从主权国家的兴衰看权力博弈形态的转型

传统的国际关系理论,无论是现实主义、自由主义、建构主义还是科学行为主义理论,都是把主权国家抽象成一个统一的国际关系行为体。这一行为主体有一致的利益,也自然要有一致的对外政策目标和手段。在20世纪,尤其是在两次世界大战和冷战期间,这一概念抽象是非常准确的。但冷战结束以后,尤其是进入21世纪以后,这一概念抽象逐渐与国际关系的现实相违背。一方面,国家综合实力并不能直接转化为具体领域的竞争优势;另一方面,很多国家,包括超级大国在内,其对外政策的主要阻力可能不是所谓的竞争对手,而是其国内不同的利益集团。这导致传统的国际关系理论,从假设到概念和推理层面,都已经无法解释和预测今天的世界,而权力小博弈理论可以为认识多元复杂互动博弈时代的国际关系提供一个新的解释框架。     

Who Should Pay for Interdependent Risk? Policy Implications for Security Interdependence Among Airports

We study interdependent risks in security, and shed light on the economic and policy implications of increasing security interdependence in presence of reactive attackers. We investigate the impact of potential public policy arrangements on the security of a group of interdependent organizations, namely, airports. Focusing on security expenditures and costs to society, as assessed by a social planner, to individual airports and to attackers, we first develop a game-theoretic framework, and derive explicit Nash equilibrium and socially optimal solutions in the airports network. We then conduct numerical experiments mirroring real-world cyber scenarios, to assess how a change in interdependence impact the airports' security expenditures, the overall expected costs to society, and the fairness of security financing. Our study provides insights on the economic and policy implications for the United States, Europe, and Asia.     

Security Investment in Contagious Networks

Security of the systems is normally interdependent in such a way that security risks of one part affect other parts and threats spread through the vulnerable links in the network. So, the risks of the systems can be mitigated through investments in the security of interconnecting links. This article takes an innovative look at the problem of security investment of nodes on their vulnerable links in a given contagious network as a game‐theoretic model that can be applied to a variety of applications including information systems. In the proposed game model, each node computes its corresponding risk based on the value of its assets, vulnerabilities, and threats to determine the optimum level of security investments on its external links respecting its limited budget. Furthermore, direct and indirect nonlinear influences of a node's security investment on the risks of other nodes are considered. The existence and uniqueness of the game's Nash equilibrium in the proposed game are also proved. Further analysis of the model in a practical case revealed that taking advantage of the investment effects of other players, perfectly rational players (i.e., those who use the utility function of the proposed game model) make more cost‐effective decisions than selfish nonrational or semirational players.     

集权、分权、利益集团理论与美国公共行政的发展

本文从论述汉密尔顿、杰斐逊和麦迪逊政治思想入手，分析了以集权思想为特征的汉密尔顿＂古典式行政模式＂、以分权思想为特征的杰斐逊＂浪漫式行政模式＂和以利益集团思想为特征的麦迪逊＂新古典式行政模式＂产生的历史条件和原因，并从宏观上考察了３种＂行政模式＂在美国行政的不同发展阶段中的实践和影响。     

农业投入中政府与农户的博弈分析

农业投入状况关系着农业生产和农村经济的发展。目前农业投入不足已成为制约我国整体经济发展的“瓶颈”。在是否增加农业投入的问题上,政府与农户之间存在着一种博弈关系。通过农业投入不足的现状考察,用博弈的方法阐释农业投入不足的原因,提出加大农业投入的几点对策。     

见义不为现象的法律救治

见义勇为立法的重要内容之一,就是规定社会和国家对见义勇为者权益的救济和保护负有不可推卸的义务。作者认为对见义勇为者的权益实行法律保护是救治当前道德冷漠现象的一剂良方,是与现实需要紧密结合的法律规范。它的制定与实施又进一步充实了法律的正义精神,是法律价值的全面体现。但在现阶段我国还不具备相应的历史与现实条件用法律强制的手段推行见义勇为的道德行为。     

和谐社会构建中的利益表达与利益协调

我国正处在一个社会转型的时代,利益关系格局也发生了一定的变化,产生了利益分化和重组。在这个利益分化的时代,中国的经济利益关系格局出现了经济利益主体多元化、经济利益来源多样化、经济利益差距扩大化和经济利益关系复杂化等新的特征。对此,我们必须正视问题,应特别注意利益表达机制的构建并进行合理的利益协调,充分发挥市场、政府和利益集团的作用,只有这样才能构建一个和谐的社会。     

谈激发大学生政治理论课的学习兴趣

政治理论课是大学生必修的一门课程,它不仅向学生讲授马克思主义的理论知识,还要帮助学生树立科学的世界观、人生观和价值观。政治理论课的教学质量如何,不仅影响到每个学生的未来,而且关系到国家的前途。所以我们要大力改进课堂教学,用教学的高质量来培养学生的高素质。如今大学生普遍不喜欢上政治理论课,极大地影响该课程的教学效果,更难以实现政治理论课的智育和德育双重功能。我们认为,针对目前大学政治理论课的低效性现状,可以通过激发学生的学习兴趣来提高政治理论课的教学效果。     

批判的视境：传媒作为世界（下）——西方传媒批判理论的四个世界

对于大众传媒作为世界的丰富内涵的阐释,则是传媒批判理论始终如一的目标。具体来说,最初是对于大众传媒作为文化世界的发现;继而,是对于大众传媒作为权力世界的发现;然后,是对于大众传媒作为文本世界的发现;最后,是对于大众传媒作为游戏世界的发现,它意味着文化世界、权力世界、文本世界的消解,也意味着全新的传媒世界的即将莅临。     

Deposit Insurance,Institutions, and Bank Interest Rates

Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an explicit scheme of deposit insurance. This instrument aims at two main targets, contributing to systemic stability and protecting depositors. However, it may also affect the interest rate spread in the banking system, which can be viewed as an indicator of either inefficiency or market power in this financial segment. This paper provides an empirical investigation of the effect of deposit insurance and other institutional and economic variables on bank interest rates across countries. We find that deposit insurance increases the lending–deposit spread in banking. The main effect seems to arise not from the deposit side though, but from an increase in the lending rate. We interpret this result as evidence of the presence of moral hazard problems related to this instrument. We also find that higher quality of institutions is associated with lower spreads, thus contributing to eroding sources of market power in the banking sector.