Comprehensive audits for use in evaluating scientific research

Calls for new arrangements to deal with problems involving the integrity of results reported from scientific research have generally taken the form of investigations into data quality and the research methods utilized. Alternatives to proposed government regulation of scientific research have included suggestions for using accounting type audits of the kind used for attesting to the representations of management in corporate financial reports. Here a different type of audit is suggested for the advantages it offers in dealing with the situations in science—which are much less structured and not restricted to situations like those to which financial accounting audits are directed. A broadening from “accounting”; to “accountability”; is thereby achieved. Experimentation with the use of such audits is suggested which can simultaneously help to improve scientific processes and accommodate the interests of the public in responding to the results of scientific research. A beginning is also suggested in the form of “GAO type”; (U.S. General Accounting Office) audits of research activities undertaken (or to be undertaken) at laboratories such as Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia as they are being redirected from military to civilian type research. It is also suggested that GAO type audits be extended from audits of management activities to examination and evaluation of the validity and significance of the research that has been, or is to be, undertaken.     

A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance

We compare in a laboratory experiment two audit-based tax compliance mechanisms that collect fines from those found non-compliant. The mechanisms differ in the way fines are redistributed to individuals who were either not audited or audited and found to be compliant. The first, as is the case in most extant tax systems, does not discriminate between the un-audited and those found compliant. The second targets the redistribution in favor of those found compliant. We find that targeting increases compliance when paying taxes generates a social return. We do not find any increase in compliance in a control treatment where individuals audited and found compliant receive symbolic rewards. We conclude that existing tax mechanisms have room for improvement by rewarding those audited and found compliant.     

Misperception of chance and loss repair: On the dynamics of tax compliance

Previous experimental studies on tax behavior have been particularly concerned with determining the absolute effect of detection rate and punishment on tax filing, leading to mixed results. In this paper, we shed some additional light on the effectiveness of audit probability and sanctions by drawing upon a dynamic setting with particular focus on the time lag between audits. Our results showed that tax compliance decreased immediately after a random audit, suggesting that subjects were prone to misperception of chance. Sanctions decreased compliance to a lesser extent; they were, however, associated with the tendency of subjects to repair their losses by increasing their capital stock.