工业劳动力流动、资本创造与经济地理空间均衡

资本创造模型（CC模型）忽视了要素流动对产业空间分布的影响。而发展的新的资本创造模型则认为资本集聚的过程必然伴随着工业劳动力的流动过程。另外，是资本的实际收益而不是名义收益决定资本是否创造。研究结果表明，随着贸易自由度、工业品支出份额及资本贴现率的变大，替代弹性及资本折旧率的变小，将降低对称结构的稳定性，而提高中心-外围结构的稳定性；经济地理空间的产业均衡是集聚力和分散力相互作用的结果。当企业生产工业品的规模报酬递增程度足够显著，或者工业品支出份额很高时，市场拥挤效应将彻底消失，并转化成为促进产业集聚的动力；突破点与持续点的大小比较可以形成不同的关系，这意味着随着贸易自由度的变化，本文发展的资本创造模型可以体现出多样化的产业空间动态演化行为。     

政府动态奖惩机制下绿色建筑供给侧演化博弈研究

从绿色建筑供给侧角度出发，构建消费者效用函数、开发商利润函数和政府与开发商的演化博弈模型，分析消费者绿色偏好、建筑绿色度、成本等因素对建筑价格、需求和利润的影响以及政府动态奖惩政策下系统的演化稳定策略。结果表明：消费者绿色偏好支付系数和建筑绿色度的增大有利于绿色建筑价格、需求和利润的提高，但高成本却使需求和利润降低；政府采用静态补贴与静态税收政策时，博弈系统不存在演化稳定策略，采用动态补贴与静态税收、静态补贴与动态税收、动态补贴与动态税收三种政策组合时，系统存在演化稳定策略；动态补贴与静态税收的政策组合在推动绿色建筑发展方面优于其他政策；开发商开发绿色建筑的概率与补贴上限值呈负相关，与税收上限值呈正相关。     

从主权国家的兴衰看权力博弈形态的转型

传统的国际关系理论,无论是现实主义、自由主义、建构主义还是科学行为主义理论,都是把主权国家抽象成一个统一的国际关系行为体。这一行为主体有一致的利益,也自然要有一致的对外政策目标和手段。在20世纪,尤其是在两次世界大战和冷战期间,这一概念抽象是非常准确的。但冷战结束以后,尤其是进入21世纪以后,这一概念抽象逐渐与国际关系的现实相违背。一方面,国家综合实力并不能直接转化为具体领域的竞争优势;另一方面,很多国家,包括超级大国在内,其对外政策的主要阻力可能不是所谓的竞争对手,而是其国内不同的利益集团。这导致传统的国际关系理论,从假设到概念和推理层面,都已经无法解释和预测今天的世界,而权力小博弈理论可以为认识多元复杂互动博弈时代的国际关系提供一个新的解释框架。     

The Eurasian Economic Union: Development Prospects and Possible Obstacles

This article analyzes the development prospects and problems for the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). It examines issues of integration within the EAEU, as well as interactions with other countries, both CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and non-CIS. The main problem of integration within the EAEU is the dominance of redistributive motives over productive ones. This article assesses the extent of Russian oil and gas transfers to EAEU partners and the impact of tax maneuvers on their size. It shows that the creation of mechanisms for redistributing profits within the EAEU will allow a positive economic effect to materialize from free trade agreements with non-CIS countries. The article assesses the risks for the EAEU related to Russia’s introduction of a unilateral ban on food imports from countries on the sanctions list and to the possible establishment of tariffs on trade with Ukraine.     

Who Should Pay for Interdependent Risk? Policy Implications for Security Interdependence Among Airports

We study interdependent risks in security, and shed light on the economic and policy implications of increasing security interdependence in presence of reactive attackers. We investigate the impact of potential public policy arrangements on the security of a group of interdependent organizations, namely, airports. Focusing on security expenditures and costs to society, as assessed by a social planner, to individual airports and to attackers, we first develop a game-theoretic framework, and derive explicit Nash equilibrium and socially optimal solutions in the airports network. We then conduct numerical experiments mirroring real-world cyber scenarios, to assess how a change in interdependence impact the airports' security expenditures, the overall expected costs to society, and the fairness of security financing. Our study provides insights on the economic and policy implications for the United States, Europe, and Asia.     

Security Investment in Contagious Networks

Security of the systems is normally interdependent in such a way that security risks of one part affect other parts and threats spread through the vulnerable links in the network. So, the risks of the systems can be mitigated through investments in the security of interconnecting links. This article takes an innovative look at the problem of security investment of nodes on their vulnerable links in a given contagious network as a game‐theoretic model that can be applied to a variety of applications including information systems. In the proposed game model, each node computes its corresponding risk based on the value of its assets, vulnerabilities, and threats to determine the optimum level of security investments on its external links respecting its limited budget. Furthermore, direct and indirect nonlinear influences of a node's security investment on the risks of other nodes are considered. The existence and uniqueness of the game's Nash equilibrium in the proposed game are also proved. Further analysis of the model in a practical case revealed that taking advantage of the investment effects of other players, perfectly rational players (i.e., those who use the utility function of the proposed game model) make more cost‐effective decisions than selfish nonrational or semirational players.     

农业投入中政府与农户的博弈分析

农业投入状况关系着农业生产和农村经济的发展。目前农业投入不足已成为制约我国整体经济发展的“瓶颈”。在是否增加农业投入的问题上,政府与农户之间存在着一种博弈关系。通过农业投入不足的现状考察,用博弈的方法阐释农业投入不足的原因,提出加大农业投入的几点对策。     

林业投资均衡性的理论分析

我国林业投资体制的改革面临着许多新的课题,研究市场经济条件下林业投资状况十分必要。首先,从均衡理论出发,在分析宏观经济政策对林业的影响和林业投资现状基础上,对形成这种状况的主要原因进行了探讨;其次,以林业投资对象为主体,对其微观经济行为的成本与收益问题进行了分析;最后,提出深化林业投资体制改革要促进投资主体多元化,给予林业更多的政策扶持,进一步完善林业法律法规,以促进我国林业持续稳定地发展。     

管理贸易的制度经济学分析

各国开展对外贸易是为了能充分、有效配置国内外资源 ,并从中获得最大利益 ,但在追求最大利益的过程中 ,各国所采取的贸易政策都不尽相同。这些不同的贸易政策大体分为自由贸易与保护贸易两类。 2 0世纪 80年代初 ,一种既不同于自由贸易 ,也不同于保护贸易 ,但又兼有两者特点的新型的贸易制度开始出现 ,这便是“管理贸易”。管理贸易是自由贸易与保护贸易博弈的结果 ,是各国在无法达到最佳目标模式时所能选择的次佳目标模式 ,其本质是有组织的自由和协调的保护。一些西方国家先后采取管理贸易并获得了有效的实践效果。我国应正视这一新情况、新趋势进行贸易制度变迁与创新———实行偏保护的管理贸易政策     

关于人性论的博弈分析

中国的人性论生发出的圣人治国,是对人性的否定,产生的是囚徒困境难题;西方的人性论产生的是法律治国,是对人性的肯定,破解了囚徒困境难题.从博弈论视角看,出现如此分野的原因是,中国古代社会政治家们试图设计一种仅有帕累托最优均衡的制度,但因为没有从现实的人性出发,导致只能依靠人治维护表面的帕累托最优均衡,实际上存在的却是囚徒困境;西方社会的政治家们则以承认人性为前提,设计了一种帕累托次优均衡的制度.