically search for the highest acceptable demands.     

Corporate Social Responsibility: A Complementary Perspective of Community and Corporate Leaders

Research studies on Corporate Social Responsibility (CRS) often focus on revealing corporate leaders’ attitudes toward various issues of CSR. The position of the present paper is that to understand CSR, we must grasp the collaborative perspective of CSR, and discern the attitudes of community leaders as well as corporate leaders. To this end, the study compares attitudes of community leaders with those of corporate leaders in three localities in Israel. The study examines various issues of CSR, highlighting the benefits to both community and corporation of reciprocal relations. Results from t‐tests confirmed significant differences between the groups. Some important implications for CSR particularly in terms of collaboration between community and corporation are discussed.     

A theory of happiness-wealth relationship with status-sensitive communication

Personal happiness might not solely depend on the individual's level of wealth but also on the individual's level of sincere social capital. This paper argues that if sincere interpersonal communication is sensitive to economic status disparities, the accumulation of personal wealth beyond the community's average erodes the individual's sincere social capital. A measure of sincere social capital that is based on such sensitivity is constructed. Its consideration leads to the depiction of the individual's happiness-wealth relationship as an inverted U-shaped curve that peaks at personal wealth that is greater than the community mean.     

How Using a Marketing Approach Helps Social Work Students to Develop Community Projects Successfully

With only one academic year in which to develop a communityproject, social work students can hardly gain the experiencethey need in this field, while providing their clients witha suitable service. The present study investigates the relationshipbetween implementation of the marketing approach and the successfulexecution of a community project. Four aspects of this issueare probed: adherence to the programme implementation plan,the programme’s effectiveness, its contribution to theorganization it is intended to serve, and client empowerment.Participants were 146 social work students at a university inIsrael; the findings show a statistically significant connectionbetween the market variables and each of the project’ssuccess variables. On the multivariable level, all the successvariables proved to be clearly influenced by different marketvariables. The application of a marketing approach by socialwork students undergoing their training in community practiceis discussed.     

An integrative spatial capital-based model for strategic local planning – An Israeli case

This paper presents an integrative model for strategic local planning based on the concept of spatial capital. The model bridges the gap between vision and reality by stimulating actions that are directed at mitigating challenges to the vision. The model uses the concept of ‘spatial capital,’ which is based on the accumulated assets and capabilities of a region. In addition, ‘development engines,’ which are alternative macrostrategies designed to help achieve the major goals set by the plan’s vision, are offered for use by the model. The developed model aims to achieve a better integration of the region’s overall capital resources.     

On forming variable set composites to summarize a block recursive model

A method, described by Coleman, for forming composite variables and estimating effects in block recursive models is explicated. It is shown that two sets of estimates need to be distinguished. Coleman's approach utilizes a mixture of the two sets and is useful for a specific application. For more general purposes one set of estimates is preferred to the other; empirical examples are given.     

A network ridesharing experiment with sequential choice of transportation mode

Within the last decade, there has been a dramatic bloom in ridesharing businesses along with the emergence of new enabling technologies. A central issue in ridesharing, which is also important in the general domain of cost-sharing in economics and computer science, is that the sharing of cost implies positive externalities and hence coordination problems for the network users. We investigate these problems experimentally in the present study. In particular, we focus on how sequential observability of transportation mode choices can be a powerful facilitator of coordination in ridesharing. Our study abstracts the essential issues of coordination in ridesharing into a directed network game with experimentally testable predictions. In line with the theoretical analysis, our experimental evidence shows that even a limited extent of sequential choice observability might lead to efficient coordination. However, convergence to efficiency is slower with more limited observability, resulting in a significant increase in travel cost.