关于建立股指期货交易制度的构想

随着中国正式加入WTO ,推出股票指数期货已是确定的方向。目前中国建立股指期货交易制度不仅是必要的 ,也是可行的。股指期货作为一种金融创新产品 ,它的建立首先必须有统一交易场所 ,科学设计合约 ,同时也要进一步规范现货市场 ,培育交易主体 ,引入做空机制 ,规范会员结构 ,健全监管制度     

The repeated public goods game: A solution using Tit-for-Tat and the Lindahl point

This paper demonstrates how a repeated public goods problem may be solved by using Tit-for-Tat (TFT) on the Lindahl point. The general solution is developed; geometric and numerical examples are offered.I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

多功能开放型企业供需网成员企业合作关系的经济模型

多功能开放型企业供需网(SDN)合作伙伴关系的稳定性，将直接决定SDN创新管理理念的生命力和未来发展前景，传统企业间的一次性静态博弈和供应链(SC)盟员间的有限次重复博弈，都是低效的合作关系，因而其稳定性较差，无限次重复博弈以及由此而引发的触发策略，能够实现帕累托最优的纳什均衡，是SDN合作伙伴关系稳定发展的深层经济学原因，通过建立SDN成员企业合作关系的经济模型，论证了SDN的稳定性。     

供应链管理模式下的企业外包设计研究

供应链管理是近年来在国内外逐渐受到重视的一种新的管理理念与模式,其管理思想是使企业将主要精力放在核心业务上,充分发挥优势,企业中的非核心业务外包给合作企业来完成。因此,企业外包设计成为供应链管理思想的一个重要方面。基于这一背景,首先探讨了企业外包的含义及其构成元素;并根据威廉姆森的新制度经济学中经济业务交易的规制结构对企业外包的规制层次进行划分;最后,构建了在供应链管理模式下基于交易成本和核心竞争力相结合的企业外包设计模型。     

基于Web使用挖掘的个性化服务系统

个性化服务系统是一种由多种WEB挖掘技术构成的基于用户使用的站点个性化系统。该系统使用事务聚类、使用聚类和关联规则技术等数据挖掘技术分析用户访问模式,并结合用户当前访问情况提供实时化个性服务。实验结果说明,个性化服务系统具有较好的性能。     

供应链企业间的合作轨道模型

文章主要介绍了轨道模型在供应链企业合作中的应用 ,根据合作程度的不同 ,伙伴企业处于以核心企业为中心的不同轨道。文章分别从静态和动态的角度运用轨道模型分析了企业间合作关系以及这种合作关系的变化。一方面使企业间的合作问题简单化 ;另一方面 ,轨道模型便于对合作问题进行深入的定量化研究。     

内幕交易民事责任问题研究

分析了我国证券市场内幕交易法律责任确认的现状以及民事责任制度缺位的原因 ,并分析了内幕交易民事责任求偿的主体资格问题以及内幕交易民事损害赔偿的归责原则和赔偿标准 ,提出了建立内幕交易民事责任制度的建议     

对“两种置换”与改制成本的思考

国有企业改制的焦点集中于"两个置换"问题上,而它们之间存在着直接的依赖关系。从某种意义上来说,改制成本就是为确保新制度顺利推进而产生的社会交易费用。一方面,交易费用的存在与人力资源价值、人的本性、以及改制后企业经营管理能力有关,其支出有着重要的作用。另一方面,交易费用的存在会减少交易量,损害资产经济专门化和资源的利用,影响资源使用的边际等式和使用的密集度,且过高的交易费用会使许多潜在的交易难以转化为现实的交易,导致社会财富的净损失。因此,政府应该对其支出的流量和流向予以把握和控制,按照"支出合理,方式多样"的原则运作,推动"两种置换"的顺利完成。     

The employment contract: A test of the transaction cost theory

This paper tests some predictions derived from Williamson's transaction cost theory of the organization of work, which holds that the form of the employment relationship is determined largely by the idiosyncrasy of work—that is, the nature of skills and knowledge used in production. It examines the occurrence of theoretically relevant provisions in collective bargaining agreements in the United States and finds they are related to a contract-level proxy for idiosyncrasy (based on bargaining structure) as predicted by the theory. An analysis of an individual-level variable, the difficulty of finding a comparable job, provides some additional support. Finally, several alternative explanations of the results are considered, and it is argued that none are consistent with the evidence. The analysis thus finds strong, if necessarily provisional, support for the theory.     

Far-sighted equilibria in 2 × 2, non-cooperative,repeated games

Consider a two-person simultaneous-move game in strategic form. Suppose this game is played over and over at discrete points in time. Suppose, furthermore, that communication is not possible, but nevertheless we observe some regularity in the sequence of outcomes. The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation for the question why such regularity might persist for many (i.e., infinite) periods.Each player, when contemplating a deviation, considers a sequential-move game, roughly speaking of the following form: if I change my strategy this period, then in the next my opponent will take his strategy b and afterwards I can switch to my strategy a, but then I am worse off since at that outcome my opponent has no incentive to change anymore, whatever I do. Theoretically, however, there is no end to such reaction chains. In case that deviating by some player gives him less utility in the long run than before deviation, we say that the original regular sequence of outcomes is far-sighted stable for that player. It is a far-sighted equilibrium if it is far-sighted stable for both players.