中国家用轿车初购者与再购者的决策过程差异研究

中国的家用轿车市场正在从以初购者为主的新兴市场向以初购、再购者并重的成熟市场转变.再购者与初购者的购车决策过程存在系统性差异.本研究探索了中国家用轿车初购者与再购者在属性感知一价值判断一态度形成一行为意向这一决策过程的差别.我们通过对北京4802名有购车意向的消费者(2182名初购者与2620名再购者)的调查,发现初购者与再购者在以下四方面存在显著差异:(1)在属性方面,初购者更重视品牌声誉这一外在属性,而再购者更重视汽车的内在属性(内外设计、做工及驾驶性能);(2)在价值方面,初购者更在意车辆的情感价值,而再购者更追求功能价值;(3)在行为方面,初购者更易受周围社会群体的影响,而再购者更听从内心态度的主宰;(4)在购买方面,虽然初购者与再购者都更倾向于购买高销量品牌,但相对于初购者,再购者能更多地尝试低销量品牌.     

Strategic goals and design drivers of the supplier portal: lessons from the Ferrari case

The purpose of this work is to identify the main design drivers of a supplier portal and to verify the relationships between these drivers and the strategic goals of such portals. Through the analysis of an empirical case, three different design drivers have been identified, called penetration, breadth, and depth. Moreover, a relationship has been found out between strategic goals and the identified design drivers. This relationship, based on the evidences of a currently successful field experience, can provide a framework to support the design of a supplier portal.     

略论买方市场与经济增长

我国近年来告别短缺经济,进入买方市场,标志着我国经济运行已经进入一个新阶段。但是,我们的买方市场远远不同于发达国家的买方市场,有着它自身的特征。因此,我们要在宏观调控上采取相应的举措,以便在买方市场条件下更好地促进我国经济增长。     

论委托拍卖合同的法律特性

论述了委托拍卖合同的法律性质,即它是双方法律行为、双务合同、有偿合同、诺成合同、有名合同、非计划合同、法定要式合同、必须遵循有关法定原则的合同以及委托拍卖合同的法律特性,即合同法律关系和法律性质的特殊性、合同主体的特殊性、合同客体的特殊性以及合同内容的特殊性.     

Group Buying,Buyer Heterogeneity,and Sellers' Bargaining Power*

Group buying enables collective bargaining opportunity that individual buyers lack to negotiate prices with sellers. This potential negotiation capability has two opposing effects. On the one hand, the prospect of the group being able to negotiate price with its rival forces each seller to lower its price offer, as too high a price will induce the group to give its rival an opportunity to undercut its price via negotiation, likely taking away all the buyers. On the other hand, the potential negotiation opportunity may also discourage sellers from competing aggressively in their price offers, as the benefit of charging a low price could be offset by competitors in negotiation, thus yielding overall higher prices for the buyers. In this study, we find that compared to individual purchase, buyers benefit from collective bargaining opportunity by group buying only if sellers’ bargaining power relative to the buyer group is low and/or buyers’ preferences toward the sellers are sufficiently differentiated. Given buyers’ strategic choice of group purchase, sellers may be worse off with a further increase in bargaining power, and so may social welfare.