对经营者实施股权激励的法律分析

对经营者实施股权激励在中国法律上有两大障碍 ,一是经营者所持股份的来源如何解决 ,二是经营者如何取得股份。在借鉴国外立法经验对中国企业具体做法进行法律分析的基础上 ,提出了引入折衷资本制 ,让经营者通过合法途径取得股份等消除法律障碍的立法建议     

Competition and Coordination in a Two‐Channel Supply Chain

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination.     

Information Sharing in a Manufacturer–Supplier Relationship: Suppliers' Incentive and Production Efficiency

While there have been vast discussions on the materialistic benefits of continuous improvement from the Toyota and Honda experiences, the academic literature pays little attention to information sharing. In this study, we construct a dynamic adverse selection model in which the supplier privately observes her production efficiency, and in the contractual duration the manufacturer obtains an informative but imprecise signal regarding this private efficiency. We show that despite the disclosure of proprietary information, information sharing may benefit the supplier; the supplier's voluntary participation is more likely to occur when the shared information is rather imprecise. On the other hand, our analysis also reveals that this information sharing unambiguously gives rise to an upward push of the production quantity, and may sometimes lead to an upward distortion that ultimately hurts the supply chain. We also document the non‐trivial impact of the timing of information sharing on the supplier's incentive to participate.     

低碳视角下的可再生能源政策——激励机制与模式选择

利用可再生能源是实现碳减排和能源安全的主要手段,是实现中国可持续发展的主要途径。然而,由于缺乏对可再生能源外部性的合理评估,现实的和潜在的风险阻碍了可再生能源技术的大规模应用。有效的激励政策是,通过价格、补贴和强制消费等手段刺激企业投资可再生能源,促进经济向低碳方向发展。纵观世界各国,不同的可再生能源政策模式在控制成本、创造需求、降低风险及稳定性等各方面存在差异性,而政策的激励效果是以上因素综合作用的结果。因此,政策制定者必须根据现实的能源要素禀赋和技术发展水平进行合理的政策模式选择。中国可再生能源开发潜力大,近年来利用增速快,但也存在着整体利用率低、地域和技术发展不平衡等问题。在现阶段,中国可再生能源激励政策应以固定上网电价制模式为主,将可再生能源利用数量作为基本目标,促进技术创新,建立合理的定价机制。这对中国建设低碳社会、加快转变经济发展方式具有关键性作用。     

论我国公司治理结构的完善——以国美之争为例

以国美之争为例,分析了公司治理结构中存在的问题,即经理人制度不完善,监事会和独立董事的规定不足,对中小股东利益的保护缺位等,进而给出了完善公司治理结构的几点建议,即完善经理人制度、监事会制度和独立董事制度以及积极保护中小股东的利益。     

农户参与食品追溯体系激励机制实证研究

通过构建理论模型,探讨了食品追溯体系对农户提高食品安全水平的激励作用,得出以下结论：提高食品追溯体系的有效性、增加对提供安全食品的农户的报酬以及加大对提供不安全食品的农户的惩罚力度是提高食品安全水平的必要条件。食品追溯体系的有效实施可以降低农户的隐匿行动,增加其生产安全食品的努力水平。通过对最早推广蔬菜质量安全追溯体系的北京市蔬菜种植户的调查结果进行统计分析并利用二元logistic模型进行检验,得出影响蔬菜种植户参与蔬菜质量安全追溯体系的正向激励因素主要有：蔬菜种植的高成本收益率、可追溯蔬菜高价预期、加入产业化组织、接受政府补贴和参加技术培训,逆向激励因素主要有：食品安全监管部门对不安全食品供应商的惩罚力度、农户对参与食品追溯体系的风险预期。     

政府激励与增长方式转变:信息不对称的视角

信息不对称在经济增长方式的转变过程中会产生道德风险与逆向选择问题.通过多任务道德风险模型和自愿退出机制的逆向选择模型,可从多级政府间、政府和企业间两方面就信息不对称问题对经济增长方式的影响进行研究.研究表明,信息不对称是我国经济高速增长而增长方式转变未见显著改善的主要原因之一,同时信息不对称也是导致不同地区间存在增长方式转变差距的重要因素.为抑制信息不对称造成的负面影响,上级政府在考核下级政府时应加大对经济增长方式转变的考核权重,建立并完善系统的经济增长方式的评价体系.另一方面,应力避企业隐藏信息的行为,加大对企业转型的转移支付,促进企业生产方式实现从粗放型向集约型的根本转变.     

Coaching as a Packaged Intervention for Telemarketing Personnel

Prior literature indicates that although the sales function of an organization is a critical element for its success, there is a lack of research on specific actions managers can take to influence sales subordinates. The purpose of the present study was to assess the effects of a coaching package combined with incentives on sales performance for telemarketing personnel in an organizational setting. Following the implementation of the coaching package, there was a substantial increase in critical behaviors performed, pending sales set, and final sales completed by all telemarketers.     

股权激励绩效与股权结构关系

股权激励绩效与股权结构间的关系分析对股权激励制度的推行意义重大。运用分布滞后模型对中国上市公司中在相关的年份实施经营者股权激励的公司进行的全样本的动态研究发现：实施股权激励后．公司股权集中度降低;在注意提升内部人持股比例,加大激励力度的同时,提高了股票的流通性;上市公司实施股权激励当年的股权激励绩效与公司第一大股东、前五大股东、前十大股东持股比例均呈显著的负相关关系;股权激励绩效与国有股比例、非流通股比例呈显著的负相关关系,而与非国有股比例、流通股比例和内部人持股比例呈显著的正相关关系。     

Exploitation aversion: When financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Studies of the principal-agent relationship find that monetary incentives work in many instances but that they can also backfire. Various mechanisms for this failure have been examined (e.g., intrinsic motivation, image concerns). We posit that an aversion to being exploited, i.e., being used instrumentally for another’s benefit, can also cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment we find that compliance is lower for exploitative principals compared to neutral ones despite using the same contracts. To corroborate our results we show that surveyed “exploitation aversion” mediates this effect. Our results have implications for the design and implementation of incentives within organizations.