塞尔意向行动理论探析

意向行动理论是塞尔行动哲学的重点,研究对象是人类有意识、有目标的行动.首先,梳理意向行动的构成要素,包括“慎思”、“在先意向”、“行动中意向”、“行动”和“间隔”.其次,通过解析要素的相互关系,廓清意向行动的结构和运作模式,以图形方式展现出来.最后,评述奥肖尼斯和帕切里关于“在先意向”和“行动中意向”的一系列批判性观点.以此为基础,论证如何通过“行动中意向”来消解早期行动因果理论的异常因果链问题.     

论哈贝马斯对言语行为理论的继承与超越

哈贝马斯的普遍语用学以奥斯汀与塞尔的言语行为理论为基础，但又有超越。这种超越体现在3个方面：哈贝马斯突破了奥斯汀与塞尔关于制度界限内的以言行事行为，提出了非制度界限内的言语行为，并研究了后者实现以言行事的效果必须要满足的语用前提；与奥斯汀和塞尔不同，哈贝马斯明确提出了3种不同的有效性要求；哈贝马斯在批判奥斯汀与塞尔对言语行为分类的基础上，提出了自己的言语行为的分类。     

言语行为论能用来反驳罗素的摹状词理论吗?

约翰·塞尔提出了一种基于言语行为论的论证,支持斯特劳森,反驳罗素的限定摹状词理论。他的论证有两个前提。第一,只有两种可能的方式把罗素的理论应用于所有种类的语内行为:我们要么把每个包含限定摹状词的语内行为都分析为包含有存在断定,或者把它分析为只在命题内容中有存在性表达。第二个前提是两种方式都行不通。我质疑第二个前提并试图表明塞尔并没有给出充分理由证明普通所谓命令或提问不能包含断定。在结尾处,我描述了一种语言现象,即包含限定摹状词的语言可用来进行欺骗,以支持罗素的理论。     

自然主义视角下的海德格尔意义观——兼论现象学与自然主义的视域差异

塞尔从自然主义立场出发，批评现象学犯了视角主义的错误，并将其困境解读为“现象学的幻象”，认为海德格尔的意义观就是这种幻象的典型。塞尔的这个解读没有足够注意海德格尔有关语言意义与存在意义的区分。从自然主义视野看，海德格尔将语言意义追溯至存在意义的做法看起来预设了意义的存在，并且陷入了某种循环之中。但海德格尔并没有停留在这里，而是借此循环进一步揭示出意义的时间性结构。反之，通过考察自然主义意义观的基本思路可以发现，意义与真之间也存在某种循环定义或论证的关系。自然主义者没有看到现象学思考的着力点正是此意义与真的相互交织处。与自然主义被动地陷入“循环-定义”不同，现象学主动地接受并展示这个“循环-结构”自身的意义。海德格尔的意义观就是此意义结构的一个生动展示。     

商务合同中暗示条款的言语行为理论探析

《合同法》规定合同条款分为明示条款和暗示条款。暗示条款无需在合同中以文字的形式出现,但需要当事人双方通过正常的思维能推断出来。法律和语言之间的关系不是孤立的。语言学家约翰·兰肖·奥斯汀的言语行为理论既是《合同法》中暗示条款存在的语言学基础,又是对《合同法》中暗示条款进行司法解释的有力证据,它影响、制约着《合同法》中暗示条款的存在、发展和应用。     

Institutions as dispositions: Searle,Smith and the metaphysics of blind chess

This paper addresses the question what the fundamental nature and mode of being of institutional reality is. Besides the recent debate with Tony Lawson, Barry Smith is also one of the relatively few authors to have explicitly challenged John Searle's social ontology on this metaphysical question, with Smith's realism requirement for institutions conflicting with Searle's requirement of a one‐world naturalism. This paper proposes that an account of institutions as powers or dispositions is not only congenial to Searle's general account, but can also satisfy both the realism and the one world requirements. Searle's worry that such a dispositional account is unable to account for the deontic nature of institutions is countered by an appeal to higher‐order powers as well as Searle's notion of the gap and desire‐independent reasons for action.     

塞尔社会实在理论的批判性研究

塞尔的社会实在理论是从本体论角度探讨人类如何建构社会实在的理论。为了证明其社会实在理论,塞尔提出三要素即功能归属或赋予、集体意向性、构成性规则的论证,并在此基础上,发展出一条更好的基本原则即地位功能宣告的论证。但是,由于悬置了人类实践,塞尔的论证是不合理的。从马克思主义的立场看,塞尔的社会实在理论揭示了语言在人类建构社会实在中的重要作用,从而丰富了实践与社会实在之间的中介理论;但它通过悬置支撑语言制度的实践行为,过高地夸大了语言制度在社会实在建构中的作用。     

A sociological formalization of Searle's social ontology

John Searle's theory of social reality is among the most influential accounts in the history of philosophy. His theory also implicates concepts and issues of foundational interest to sociologists, including social structure, institutional differentiation and the relationship between linguistic performativity and institutional reality. Despite this overlap with sociological theory, and despite some sustained attention from sociologists (e.g., Lukes, 2007 ), no formal theoretical model of Searle's work exists within sociology. This paper reviews the core concepts of Searle's theory before concisely describing and then formally modelling their propositional structure. Though the overlap of Searle's approach with classical and contemporary sociological theory is discussed throughout, the paper concludes with a specific argument about his proper assimilation into sociological theory vis‐à‐vis Durkheim, Bourdieu and Giddens.     

言语行为理论的哲学思考

言语行为理论的创建和发展为20世纪的语言哲学的发展打开了新的视野和思路。文章以语言哲学和社会哲学的视角,从语言的意义、语言与人和社会的关系两个方面对言语行为理论进行研究和探讨,并指出言语行为理论拓展了传统语言意义的概念,为我们全面理解语言的本质,以及语言与社会的互动关系产生了积极的推动作用。     

On the historicity of social ontology

The question I raise is whether the basic features of mind, social categories, and society are unchanging or changing. Some understandings of ontology would seem to suggest that social ontology is a branch of metaphysics. However, as the history of concepts such as metaphysical and ontology indicate, our concepts and knowledge are historical. It is widely held that society is concept- and activity-dependent. I examine critically two strands of social ontology in terms of their answers to this problematic: (1) John Searle’s theory of the construction of social reality and (2) critical realist theory of mind and society as interlaced emergent layers of reality. Apart from emergence in natural systems, there is also emergence beyond nature as consciousness, agency and society cannot be completely explained in terms of biological realities; but how and when did this emergence occur? We need an account of the emergent order of language, reflectively conscious mind, and institutions not only for its own sake, but also because the process whereby new objects and properties emerge may be on-going, path-dependent, diverse, and open-ended. The main argument is that the object of study of social theorists is geo-historically specific, liable to diversity within any given world-historical epoch, and open to further changes and new forms of emergence in the future.