金孟贤和他的荣昌建安──湘西荣昌建安有限责任公司的振兴之路

远看金孟贤似乎显得柔弱、单瘦，或许擦肩而过的人不会向他投入太多的关注：近瞧，金孟贤浑身透着一股英气，一股成功男人的胆魄与气慨。和他交流，平实而豪爽的话语间时时显露出一个精明企业家的睿智与宏略。人们不得不佩服他短短几年内，把一个名不见经传的小小施工队发展壮大成一支具备市政工程、装修装饰工程、堤防工程、房地产开发和小型水利水电工程施工的国家二级建筑施工企业。金孟贤，1987年毕业于吉首大学经济管理系，1988年在邵东团山建筑公司任副经理、施工技术员；1990年调入吉首一建任项目经理、副经理、助理工程师；1996年受…     

加强建筑市场管理根治"豆腐渣工程"

建筑工程是一个综合产品,工程质量是各项工作的综合表现,涉及到技术、认识、政策、市场、管理等主客观的方方面面.近几年来,虽然工程质量有较大的提高,但还存在一些问题,质量状况参差不齐,发展不平衡,质量通病尚未消除,工期长、质量差、效益低的矛盾依然突出.     

水利工程建设管理存在的问题及对策分析

在经济的发展与社会的不断进步下,水利工程的建设项目逐渐增多,同时也对建设质量提出了更高的要求。在这样的情况下,我们需要全面分析水利工程建设过程中建设管理方面存在的问题并针对性地找出解决对策。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

浅析建筑工程质量和施工安全的统一性

随着经济的发展,我国的建筑业也随之兴盛起来。但是美中仍有不足之处,建筑工程中也出现了亟待解决的问题。其中在工程质量和安全性方面的问题比较突出。本文主要讲述了建筑工程质量和施工安全方面的问题,从工程质量中存在的问题和有效地解决策略,以及施工安全方面容易存在的问题以及有效策略开始论述,经过笔者的多方调查,比较详细的阐述以上各方面的内容,对真正提高质量和安全性有一定的作用,希望对相关人员有一定的借鉴意义。     

建设工程质量检验及控制方法研究

工程质量是决定于工程建设成败的关键,质量的优劣,直接影响工程建成后的运用.工程建设质量的好坏,影响建设、施工单位的信誉、效益.控制工程建没质量是参建各方工作的重点,也是参建各方共同的职责.