Academic economists behaving badly? A survey on three areas of unethical behavior

This article measures the degree to which academic economists have engaged in unethical behavior and the degree to which academic economists believe the profession as a whole engages in unethical behavior. Three main types of unethical behavior are examined: (1) falsification of research; (2) expropriation of graduate student research or including an undeserving co-author on a research paper; and (3) exchange of grades for gifts, money, or sex. Using a unique data set gathered at the 1998 American Economic Association (AEA) meetings, we find that there is a significant amount of misconduct, particularly in the second category.     

Detecting the number of components in a finite mixture having normal components

A procedure is described which detects the number of components in a mixture distribution having normal components. The test is based on the behavior of the sample order statistics near the center of the distribution. Numerical results are presented and comparisons with tests proposed by Shapiro and Francia (1972) and Baker (1958) are provided.     

On a criterion for evaluating an estimator

A criterion for evaluating an estimator of the mean μ of a population is studied. The criterion considered is that the estimator be within a units of μ a large percentage (say, (1-β) 100%) of the time. This is referred to as the α -β criterion for estimating μ. A variation of this criterion is also studied.     

Team effects on compensation: an application to salary determination in the National Hockey League

Studies of salary determination largely model pay as a function of the attributes of the individual and the workplace (i.e., employer size, job characteristics, and so forth). This article empirically investigates an additional factor that may influence individual pay, specifically coworker productivity. Data from professional sports are used to evaluate this question because both salary and teammate performance measures are readily available. We find that team attributes have both direct effects on an individual's pay, and indirect effects through altering the rates at which individual player productive characteristics are valued.