发展地球系统科学的背景、问题及对策

本文比较了地球系统科学和传统地球科学在研究方法上的区别 ,认为地球系统科学的产生对地球科学各分支的局限性形成挑战 ,指出 :(1)规模适度的研究团队是从事地球系统科学的基础 ;(2 )基于地球各分支学科的系统整合是地球系统科学演进的基本路径 ;(3)生物系统与非生物系统的交互作用是地球系统科学研究的难点。本文还提出了推动地球系统科学研究的相关措施。     

面向价值网络的企业协同竞争博弈模型研究

运用演化博弈理论的方法,分析价值网络模式下企业的协同竞争机制,构建企业主体间协同竞争的演化博弈模型,指出价值网络模式下企业协同竞争行为的博弈过程及特点,揭示出系统的初始状态、发展阶段及利益分配机制对演化博弈过程的影响机理。     

Discerning self‐interested behaviour in attitudes towards welfare state responsibilities across Europe

Baslevent C, Kirmanoglu H. Discerning self‐interested behaviour in attitudes towards welfare state responsibilities across Europe Int J Soc Welfare 2011: 20: 344–352 © 2010 The Author(s), International Journal of Social Welfare © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the International Journal of Social Welfare. This article reports on an investigation into the influence of individual characteristics on attitudes to government responsibility for welfare‐related tasks using data from the European Social Survey. The main finding of this investigation was that socio‐demographic characteristics, basic personal values, a left–right ideological position and religious affiliation were all associated with attitudes towards welfare policies. An item‐by‐item examination of the six issues enquired about in the survey revealed that people tended to hold the government responsible for tasks that would benefit them more directly. Taken as a whole, the empirical findings were interpreted to mean that individuals' tastes for welfare state policies were driven, at least partially, by self‐interest, but it was also noted that further work was needed to disentangle the potential role of group loyalty effects.     

School tracking and its role in social reproduction: reinforcing educational inheritance and the direct effects of social origin

The degree of social reproduction varies considerably between industrialized countries, raising the question of which institutional regulations promote or restrict this process. Education is considered the main mediator of social reproduction. Because school tracking – the sorting of children according to ability and interest at different ages – is known to affect educational attainment and the degree of tracking varies strongly across countries, it may thus account for differences in social reproduction. However, empirical studies are scarce, and the total impact of tracking on social reproduction remains ambiguous. Using the European Social Survey (ESS) 2012 and 2014 from 24 countries, we demonstrate that school tracking is strongly associated with higher degrees of social reproduction. Decomposing the process of social reproduction into educational inheritance, educational returns and direct effects of social origin, we find that although all channels contribute to social reproduction, the impact of tracking seems to be exerted through educational inheritance and to a similar degree through direct effects of social origin, whereas educational returns do not seem to be affected. Even net of educational attainment, social origin thus has a stronger effect on social status in tracked systems. We ascribe this effect to differences in qualitative choices within educational tracks, such as fields of study.     

力量不对等供应链下游寡头行为演化机理

以常见的垄断竞争的供应商和寡头竞争的强势零售商组成的供应链为研究对象,应用演化博弈论中双种群演化模型探讨供应商讨价还价能力对强势零售商使用买方势力行为的影响,得到强势零售商对供应商交易行为的演化稳定策略(ESS)。研究表明,供应商的讨价还价能力和零售商转嫁成本策略导致的交易成本和风险成本是影响ESS的重要因素,供应商较高的讨价还价能力及转嫁成本策略导致的较高的交易成本和风险成本,将有助于消除零售商滥用买方势力的行为。     

协调型制度的进化博弈分析

运用进化博弈论方法来研究协调型制度,将其定义为协调博弈的进化稳定策略均衡.指出协调博弈的多重均衡导致了制度的多样性,于是不同制度间的效率差异产生了制度变迁的压力,但是制度变迁能否实现还取决于与制度所对应的均衡是否具有随机稳定性.     

政府统计部门实施用户满意度调查的若干构想——基于欧洲统计系统的实践经验

通过用户满意度调查来测量用户对统计数据质量水平的主观感知,为统计数据质量评估与控制提供了一条重要的信息渠道。基于对政府统计部门实施用户满意度调查的社会背景及其必要性的分析,借鉴在国际同领域实践中起步较早的、较具代表性的欧洲统计系统用户满意度调查的相关实践经验,对中国政府统计部门实施用户满意度调查的制度保障、目标定位与内容设计以及调查组织实施等方面的实践要领进行了探讨。     

基于演化博弈的风险投资退出歧视价格拍卖竞价系统均衡研究

本文以风险投资退出股权歧视价格拍卖为研究背景,运用演化博弈的方法研究异质投标企业的竞价策略,得出了在不同的市场供需情况下竞价策略演化的一般规律。研究表明:竞价系统最终均衡不仅与投标企业相对支付有关,而且与市场供需情况以及系统初始状态有关。最后指出通过设置竞价下限、隐藏市场供给以及信号传递可以有效地促进投标企业选择高价策略。     

流域水资源配置中的演化博弈分析

论文将演化博弈理论运用流域水资源配置中,分别通过对水资源生产商之间以及水资源生产商和政府水资源监管部门的复制动态及其进化稳定策略进行分析,求出了各自的复制动态方程以及进化稳定策略,并进行了稳定性分析。研究表明:(1)水资源生产商之间的演化博弈存在唯一进化稳定策略;(2)水资源生产商与政府水资源管理部门的演化博弈,存在两个演化稳定策略:(H,L),(L,H),其中(L,H)是期望的系统演化方向;(3)超量取水策略群体的比例越大,各参与群体的期望得益越小,从而引发水资源配置中的冲突问题,采取正常取水策略可以增加双方的期望得益,政府水资源监管部门采取重奖重罚的激励机制可以有效抑制超量取水,拆解冲突,增加得益。