推进公平是市场经济体制下政府的重要职能

推进公平是政府在市场经济体制下必须履行的重要职能 ,政府推进公平是协调经济利益关系、维持社会稳定的需要 ,是提高效率的保证 ,是对“市场缺陷”的弥补。公平是发展社会主义市场经济的最终目标之一。政府干预市场是为了实现效率与公平的兼顾与协调。为防止两极分化 ,我国政府须在推进起点公平、结果公平、环境公平上应采取切实可行的措施。     

Exploring Neglected Dimensions of Social Policy: The SDW, Fiscal Welfare and the Exemplar of Local Taxation in England

Titmuss's Social Division of Welfare (SDW) thesis is a vitally important but much neglected element of social policy analysis. This article seeks to explore the SDW, with a particular focus on fiscal welfare. Fiscal welfare has been described as forming a hidden welfare state, and while taxation is one of the main ways in which governments affect the lives of citizens, studies of welfare pay remarkably little attention to its impact. Fiscal welfare is examined by using, as an exemplar, local taxation in England, a subject that itself is neglected within social policy. Local taxation in England is of interest because it illustrates the impact of a system of taxation on different groups of citizens, and how this can operate to the benefit of rich over poor citizens. This is because the current system is highly regressive, meaning that those on low and middle incomes spend proportionately more of their income paying the tax than do those on high incomes. What is of further interest is how within the debate about reform of local taxation, concern with regressivity becomes obscured and ceases to be the focus of attention. We are thus provided with an example of how fiscal welfare remains a hidden issue. The article concludes by arguing that social policy analysis needs to move beyond the narrow confines of social welfare and develop a broader understanding of welfare, based on the SDW.     

Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions

Reciprocity considerations are important to the tax compliance problem as they may explain the global dynamics of tax evasion, beyond individual tax evasion decisions, toward a downward or upward spiral. To provide evidence on reciprocity in tax compliance decisions, we have conducted a laboratory experiment in which we introduced two types of inequities. The first type of inequity is called vertical, because it refers to inequities introduced by the government when it sets different fiscal parameters for identical taxpayers, while the second type of inequity is called horizontal because it refers to the fact that taxpayers may differ in tax compliance decisions. In this setting, taxpayers may react to a disadvantageous or advantageous inequity through negative or positive reciprocal behaviors, respectively. Our results support the existence of negative and positive reciprocity in both vertical and horizontal cases. When both inequities come into play and may induce reciprocal behaviors in opposite directions, the horizontal always dominates the vertical.     

收入再分配政策能否兼顾效率与公平的经济学分析

长期以来,社会各界对于“收入再分配政策能否兼顾效率与公平”问题一直存在着激烈的争论,而对于这一问题的回答不仅具有深远的理论意义,而且具有重要的政策涵义.为此,本文通过构建数理经济模型的方法,参与对这一问题的理论探讨.根据本文理论模型的分析,得出一个关键结论:在一些参数条件下,再分配政策可以兼顾效率与公平;而在另一些参数条件下,“效率与公平”这两个政策目标之间存在冲突.本文的这一结论并没有简单支持以往的任何一种观点,而是表明:如果能够根据经济发展水平,合理设计收入再分配政策,就可以实现效率与公平兼顾的政策目标;如果再分配政策的设计与经济发展水平不相适应,那么旨在改善收入分配不平等状况的再分配政策就会阻碍经济增长.     

Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments

While preference-based explanations play an increasing role in economics and sociology, the accurate measurement of social preferences deserves more attention. Most laboratory experiments measure social preferences by studying the division of “a cake that nobody had to bake” (Güth and Kliemt, 2003). This article reports results of the first ultimatum game experiment with bargaining over waiting time. The experiment was created to avoid effects of windfall gains. In contrast to donated money, time is not endowed by the experimenter and implies a natural loss to subjects. This allows for a better measurement of the inherent conflict in the ultimatum game. We implemented three anonymity conditions; one baseline condition, one condition with anonymity among subjects and one double-blind condition in which the experimenter did not know the division of waiting time. While we expected to observe less other-regarding behavior in ultimatum game bargaining over time, our experimental results rather confirm previous ultimatum game experiments, in which people bargained over money. The modal offer was half of the waiting time and only one offer was rejected. Interestingly, anonymity did not change the results significantly. In conclusion, our experiment confirms other-regarding behavior in the ultimatum game.     

我国社会福利的发展取向:走进福利国家——基于风险社会理论的分析

风险社会理论是西方学者关于晚期现代性社会问题的一种思考。它虽然不能直接应用到我国语境中来,但能够促进我们对转型中的社会问题加以反思。从这个意义上,我国解决转型中的社会问题与社会风险的方略也与西方是不同的。当前中国正面临着多重社会风险,并且这些风险是不平等地分配的。要化解风险,需要我们建立制度化的社会福利制度,促进劳动力的去商品化、满足社会需要和维护社会公平。从长期来看,我们需要重返福利国家。     

社会工作在创新社会管理中的作用

发展社会事业、促进社会公正、加强社会管理、完善社会体制是新的历史时期社会建设的主要内容。创新社会管理就是要以主动的建设和变革为手段,以改善社会的状况、建设一个更好的社会。公平正义既是创新社会管理的有效途径,也是社会工作的专业价值追求,因此,社会工作的发展必将为创新社会管理注入新的活力。     

服务公平性对储户与银行之间关系的影响

作者在某银行广州地区的15个营业点对储户进行了一次问卷调查,探讨服务公平性对顾客与企业之间关系的影响。数据分析结果表明,结果公平性、程序公平性、交往公平性和储户感觉中的软、硬质量是同一个高阶因子的子因子,储户在正常服务环境中感知的服务公平性影响储户的消费情感和储户对本次消费经历的评估(服务质量、消费价值、储户的满意感),进而影响储户与银行之间的关系(信任感、储户与服务人员的人际关系纽带、储户与银行的感情纽带)和储户的行为意向(再购意向和口头宣传意向)。     

Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power

We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders. We also elicit responders’ willingness to pay for (un)conditional veto power. The bids reveal a large endowment effect.     

从“效率优先”转向“注重公平”的必然性

公平与效率的关系是当前我国社会面临的最基本、最重要的问题之一,关系到社会的稳定发展,关系到社会主义和谐社会的构建和社会主义的前途命运。公平与效率是一个矛盾的统一体。公平是以人本身为尺度的平等,效率是以劳动为尺度的平等。公平维持着社会的正常秩序,效率提供着社会发展的动力。只有保持公平与效率的平衡,才能使社会在和谐、稳定中可持续发展。我国社会发展已进入一个关键期,社会发展的内在逻辑已由"效率优先"转变为公正优先,注重公平已成为社会的主要问题。