The Effects of Diversity on Small Work Group Processes and Performance

Diversity is an increasingly important factor inorganizational life as organizations worldwide becomemore diverse in terms of the gender, race, ethnicity,age, national origin, and other personal characteristics of their members. The exact impact ofwithin-group diversity on small group processes andperformance is unclear. Sometimes the effect ofdiversity seems positive, at other times negative, andin other situations, there seems to be no effect at all.In this article, we suggest that these types of findingsmight be explained by using agroup-development model to examine theimpact of diversity on group processes and performance. Our modeluses concepts from Jackson et al.'s (1995), Milliken andMartins' (1996), and other models, as well as our ownconcepts, to show how diversity affects group development and performance. Among the conceptsincluded in the model are readily detectable personalattributes, underlying personal attributes, cognitiveparadigm dissimilarity, cognitive costs and rewards, diversity management skills, group behavioralintegration, and cognitive performance resources. In thepages that follow, we will explain each of thecomponents of the model and suggest specific hypotheses generated from the model.     

A Case Against Making the Control of Clients a Negotiable Contingency for Interdisciplinary Teams

Most discussions of interdisciplinary teamsassume that cross-functional teams are desirable.Critical analyses of the fundamental contradictionsinherent in bringing together professionals with diverse ideologies, interests, contingencies, andtechnologies are rare. Even less common are discussionsof the negative consequences of these contradictions forclients. Based on observations in an institution for youth-in-trouble, this paper argues thatthe control of clients is one key process underlyingconflicts and dilemmas in interdisciplinary teams; itbuilds a case against making the control of clients a negotiable contingency for teams. Given theuniversal nature of control mechanisms, those mostdirectly responsible for control have a superiorbargaining position because, in order to be effective,their control routines must be consistent. Althoughthese workers may yield to other treatment ideologiesregarding particular clients, the overall outcome is theenhancement of their interests. Moreover, the outcome of negotiations may generate confusionfor clients because of inconsistencies in theapplication of control mechanisms. Three strategies tominimize interprofessional negotiations regarding the control of clients are discussed: theformulation of clear boundaries between thoseresponsible for control and those who are not; theestablishment of policies to address conflicts betweencontrol and competing treatments; and, client determinationof differential levels of interprofessional coordinationand cooperation.     

A MODEL FOR SWITCHING DISPATCHING RULES IN REAL TIME IN A FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING CELL

We model choice of dispatching rules in real time (system state dependent) as a pattern recognition problem, using a modified version of Data Envelopment Analysis. A data base of system state and performance values is created from extensive simulation, and this data base is used to train the pattern-recognition model. Our results show that the model is very effective in choosing a mix of dispatching rules over a period of time, varying the mix with system objectives, and performing better than the strategy of using fixed rules. We show how “If-Then” decision rules can be created from the model and portrayed in a decision-tree-like diagram. Since such decision rules are based on rigorous mathematical foundations, optimization will be ensured in our approach.     

Influence at Work: A 25-Year Program of Research

Organization of any kind, from prehistorichunting societies to companies working through theworldwide web, operate with a distribution of influenceand power among their members. This distribution of influence has consequences at three levels: forthe people working in the organization, for theorganization itself, and, from time to time, for membersof society outside the organization. A series of action- and policy-oriented projects on thedistribution of influence were developed by or incollaboration with the Centre for Decision MakingStudies of The Tavistock Institute over a quarter of acentury. They started with a seven-country comparativeresearch on top management decision making, followed bytwo 12-country studies on Industrial Democracy and a5-year longitudinal program in seven companies in three countries. These and two longitudinalprojects in Britian, one on a motor car manufacturer andthe other on an airport, used a similar conceptualframework. The article draws on the evidence from this program of work, describes the evolvingtheoretical model and concludes that organizationalinfluence sharing appears to have made only limitedprogress during the last 50 years. Four explanations are put forward: overidealistic expectations;a tendency to ignore the need for certain necessaryantecedents, like competence; a tendency to act as ifinfluence sharing is not subject to contingencies like the nature of tasks; and probably mostimportantly, the almost universal tendency to designinfluence sharing measures through uncoordinatedmechanistic social engineering.     

OPTIMALITY OF STATE-DEPENDENT (s,S) POLICIES IN INVENTORY MODELS WITH MARKOV-MODULATED DEMAND AND LOST SALES

Markov-modulated processes have been used in stochastic inventory models with setup costs for modeling demand under the influence of uncertain environmental factors, such as fluctuating economic and market conditions. The analyses of these models have been carried out in the literature only under the assumption that unsatisfied demand is fully backlogged. The lost sales situation occurs in many retail establishments such as department stores and supermarkets. We use the analysis of the Markovian demand model with backlogging to analyze the lost sales case; in particular, we establish the optimality of an (s, S)-type policy under fairly general conditions.     

EXISTENCE AND DERIVATION OF FORECAST HORIZONS IN A DYNAMIC LOT SIZE MODEL WITH NONDECREASING HOLDING COSTS

We are concerned with a discrete-time undiscounted dynamic lot size model in which demand and the production setup cost are constant for an initial few periods and the holding cost of inventory is an arbitrary nondecreasing function assumed to be stationary (i.e., explicitly independent of time) in the same initial few periods. We show that there exists a finite forecast horizon in our model and obtain an explicit formula for it. In addition, we obtain fairly general conditions under which the existence of a solution horizon in the model implies the existence of a forecast horizon. We also derive an explicit formula for the minimal solution horizon. These results extend the earlier ones obtained for the dynamic lot size model with linearly increasing holding costs.     

AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF PATTERNS OF PRIORITIES AND TRADE-OFFS AMONG OPERATIONS MANAGERS

A survey of 15 firms showed that agreement among operations managers on competitive priorities is related to agreement on long-run strategic trade-off decisions and not to agreement on shortrun trade-offs. Furthermore, intended short-run actions were often in conflict with stated competitive priorities. Use of management-by-objectives linked to performance appraisal was related to agreement on competitive priorities.