匿名双向认证与密钥协商新协议

分析了一种新的匿名双向认证与密钥协商协议,它使移动网络向用户提供匿名服务, 访问网络与非法窃听者无法获知用户的身份信息,保证了用户身份、所在位置和行踪信息的机密性。该协议可以实现通信双方的相互认证,产生的会话密钥对通信双方是公正的。协议将双钥体制和单钥体制有机的结合起来,结构简单,安全高效。     

解读弗洛姆的权威理念

弗洛姆认为权威是一种人与人之间的"符号"和"关系",其中一种人把另一种人看作是高于自己.他把权威分为公开权威和匿名权威,其中公开权威又可分为合理性的权威和非理性权威.匿名权威是"顺从"和"求同",它比公开权威更有力量.在现代资本主义社会里,人们无时不在被周围匿名权威所统治.他强调要按照"自由"与"民主"的原则合理地行使权威.     

试论网络潜水现象成因

在网络整体环境中,网络使用者分为贡献者和潜水者两类。网络中存在许多影响使用者是否继续留在网络上并发表意见的相关因素,使用者的从众心理、务实心理、安全隐私心理等主观因素,以及网站的限制、使用者的经济因素、使用者个人能力的限制等客观因素,都成为影响网络使用者是否隐匿成为网络上的潜水者的重要原因。     

Underground testing: Name-altering practices as probes in electronic music

Name-altering practices are common in many creative fields—pen names in literature, stage names in the performing arts, and aliases in music. More than just reflecting artistic habits or responding to the need for distinctive brands, these practices can also serve as test devices to probe, validate, and guide the artists’ active participation in a cultural movement. At the same time, they constitute a powerful probe to negotiate the boundaries of a subculture, especially when its features are threatened by appropriation from the mass-oriented culture. Drawing evidence from electronic music, a field where name-altering practices proliferate, we outline dynamics of pseudonymity, polyonymy, and anonymity that surround the use of aliases. We argue that name-altering practices are both a tool that artists use to probe the creative environment and a device to recursively put one’s creative participation to the test. In the context of creative subcultures, name-altering practices constitute a subtle but effective form of underground testing.     

可证明安全的群组匿名认证密钥协商协议

基于BDH困难问题,借鉴环签密方案的思想,提出了一种有效的群组匿名认证密钥协商方案。该方案首先在实现群组成员认证的前提下,协商出安全的会话密钥;对群组内外实现了不同程度的匿名,即群组之外的用户完全不能获悉参与协商的成员组成,群组内的成员了解参与协商的成员组成,但不能识别成员的身份信息;支持节点的动态群组密钥更新,实现了群组密钥的前向保密与后向保密;仅通过一轮交互确定会话密钥,降低了计算复杂性、减小了存储开销。     

基于分量差的线性及匿名合作对策值的简化算法

通过给出Shapley值、均分Shapley值、贴现Shapley值、Solidarity值、广义Solidarity值、合意值、 Banzhaf值及最小二乘预核仁分量差的显式解析表达式,本文提出了一种同时计算这些线性及匿名效用可转移合作对策值的简化算法.特别地,这一算法也适用于同时计算这些值中的两种及以上.为了详细说明简化算法的计算过程及优越性,文中给出了具体的数值算例,并将其与传统算法进行了比较分析,结果表明简化算法确实能显著降低同时计算多个值的时间复杂度.     

How to ask sensitive multiple-choice questions

Motivated by recent failures of polling to estimate populist party support, we propose and analyze two methods for asking sensitive multiple-choice questions where the respondent retains some privacy and therefore might answer more truthfully. The first method consists of asking for the true choice along with a choice picked at random. The other method presents a list of choices and asks whether the preferred one is on the list or not. Different respondents are shown different lists. The methods are easy to explain, which makes it likely that the respondent understands how her privacy is protected and may thus entice her to participate in the survey and answer truthfully. The methods are also easy to implement and scale up.     

新浪漫派：无名氏小说的流派定位

西方浪漫主义与西方现代主义,西方浪漫主义与中国浪漫主义,西方现代主义与中国现代主义,中国浪漫主义与中国现代主义,彼此之间既有联系又有不同。本文从无名氏创作文本出发,论证了无名氏小说“新浪漫”的流派归属。     

Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies

We study economies with one private good and one pure public good, and consider the following axioms of social choice functions. Strategy-proofness says that no agent can benefit by misrepresenting his preferences, regardless of whether the other agents misrepresent or not, and whatever his preferences are. Symmetry says that if two agents have the same preference, they must be treated equally. Anonymity says that when the preferences of two agents are switched, their consumption bundles are also switched. Individual rationality says that a social choice function never assigns an allocation which makes some agent worse off than he would be by consuming no public good and paying nothing. In Theorem 1, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, budget-balancing, and symmetric social choice functions, assuming convexity of the cost function of the public good. In Theorem 2, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, budget-balancing, and anonymous social choice functions. In Theorem 3, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, budget-balancing, symmetric, and individually rational social choice functions.     

Challenging the techno-politics of anonymity: the case of cryptomarket users

Anonymity is treated as a problem of governance that can be subject to technical resolution. We use the example of the darknet to critically examine this approach. We explore the background assumptions that have been made about anonymity as a quality of social life. We conceive of anonymity as a way of engaging and maintaining social relationships in an anonymous mode. We draw on a study of darknet ‘cryptomarket’ users who mainly use the darknet to buy and sell illicit drugs, discuss drug quality and share information on safe and effective use. We identify the personal satisfaction that comes from interacting anonymously online, the challenges this represents for maintaining trusted interactions and how they are overcome, and the combination of technology and action involved in maintaining anonymity. We argue that attempts to promote de-anonymising norms and technology are based on an erroneous understanding of what anonymity is.