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杨扬 《聊城大学学报(社会科学版)》2012,(3):58-63
近年来,政党外交日益受到学术界和政府的高度重视,对中共政党外交从不同角度进行学术研究的文献也逐渐增多。学术界分析了政党外交的定义、原则等理论,并阐释了毛泽东执政时期中共政党外交的理论与实践。客观评析毛泽东执政时期中共政党外交,可为以后的研究提供更多的参考。 相似文献
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When do attributions of responsibility predict support for governmental institutions? Data from an online survey of 508 United States citizens examining attributions for their most salient national problem revealed associations between attributions and evaluations of the Presidency, Supreme Court, and Congress. With respect to the Presidency, causal attributions were related to more negative evaluations, while resolution attributions were related to more positive evaluations. This was especially true for conservative participants. With respect to the Supreme Court, causal attributions were related to more negative evaluations. With respect to Congress, there was an association between causal attributions and negative evaluations, but only for those with a low level of resolution attributions. Results are discussed in terms of the political climate and differences in institutional expectations. 相似文献
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Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha 《The Social Science Journal》2017,54(2):206-215
What explains the quit rates of federal agencies? Can presidential rhetoric affect quit rates of federal agencies, particularly those that implement salient policies? Although much research examines other ways presidents may affect the federal bureaucracy, absent is a systematic examination of presidential leadership of agency quit rates, despite the importance of personnel turnover to effective bureaucratic implementation. I argue that presidential rhetoric on the size of government can affect agency turnover. This impact is only likely for agencies that implement salient policies, because salience encourages bureaucratic responsiveness to elected officials. The findings reveal that presidents who speak more favorably about government reduce aggregate turnover in the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Education from 1980 through 2005. I conclude with some observations about what these findings mean for presidential control of the bureaucracy. 相似文献
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