两阶段供应链中三种定价方式研究

本文考虑渠道一体化对品牌建设的作用,在一个制造商和两个零售商的两阶段供应链系统中,其中确定性的市场需求与产品的市场零售价格有关,通过分析以下三种定价方式下的最优定价和库存策略下供应链成员和系统的收益,1)商品市场零售价格由零售商各自决定,两零售商和制造商之间存在着竞争活动;2)商品市场零售价格由制造商统一制定;3)市场零售价格、转让价格和系统库存水平按渠道协调的最优原则确定,确定了同一产品品牌内部的市场竞争、定价控制权及转让价格对渠道性能及品牌自身造成的影响,并由此提出了分散决策系统中的一种激励机制.     

Price-setting newsvendor with strategic consumers

We consider a newsvendor who sells a single product over a single season with the objective of determining both the selling price and stock quantity to maximize the expected profit. The customers are strategic and we consider two demand cases: additive and multiplicative. For each case, we derive the newsvendor׳s optimal decisions and demonstrate that neglecting the price-sensitivity of demand leads the newsvendor to make sub-optimal decisions. Moreover, we show that under certain conditions, strategic consumer behavior may positively affect the newsvendor׳s optimal expected profit in the additive demand case.     

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

We analyze a signaling game between the manager of a firm and an investor in the firm. The manager has private information about the firm's demand and cares about the short‐term stock price assigned by the investor. Previous research has shown that under continuous decision choices and the Intuitive Criterion refinement, the least‐cost separating equilibrium will result, in which a low‐quality firm chooses its optimal capacity and a high‐quality firm over‐invests in order to signal its quality to investors. We build on this research by showing the existence of pooling outcomes in which low‐quality firms over‐invest and high‐quality firms under‐invest so as to provide identical signals to investors. The pooling equilibrium is practically appealing because it yields a Pareto improvement compared to the least‐cost separating equilibrium. Distinguishing features of our analysis are that: (i) we allow the capacity decision to have either discrete or continuous support, and (ii) we allow beliefs to be refined based on either the Undefeated refinement or the Intuitive Criterion refinement. We find that the newsvendor model parameters impact the likelihood of a pooling outcome, and this impact changes in both sign and magnitude depending on which refinement is used.     

Revenue Management vs. Newsvendor Decisions: Does Behavioral Response Mirror Normative Equivalence?

We study and compare decision‐making behavior under the newsvendor and the two‐class revenue management models, in an experimental setting. We observe that, under both problems, decision makers deviate significantly from normative benchmarks. Furthermore, revenue management decisions are consistently higher compared to the newsvendor order quantities. In the face of increasing demand variability, revenue managers increase allocations; this behavior is consistent with normative patterns when the ratio of the selling prices of the two customer segments is less than 1/2, but is its exact opposite when this ratio is greater than 1/2. Newsvendors' behavior with respect to changing demand variability, on the other hand, is consistent with normative trends. We also observe that losses due to leftovers weigh more in newsvendor decisions compared to the revenue management model; we argue that overage cost is more salient in the newsvendor problem because it is perceived as a direct loss, and propose this as the driver of the differences in behavior observed under the two problems.     

How to Compete Against a Behavioral Newsvendor

We investigate newsvendor ordering behavior under competition. We present a laboratory experiment that documents the behavioral ordering regularities in competitive newsvendor environments, and an analytical model extending the standard theory of newsvendor competition by including an optimal best‐response policy for competing with a behaviorally biased newsvendor. We test the effectiveness of this policy using an out‐of‐sample experiment and find that it results in improved market share, service level and profitability.     

需求分布规律变化情况下的报童订货策略

在需求分布规律变化情况下,报童在进行订货决策时会因为错误判断需求分布规律而导致期望库存成本增加。为了解决这一问题,本文集成传统历史需求信息和非传统需求信息以正确地认知需求分布规律,在此基础上决策订货量。假设需求服从均值不同、方差相同的两种类型的正态分布,每一种正态分布的概率已知。利用信号检测理论构建基于历史需求信息与需求分布概率的报童最优订货策略,并与只基于需求分布概率的直觉规则订货策略进行对比。结果表明：只要排除需求分布概率很大或很小两种极端情况,最优订货策略比直觉规则订货策略在控制期望库存成本方面的作用更明显,即利用历史需求信息可以有效修正报童对实际需求分布的检测结果,从而提高实际订货决策的准确性。研究结果对传统历史需求信息和非传统需求信息的集成以及需求信息交换等有一定的管理学启示和应用价值。     

多产品救援物资的储备决策:一个扩展的Newsvendor模型

储备一定数量的救援物资用于应对可能的灾害事件对于改善救援工作的绩效有着重要的意义。在考虑救援组织机构面对多种可能的灾害事件的基础上，本文利用一个二阶段交付过程模型来刻画灾害事件发生后救援物资的交付。该模型明确救灾组织在灾害事件发生后首先交付储备物资，如果需求短缺则再综合利用社会捐赠物资和应急采购满足剩余需求。以期望总成本最小化为目标，在需求全部被满足的前提下，本文建立了多产品救援物资的储备决策模型，并给出了其最优解的隐函数形式。进一步，考虑救灾物资储备存在预算限制，研究了具有预算限制的多产品救援物资储备决策模型，并设计了一种二分法的求解算法。数值算例的计算结果则对所建立模型及算法进行了检验。     

基于资金供应链价值视角的最优现金持有方案研究

内部资金的配置不当常常引发公司高层的控制权争夺而损害公司利益。在投资项目中如何设计包含预期投资收入和现金分红比例组合要素在内的最优现金持有方案以提升公司价值成为公司所有者和高管共同面临的问题。本文借鉴报童模型,以公司所有者为先行者,建立了两者之间的斯塔克伯格博弈模型,分析最优现金持有方案的设置及其对公司所有者和高管的影响。研究发现:风险中性的公司所有者总会接受高管内部参股投资,并设置行业现金分红比例以给予高管资金使用方便;最优现金持有方案下,高管总会倾向于选择内部参股而不选择外部投资;此时,公司所有者的收益和资金供应链的效率都会提高,而高管选择外部引资是否能提高收益则取决于已有的薪酬合同水平。研究结论既支持了内部资金市场的"收集有利信息"假说,同时也对公司所有者在控制权私利倾向较强的职业经理人市场中如何科学决策有着重要的借鉴意义。     

带有再融资摩擦的报童库存问题

通过贷款融资来解决资金不足问题是现代企业常用的方法之一,文章研究了报童在资金不足时,通过银行贷款来解决资金问题;并假定了当报童销售收入不足偿还银行本息时,付出一定的额外成本(摩擦成本)再融资来偿还银行本息,以及银行根据报童的借贷情况设定利率的反应行为;指出再融资摩擦系数越大,报童最佳订购量越少,期望利润越低,因此减少报童融资成本对增加报童订购量促进报童利润增加有重要意义。更近一步地,研究了报童、银行合作贷款的情况,指出合作贷款能使报童订购量增加,有利于社会的发展。最后通过一个数例来考察各因素对贷款融资的影响。     

资金紧缺型企业规避风险时的决策行为分析

现实中许多企业（尤其中小企业）往往需要通过各种融资手段获取资金以支持其日常运作。融资在为企业带来运作资金的同时,也增加了企业的财务风险。通过在经典报童模型中引入企业的财务状态,综合分析了企业的最优运作决策与财务决策,以及企业决策者对待风险的态度（风险中性、损失规避等）对其决策行为的影响。研究发现,与风险中性型零售商相比,在一定条件下,损失规避型零售商能够在不降低企业期望收益的前提下降低企业的财务风险。