Formal governance,interfirm coordination,and performance in partnerships: An empirical investigation of a mediation model

This study investigates the extent to which formal governance mechanisms such as contracts and equity ownership affect interfirm coordination and partnership performance. We analysed data from a survey of 301 Korean firms to show that interfirm coordination partially mediates the relationship between contract completeness, defined as the extent to which a contract specifies task operations and contingencies, and partnership performance. Furthermore, we find that more complete contracts can attenuate the negative effects of equity ownership on coordination, and that this effect is particularly strong when partner tasks are interdependent and relational norms are weak.     

转型期实现内外均衡的政策搭配研究

中国在入世后的10年左右 ,正处于转型经济中。应该通过调节社会总需求、社会总供给等政策工具 ,实现合理搭配 ,以达到中国宏观经济的内外均衡     

企业家思辨

本文对不同学派的企业家观进行了分析 ,从管理学角度出发指出对企业家的分析应从企业 (企业维度 )、企业发展 (时间维度 )、企业家能力与企业发展的要求相匹配三个维度进行 ,只有那些具备与企业发展阶段相适应领导能力与管理能力的人才堪称企业家。     

Inventory and transshipment decisions in the rationing game under capacity uncertainty

In this paper, we consider the inventory decisions of two retailers who are supplied by a single supplier with uncertain capacity. When capacity is allocated in proportion to the retailers׳ orders, the retailers compete for the capacity by inflating their orders (i.e., the rationing game). In addition, we allow the retailers to implement transshipment between them such that they cooperate by transshipping the surplus stock of one to another who is out of stock. Our analysis of Nash equilibrium orders shows that, while order inflation in the equilibrium orders persists in the rationing game with transshipment, it may not occur if the amount of capacity shortage is small and the transshipment prices are low. Thus, carefully chosen transshipment prices may alleviate order inflation behavior. We also characterize centralized orders that maximize the total profit of the retailers and compare them to equilibrium orders. In particular, we investigate coordinating transshipment prices that induce the retailers to choose centralized orders. Our numerical analysis shows that, even for two identical retailers, coordinating transshipment prices exist in a more limited range of parameter values in the rationing game than they do outside the rationing game due to capacity uncertainty and limitation.     

Linking Electronic Medical Records Use to Physicians’ Performance: A Contextual Analysis

Electronic Medical Records (EMR) studies have broadly tested EMR use and outcomes, producing mixed and inconclusive results. This study carefully considers the healthcare delivery context and examines relevant mediating variables. We consider key characteristics of: (i) interdependence in healthcare delivery processes, (ii) physician autonomy, and (iii) the trend of hospital employment of physicians, and draw on theoretical perspectives in coordination, shared values, and agency to explain how the use of EMR can improve physicians’ performance. In order to examine the effects of physician employment on work practices in the hospital, we collected 583 data points from 302 hospitals in 47 states in the USA to test two models: one for employed and another for nonemployed physicians. Results show that information sharing and shared values among healthcare delivery professionals fully mediate the relationship between EMR use and physicians’ performance. Next, physician employment determines which mediating variable constitutes the pathway from EMR use to physicians’ performance. Finally, we highlight the impact of shared values between the hospital and physicians in enhancing information sharing and physicians’ performance, extending studies of these behaviors among network partners in industrial settings. Overall, our study shows that EMR use should be complemented by processual (information sharing), social (shared values), and structural (physician employment) mechanisms to yield positive effects on physicians’ performance.     

治理机制、行业聚集与国有工业部门绩效变动模式

1978年以来,中国国有企业的绩效呈现出U型变动模式.1992年前,在卖方市场和短缺经济的条件下,国有企业的生产率提高而利润率却大幅下降.其中的症结在于以内部人控制、软预算约束和行政干预为特征的治理机制.1992年后国有企业的绩效在谷底徘徊,并从1998年开始大幅上升.在市场竞争加剧和治理机制没有实质性改变的情况下,国有资本向高利润行业的聚集和对民间资本的进入限制是国有企业绩效整体改善的关键.当前依然应当把国有企业改革作为经济体制改革的中心环节,改革的取向是深化垄断行业改革和从战略上调整国有经济布局.     

上海市人口老龄化：现状、影响及对策思考

人口老龄化已成为当今世界各国经济发展过程面临的共同性话题,就上海而言．未来上海市人口老龄化带来的影响已逐渐凸显,人口老龄化带来的养老金匮乏,劳动力不足以及社区为老服务发展滞后的矛盾已开始成为制约上海市经济发展的瓶颈,老龄化带来的影响将在未来很长一段时间内长期存在．缓解人口老龄化带来的影响以及寻求可行性办法解决老龄化人口的赡养问题已成为政府和社会必须要解决的问题。     

集群剩余与企业集群内部协调机制

企业集群内部协调既不同于市场上价格机制的无形之手,又不同于企业内部行政命令的有形之手。本文分析指出,集群内部协调的目标在于追求集群剩余,并根据企业行为的规律性对集群剩余进行了分析;介绍集群内部的各种协调机制,在此基础上,分析协调机制与集群剩余实现之间的关联。     

Bargaining within the Supply Chain and Its Implications in an Industry

Our main objective is to investigate the influence of the bargaining power within a chain on its industry. As a building block, we first discuss the implications of bargaining within a single chain by considering an asymmetric Nash bargaining over the wholesale price (BW). We show that both Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) and vertical integration (VI) strategies are special cases of the BW contract. We then develop the Nash equilibrium in an industry with two supply chains that use BW. We identify the profit‐maximizing (coordinating) bargaining power within this industry. We show that when a chain is not monopolistic, VI does not coordinate the chain and that the MS contract, where the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, is coordinating when competition is intense. We find that the main determinant of the equilibrium in mature industries is to respond well to the actions of the competing chain rather than to directly maximize the profit of each chain. That is, the equilibrium does not necessarily maximize the profit of the entire industry. While a coordination of the industry could then increase the profitability of both chains, such a coordination is likely against antitrust law. Moreover, if one chain cannot change its actions, the other chain may unilaterally improve its profitability by deviating from the equilibrium. Our results lead to several predictions supported by empirical findings, such as that in competitive industries chains will work “close to” the MS contract.     

Joint Beliefs in Conflictual Coordination Games

The traditional solution concept for noncooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium, which contains an implicit assumption that players probability distributions satisfy t probabilistic independence. However, in games with more than two players, relaxing this assumption results in a more general equilibrium concept based on joint beliefs (Vanderschraaf, 1995). This article explores the implications of this joint-beliefs equilibrium concept for two kinds of conflictual coordination games: crisis bargaining and public goods provision. We find that, using updating consistent with Bayes rule, players beliefs converge to equilibria in joint beliefs which do not satisfy probabilistic independence. In addition, joint beliefs greatly expand the set of mixed equilibria. On the face of it, allowing for joint beliefs might be expected to increase the prospects for coordination. However, we show that if players use joint beliefs, which may be more likely as the number of players increases, then the prospects for coordination in these games declines vis-à-vis independent beliefs.