从主权国家的兴衰看权力博弈形态的转型

传统的国际关系理论,无论是现实主义、自由主义、建构主义还是科学行为主义理论,都是把主权国家抽象成一个统一的国际关系行为体。这一行为主体有一致的利益,也自然要有一致的对外政策目标和手段。在20世纪,尤其是在两次世界大战和冷战期间,这一概念抽象是非常准确的。但冷战结束以后,尤其是进入21世纪以后,这一概念抽象逐渐与国际关系的现实相违背。一方面,国家综合实力并不能直接转化为具体领域的竞争优势;另一方面,很多国家,包括超级大国在内,其对外政策的主要阻力可能不是所谓的竞争对手,而是其国内不同的利益集团。这导致传统的国际关系理论,从假设到概念和推理层面,都已经无法解释和预测今天的世界,而权力小博弈理论可以为认识多元复杂互动博弈时代的国际关系提供一个新的解释框架。     

统计执法的博弈分析

针对目前中国统计数据失真相当严重并引起社会各界普遍关注的现象，运用博弈论作为分析工具，引入重复博弈研究了统计执法中数据报方与查方的利益冲突关系，从统计执法的角度揭示了统计数据失真的主要原因，并提出了相应的五项对策。     

现阶段村民自治运作中的权力博弈

村民自治的运作实际是村落场域内各权力主体之间的博弈过程。在现阶段中国农村村民自治运作中,权力博弈场内的主要局中人是政府、村干部、头面人物、普通村民。由于受村落场域多元性的影响,各类村庄权力主体在不同村庄的公共权力体系中所处的地位和发挥的作用有所差异,因此形成了干部支配型、精英主导型、群众自治型等多种村庄权力结构。村民自治运作中的权力博弈势必导致各类权力主体在村庄公共权力体系中的地位和作用的改变,并引起村庄权力结构的变迁。     

Allocation of resources in asymmetric competitions: How do the weak maintain a chance of winning?

To maintain a chance of occasionally beating a stronger player in a competition waged over several fields, a weaker player should give up on some of the fields and concentrate resources on the remaining ones. But when do weak players actually do this? And which fields do they give up when the fields differ in their likelihood of being assessed? We report an experimental study of resource allocation in which asymmetric pairs of players compete over asymmetric fields. Symmetric players and symmetric fields are used for control. We find that players behave as follows: (1) Average wins are the same in the symmetric and asymmetric fields conditions and correspond to relative player strength. (2) The proportion of fields given up on decreases with a player’s greater relative strength, increases for asymmetric field likelihoods, and increases when competitions are framed in meaningful context; this proportion is related to wins. (3) When field likelihoods are asymmetric, players’ resource allocation is correlated with likelihood. Wins generally increase with that correlation but the relation is different for players of different strength. (4) The proportion of fields given up on and the correlation with likelihood change with experience towards the values corresponding to higher wins.     

Moral values and increasing stakes in a dictator game

Using data from a large representative US sample (N = 1519), we compare hypothetical moral fairness values from the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale with actual fairness behavior in an incentivized dictator game with either low or high stakes. We find that people with high moral fairness values fail to live up to their high fairness standards, when stake size increases. This violates principles from consistency theories according to which moral values are supposedly aligned with moral behavior, but is in line with temptation theories that question the absoluteness of morality values.     

STOCHASTIC COST-VOLUME-PROFIT ANALYSIS IN A COMPETITIVE OLIGOPOLY

Previous stochastic cost-volume-profit (CVP) models have assumed that the firm was operating under either perfect competition or monopolistic conditions. This paper presents a stochastic CVP model applicable to oligopolistic competition. Each firm is assumed to maximize a linear function of the expected value and the standard deviation of its random profits. The result is a game-theoretic model that is solved using the concept of a Nash equilibrium. The results of the model are used to examine a firm's competitive strength. The model can be easily modified to accommodate a measure of risk based on the capital asset pricing theory.     

Stochastic and Intransitive Behavior in a State-Preference Model of Asset Choice*

Most models of investor behavior assume a time-state independent utility function and result in a deterministic solution where a given set of inputs uniquely specifies the decision. In contrast, a state preference model using a time-state dependent utility function is derived in this paper. The model allows the investment choice decision to be analyzed in a game theoretic context. The general solution is a mixed strategy which allows for a probabilistic interpretation of the decision. The approach presented in this paper can accommodate anomalies such as intransitivity of preference and satisficing as rational behavior. An example of a possible implementation is given along with interpretations of the outcomes.     

董仲舒王道论浅析

董仲舒将王道之依据上溯于天,认为是圣人承天意以从事的结果,并将人间的统治者确定为天之子,由此论证了现实政权的合法性;同时,他又通过"天立王以为民也"的设定,将人间统治者的统治置于以天道为依据的王道的规制之下。在此基础之上,他结合现实,对儒家视域中与王道相对的霸道,进行了论述,认为王霸皆本于仁,将儒法结合,并在治道层面主张德主刑辅,大德小刑,从而把儒法结合后的政治行动力契入儒家,使其主张具有非常强烈的现实感和可操作性。由此,中国近千年的霸王道杂之的治道模式在一定程度上得以确立。     

Rent-seeking and competitive preferences

In this experiment, I examine the extent to which competitive social preferences can explain over-bidding in rent-seeking contests. The Human treatment is a standard two-player contest. In the Robot treatment, a single player bids against a computerized player, eliminating potential social preference motives. The results show no difference in bids between treatments at the aggregate level. Further analysis shows evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects between impulsive and reflective subjects. Moreover, impulsive subjects are more likely than reflective subjects to deviate qualitatively from the shape of the theoretical best response function.     

政策性农业保险中投保农户道德风险的博弈分析

政策性农业保险是政府支持农业生产、稳定农户收入、促进农村可持续发展的农业支持保护体系的重要组成部分,近几年逐渐在全国各省市进行试点实施。农业保险市场上的信息不对称易引起逆向选择和道德风险问题,严重影响政策性农业保险市场的健康发展,制约农业保险作用的发挥。因此,有必要对政策性农业保险中投保农户的道德风险问题进行分析,以降低道德风险的发生,促进政策性农业保险的发展。