霍克海默形而上学批判研究述评

国内外学界对霍克海默形而上学批判的研究不系统，研究领域主要集中在关于霍克海默对实证主义的批判研究、关于霍克海默批判理论的特色研究、关于霍克海默批判理论的理论来源研究以及关于霍克海默批判理论的困境等方面，而关于霍克海默形而上学批判思想零星地反映在这些研究的文本中。通过梳理国内外学者的观点可以发现，霍克海默形而上学批判思想是其构建批判理论的真正发源地。     

Traditional,Problem-Solving and Critical Theory: An Analysis of Horkheimer and Cox's Setting of the ‘Critical’ Divide

Abstract

Robert W. Cox's dictum that ‘(t)heory is for someone and for some purpose’ (emphasis in the original) is said to be the most-quoted line in International Relations (IR) theory. Yet whilst this spurred a revolution in critical thinking in IR, it echoed a far older conception of Critical Theory advanced by Max Horkheimer in the 1930s that claimed there is ‘no theory of society?…?that does not contain political motivations'. Both sentiments emphasize the relation between knowledge and human interests, and yet both formulate two distinct—though allied—ways of approaching ‘critical’ theorizing. In order to understand the similarities and differences in their approaches, this paper draws out three loci of difference between Cox and Horkheimer regarding the question of emancipation: (i) the epistemological relation between ‘critical’ and ‘Problem-Solving’ (Cox) or ‘Traditional Theory’ (Horkheimer); (ii) the emphasis placed on transformation and historical process; and (iii) the importance of intersubjectivity in how each approach emancipation. It is argued that by actively combining critical (dialectical) approaches across the social sciences, broadening human agency through civilizational dialogue, and retaining a commitment to emancipatory (and visionary) political futures based on human association, that Critical International Theory can maintain ongoing relevance in IR.     

批判性：霍克海默的核心编辑理念及其启示

霍克海默的核心编辑理念是其社会批判理论所彰显的批判性,是对马克思主义批判思想的继承,也是他编辑实践中的立场、方法和理论。其核心编辑理念的启示意义在于：有助于恪守坚定的编辑信念和原则;有助于在编辑实践中既抓住现实热点,又把握深刻的理论识度;有助于立足社会现实并坚守道德评判尺度,弘扬社会责任与担当意识。     

意识形态：从特殊到总体再到知识社会学——兼论霍克海默对曼海姆意识形态概念的批判

曼海姆站在知识社会学的立场上,以意识形态的特殊概念为起点,中途经过总体概念,最后上升并回到他构建的知识社会学这一基点,从而诠释了一个全新的流动的意识形态概念。霍克海默以马克思主义为视角对其概念的思辩和形而上学性进行了有力地批驳。     

理性的自祭——《启蒙辩证法》在康德和黑格尔概念框架中的根源

本文从康德和黑格尔的相关论点中勾勒出德国哲学传统对启蒙的独特反思路向,并且证明,<启蒙辩证法>本身是在前二者所奠定的概念框架中展开的,它对启蒙的批判既是德国唯心主义传统的延续又是对它的消解,这种对总体性的总体化批判本身陷入"说谎者悖论"般的悖谬境地,构成启蒙之后意识哲学自我否定的最后一击.     

从《启蒙辩证法》看霍克海默的真理观

以霍克海默的《启蒙辩证法》为主要依据,参证其他著述,并结合时代语境来梳理霍克海默的真理观,旨在揭示出霍氏真理观的否定神学背景及其时代意义。