Demand for decision autonomy and the desire to avoid responsibility in risky environments: Experimental evidence

This paper experimentally studies individuals’ willingness to pay for the authority to make risky decisions for themselves, and the willingness to take responsibility for others, as primary determinants of leadership willingness. We consider a setup involving a pair of individuals, where one individual is designated to make both parties’ decisions by default. Depending on treatment, either party can express a willingness to pay to change this situation. If one’s willingness to pay to make her own decision herself is positive (negative), we interpret it as a demand for autonomy (a desire to delegate). On the flip side, if one’s willingness to pay to avoid making a decision on behalf of another person is positive (negative), we interpret it as a desire to avoid responsibility (a demand for authority). We find that on average, individuals are willing to pay positive amounts of money to make their decisions themselves, and incur positive but smaller opportunity costs for the right to make decisions for others. Certain individual and contextual characteristics emerge as important predictors. Notably, (1) men are more likely to demand both autonomy and authority at the same time, (2) individuals with other regarding preferences are more likely to pay to avoid taking responsibility for others’ decisions when the probability of loss is high. Exploring differences between individuals’ own decisions and the decisions they make on behalf of others, we find that subjects with other-regarding preferences tend to “cautious-shift” when making decisions on behalf of others. Also, we find that individuals who would like to avoid responsibility also tend to “shift” their decisions when put in a decision-making role. The results have implications for the allocation of decision-making authority in pairs and leadership.     

Competitive compensation and subjective well-being: The effect of culture and gender

This paper uses a controlled experiment to investigate how subjects exposed to competition in the workplace react in terms of well-being, and how this translates into productivity. The experiment was performed in Korea, a country with an interdependent culture, and France, a country with an independent culture. Exposure to the tournament slightly improves well-being in the Korean sample and decreases it in France. This different response is driven primarily by the opposite response of female subjects, with Korean women liking and French women disliking to compete. Finally, an improvement in well-being is associated with ex-post higher productivity in France, and this positive effect is most salient in the French male population; in Korea, a similar positive effect can be observed only in the female population.     

Determinants of in-group bias: Is group affiliation mediated by guilt-aversion?

In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of Social Identity Theory’s main findings. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it merely due to group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion moderating the strength of in-group favoring? We induce group membership in a minimal group setting, observe in-/out-group transfers and elicit corresponding beliefs. According to our experimental data group affiliation affects beliefs and explains a substantial part of the bias. Evidence for guilt-aversion is found only when beliefs are elicited before actions.     

Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games

This paper investigates the impact of cognitive abilities and preferences on behavior in games. We first measure subjects’ logical abilities and social preferences and then evaluate their influence on behavior in strategic-form games. For this purpose, we estimate how logical abilities and preferences relate to the probability of a subject being of a specific behavioral type. We find that better logical abilities increase the likelihood of sophisticated behavior. This shift is stronger for subjects who are classified as “selfish”. However, not even the most logically able, selfish subjects are identified as Nash types.     

The effect of cognitive diversity on the illusion of control bias in strategic decisions: An experimental investigation

By integrating cognitive diversity into debiasing literature, this paper contributes towards opening the black box of executive judgment. Based on information processing theory we investigate the role of cognitive diversity in strategic decision making. We apply a vignette-based experimental research design to examine the effect of cognitive diversity in teams on decision maker's illusion of control. The results of these experiments provide evidence for a positive influence of high cognitive diversity for debiasing judgment while similarly indicating no such effect for groups with low cognitive diversity. These findings suggest that group composition aspects can play an important role for improving judgment in decision making teams and open promising new avenues for studying debiasing in behavioral strategy research.     

Designing two factor experiments for selecting interactions

This paper considers the problem of devising a single stage procedure for selecting the treatment combination associated with the largest interaction in a two-factor rfx× c experiment having independent normally distributed observations with common known variance. The intuitive procedure based on the best linear unbiased estimators of the population interactions is employed. Initially an indifference zone formulation is used; the problem of determining the least favorable configuration is reduced to a nonlinear programming problem with log concave objective function and a convex polytope as feasible region. A solution technique is introduced in the context of an illustrative example. The problem is also considered using a preferred population formulation; this approach requires a strengthened version of the indifference zone probability requirement. It is shown that the same sample size guarantees this requirement as does the earlier one.     

Leadership in the digital era: A review of who,what, when,where, and why

Leadership as a social influence process has always involved a complex set of phenomena that demands an interdisciplinary lens. Leadership scholarship has now entered into a digital era. In a digital era, the overall phenomenon is changing, as are the tools through which we study it, demanding a new “lens” through which we view leadership. Yet, this raises the question, to what extent is leadership different in a digital era? In acknowledgement of this trend, a special issue was commissioned at The Leadership Quarterly that sought to stimulate the imagination of leadership scholars and practitioners. In the current work, we begin with a brief review of who, what, when, where and why of digital leadership. We cover leadership in informal contexts (e.g., social media), generalization from face-to-face to virtual contexts, computational modeling, the leveraging of technology (e.g., machine learning; Big Data), as well methodological how-to guides. We then plot a path forward for leadership scholars in the dawn of the digital era.     

‘Born this Way’? Prenatal exposure to testosterone may determine behavior in competition and conflict

Fetal exposure to sex hormones can have long lasting effects on human behavior. The second-to-fourth digit ratio (DR) is considered a putative marker for prenatal exposure to testosterone (vs estrogens), with higher exposure resulting in lower DR. Even though testosterone is theoretically related to competition, the role of DR in human behavior is debated; and in situations such as bilateral conflict is unknown. We investigate this through a laboratory experiment using a repeated 2-person Tullock contest played in fixed same-gender pairs. Based on a previously obtained large sample of student subjects, we selectively invited participants to the laboratory if their right-hand DR was in the top (High-DR) or bottom (Low-DR) tercile for their gender. Unbeknownst to the subjects, we performed a controlled match of the DR types (Low-Low, Low-High, High-High). This novel methodology allows us to analyze the causal effect of DR on behavior for the first time in the literature. We find that Low-DR (vs High-DR) males compete more aggressively regardless of the counterpart’s type. For females’ conflict behavior, the counterpart’s type matters more than the decision-maker’s type: Low-DRs are non-significantly more aggressive but every-one is more aggressive against High-DRs. Limitations due to sample size are discussed.     

Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players

Artificial intelligence (AI) is starting to pervade the economic and social life. This renders strategic interactions between humans and artificial agents more and more common. At the same time, experimentalists have increasingly employed computer players as a tool to provide a deeper understanding of strategic interaction in general. What can this strand of research teach us about the strategic behavior of humans interacting with AI? I review 162 experimental studies using computer players. I find that behavior and the outcomes of strategic interaction often change when humans interact with computer players rather than other humans. In particular, humans usually adapt to computer players even absent detailed prior information about them, they often act more selfishly and more rationally in their presence, and they apply different cognitive processes. Moreover, while humans are able to exploit computer players following simple algorithms, they are also vulnerable to exploitation by more sophisticated ones. Conversely, computer players may also enhance efficiency. I suggest several directions for future research.     

Personality preferences in laboratory economics experiments

Student volunteers at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) participated in one of the following one-shot games: a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner's dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type for explaining subjects’ decisions. With controls for personality preferences, we find little evidence of behavioral differences between males and females. Furthermore, we conclude that seniority breeds feelings of entitlement—seniors at USNA generally exhibited the least cooperative or other-regarding behavior.