排序方式: 共有1条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1
1.
Rodney J. Garratt Thomas Trger Charles Z. Zheng 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2009,77(4):1095-1136
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post‐auction interbidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders. These equilibria interim Pareto‐dominate (among bidders) the standard value‐bidding equilibrium without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or postbidding spoil division. 相似文献
1