关于知识推理的几种常用不精确推理模型的探讨

本文对常用几种的不精确推理模型作了初略的评述，并对这几种不精确推理模型的性能作出比较，从而得出它们的优点和缺点。     

会计信息失真的根源及其对策

会计信息失真是一个严重的现实问题,其带来的经济和社会影响巨大。为此对会计信息失真的表现和原因进行剖析,并提出了相应对策。     

解释论视野下的不动产登记错误的司法救济——从民事诉讼和行政诉讼交错的视角

在物权法之下,不动产登记错误的司法救济有民事诉讼与行政诉讼两种形式,就登记机构不予更正登记多提起行政诉讼;异议登记后提起的诉讼则属于民事诉讼;登记错误的赔偿诉讼既有民事诉讼,又有行政诉讼。不动产登记法应当统一司法救济模式,以便受损害的当事人主张权利。     

Effects of Accurate and Inaccurate Feedback on Work Performance: The Role of the Awareness of Inaccuracy

ABSTRACT

This study compared the effects of accurate (i.e., contingent) and inaccurate (i.e., non-contingent) feedback on work performance under two different work conditions. Under one work condition, participants could clearly see the outcome of their performance (i.e., visible condition). Under the other condition, they could not clearly see the outcome of their performance (i.e., non-visible condition). One hundred and twenty participants were randomly assigned to four experimental conditions (i.e., accurate/visible, inaccurate/visible, accurate/non-visible, and inaccurate/non-visible) and asked to perform a simulated work task. The results indicated that inaccurate feedback was as effective as accurate feedback under the non-visible condition, but inaccurate feedback was less effective than accurate feedback under the visible condition.     

On the potential cost effectiveness of scientific audits

The rationale for the routine performance of scientific audits has been previously discussed, and it has been proposed that independent professionals audit scientific data just as certified public accountants in independent public accounting firms audit financial data (1–4). Scientific audits would typically require the examination of data in laboratory notebooks and other work sheets, upon which research publications are based. Examples of such audits have been publicized recently, although these represent audits which have been conducted relatively inefficiently, over periods of several years per audit, and which have only been conducted due to the persistence of whistleblowers suspecting scientific fraud (5, 6). A detailed report has also appeared on the results of an audit of the research activities of a particular individual, where the audit was limited solely to an examination of the research publications themselves for errors and discrepancies (7). It should be emphasized that the purpose of conducting scientific audits is not only to detect fabrication of experimental results but also to monitor presumably more prevalent, non‐fraudulent, inappropriate practices, such as misrepresentation of data, inaccurate reporting, and departure from institutional guidelines for handling hazardous materials, working with human subjects, etc.

Two concerns which have been raised concerning the performance of scientific audits relate to cost. What would they cost, and who would pay for them? These questions, however, may be turned around. What does it cost not to conduct such audits, and who pays for that? An assumption often made is that science is self‐correcting, that sooner or later the truth will be revealed because of the need to replicate experiments of others for independent verification of novel findings (8). Testimony recently presented at a U.S. congressional hearing suggests that the self‐correcting manner in which science advances represents a very slow and inefficient process for uncovering scientific fraud (5, 6, 9). Data from a survey of university scientists was also presented, indicating “. . . a reluctance to take prompt, corrective action not only when an investigator suspects another of misconduct but also should the investigator discover flaws in his or her own published reports‐whether the flaws were the result of honest error or fraud”; (10).

The uncritical acceptance by established scientists that the self‐correcting process works compounds the problem. The Editor of Science has written that”;. . . 99.9999 percent of reports are accurate and truthful. . .”; (8). If indeed only 0.0001% of published reports were inaccurate or untruthful, there would be little justification for scientific audits. However, congressional testimony from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) revealed that”;. . . the NIH Director's office has handled an average of 15–20 allegations and reports of misconduct annually in its extramural programs, which supports the work of approximately 50,000 scientists”; (11). As I shall attempt to demonstrate, since NIH alone receives fraud‐related complaints concerning the work of at least 0.03% of scientists it supports in other institutions, and since evidence indicates that the incidence of fraud is considerably greater than 0.03% (10, 12), the need to audit data is justifiable on the basis of being cost effective.