The repeated public goods game: A solution using Tit-for-Tat and the Lindahl point

This paper demonstrates how a repeated public goods problem may be solved by using Tit-for-Tat (TFT) on the Lindahl point. The general solution is developed; geometric and numerical examples are offered.I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

多功能开放型企业供需网成员企业合作关系的经济模型

多功能开放型企业供需网(SDN)合作伙伴关系的稳定性，将直接决定SDN创新管理理念的生命力和未来发展前景，传统企业间的一次性静态博弈和供应链(SC)盟员间的有限次重复博弈，都是低效的合作关系，因而其稳定性较差，无限次重复博弈以及由此而引发的触发策略，能够实现帕累托最优的纳什均衡，是SDN合作伙伴关系稳定发展的深层经济学原因，通过建立SDN成员企业合作关系的经济模型，论证了SDN的稳定性。     

Asymptotic bias in the linear mixed effects model under non-ignorable missing data mechanisms

Summary.  In longitudinal studies, missingness of data is often an unavoidable problem. Estimators from the linear mixed effects model assume that missing data are missing at random. However, estimators are biased when this assumption is not met. In the paper, theoretical results for the asymptotic bias are established under non-ignorable drop-out, drop-in and other missing data patterns. The asymptotic bias is large when the drop-out subjects have only one or no observation, especially for slope-related parameters of the linear mixed effects model. In the drop-in case, intercept-related parameter estimators show substantial asymptotic bias when subjects enter late in the study. Eight other missing data patterns are considered and these produce asymptotic biases of a variety of magnitudes.     

Far-sighted equilibria in 2 × 2, non-cooperative,repeated games

Consider a two-person simultaneous-move game in strategic form. Suppose this game is played over and over at discrete points in time. Suppose, furthermore, that communication is not possible, but nevertheless we observe some regularity in the sequence of outcomes. The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation for the question why such regularity might persist for many (i.e., infinite) periods.Each player, when contemplating a deviation, considers a sequential-move game, roughly speaking of the following form: if I change my strategy this period, then in the next my opponent will take his strategy b and afterwards I can switch to my strategy a, but then I am worse off since at that outcome my opponent has no incentive to change anymore, whatever I do. Theoretically, however, there is no end to such reaction chains. In case that deviating by some player gives him less utility in the long run than before deviation, we say that the original regular sequence of outcomes is far-sighted stable for that player. It is a far-sighted equilibrium if it is far-sighted stable for both players.     

An analytic method for randomized trials with informative censoring: Part 1

Consider a randomized trial in which time to the occurrence of a particular disease, say pneumocystis pneumonia in an AIDS trial or breast cancer in a mammographic screening trial, is the failure time of primary interest. Suppose that time to disease is subject to informative censoring by the minimum of time to death, loss to and end of follow-up. In such a trial, the censoring time is observed for all study subjects, including failures. In the presence of informative censoring, it is not possible to consistently estimate the effect of treatment on time to disease without imposing additional non-identifiable assumptions. The goals of this paper are to specify two non-identifiable assumptions that allow one to test for and estimate an effect of treatment on time to disease in the presence of informative censoring. In a companion paper (Robins, 1995), we provide consistent and reasonably efficient semiparametric estimators for the treatment effect under these assumptions. In this paper we largely restrict attention to testing. We propose tests that, like standard weighted-log-rank tests, are asymptotically distribution-free -level tests under the null hypothesis of no causal effect of treatment on time to disease whenever the censoring and failure distributions are conditionally independent given treatment arm. However, our tests remain asymptotically distribution-free -level tests in the presence of informative censoring provided either of our assumptions are true. In contrast, a weighted log-rank test will be an -level test in the presence of informative censoring only if (1) one of our two non-identifiable assumptions hold, and (2) the distribution of time to censoring is the same in the two treatment arms. We also extend our methods to studies of the effect of a treatment on the evolution over time of the mean of a repeated measures outcome, such as CD-4 count.     

A Multivariate Model for Repeated Failure Time Measurements

A parametric multivariate failure time distribution is derived from a frailty-type model with a particular frailty distribution. It covers as special cases certain distributions which have been used for multivariate survival data in recent years. Some properties of the distribution are derived: its marginal and conditional distributions lie within the parametric family, and association between the component variates can be positive or, to a limited extent, negative. The simple closed form of the survivor function is useful for right-censored data, as occur commonly in survival analysis, and for calculating uniform residuals. Also featured is the distribution of ratios of paired failure times. The model is applied to data from the literature     

具有长期性特征的恐怖袭击与政府反恐多阶段重复博弈模型

我国反恐问题具有长期性特征,以Hausken和Zhuang的动态博弈模型作为阶段博弈,在此基础上构建了政府防御方与恐怖分子的多阶段重复博弈模型。通过数值分析方法,分别讨论了双方对于未来长远收益重视程度、恐怖分子培训与实施袭击成本、政府防御目标估值等因素对于恐怖分子的期望收益和恐怖袭击次数的影响。     

Binary Dynamic Logit for Correlated Ordinal: estimation,application and simulation

We evaluate the estimation performance of the Binary Dynamic Logit model for correlated ordinal variables (BDLCO model), and compare it to GEE and Ordinal Logistic Regression performance in terms of bias and Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) via Monte Carlo simulation. Our results indicate that when the proportional-odds assumption does not hold, the proposed BDLCO method is superior to existing models in estimating correlated ordinal data. Moreover, this method is flexible in terms of modeling dependence and allows unequal slopes for each category, and can be used to estimate an apple bloom data set where the proportional-odds assumption is violated. We also provide a function in R to implement BDLCO.     

Impatience versus Incentives

This paper studies the dynamics of long‐term contracts in repeated principal–agent relationships with an impatient agent. Despite the absence of exogenous uncertainty, Pareto‐optimal dynamic contracts generically oscillate between favoring the principal and favoring the agent.     

A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats

This paper concerns the two‐stage game introduced in Nash (1953). It formalizes a suggestion made (but not pursued) by Nash regarding equilibrium selection in that game, and hence offers an arguably more solid foundation for the “Nash bargaining with endogenous threats” solution. Analogous reasoning is then applied to an infinite horizon game to provide equilibrium selection in two‐person repeated games with contracts. In this setting, issues about enforcement of threats are much less problematic than in Nash's static setting. The analysis can be extended to stochastic games with contracts.