论我国住房抵押贷款的证券化

本文结合我国宏观经济环境的制度性特征 ,以及在资产证券化实践中存在的具体问题 ,提出抵押贷款证券化在我国推广应用的相关对策。     

The repeated public goods game: A solution using Tit-for-Tat and the Lindahl point

This paper demonstrates how a repeated public goods problem may be solved by using Tit-for-Tat (TFT) on the Lindahl point. The general solution is developed; geometric and numerical examples are offered.I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

多功能开放型企业供需网成员企业合作关系的经济模型

多功能开放型企业供需网(SDN)合作伙伴关系的稳定性，将直接决定SDN创新管理理念的生命力和未来发展前景，传统企业间的一次性静态博弈和供应链(SC)盟员间的有限次重复博弈，都是低效的合作关系，因而其稳定性较差，无限次重复博弈以及由此而引发的触发策略，能够实现帕累托最优的纳什均衡，是SDN合作伙伴关系稳定发展的深层经济学原因，通过建立SDN成员企业合作关系的经济模型，论证了SDN的稳定性。     

房产典当及其立法思考

房产典当,性质上属于营业抵押,是典当行为了确保在当期届满时出当人归还当金本息,对于出当人所有的不转移占有的不动产当物所设定的一种担保;应在未来的《物权法》的“抵押权”中增设“营业抵押权”的一般规定,并出台一部由最高立法机关制定的特别法《典当法》,以具体规定房产典当法律关系。     

房地产抵押制度研究

房地产抵押，是当前我国房地产市场的一个热点。本文试图揭示房地产抵押的主体、客体、特征、方式，以及估价、清偿、再抵押等诸多的法律问题，从不同的角度进行了理论探索，并对如何进一步完善房地产抵押制度提出立法的思考。     

我国推行住宅抵押贷款证券化问题分析

目前,在我国推行住宅抵押贷款证券化存在着抵押贷款规模过小、房地产开发融资渠道不宽、商业银行积极性不高、信用制度不健全、法律环境不完善等问题。我国还不具备大规模推广住宅抵押贷款证券化的条件。     

银行个人住房抵押贷款预警系统构想

在分析银行住房抵押贷款的各种风险因素的基础之上，提出模糊预警模型，给出预警结果。     

论以土地承包经营权抵押为特征的金融制度

在我国建立以土地承包经营权为抵押的农村金融制度具有重要的现实意义 ,它能促进农地资源有效利用 ,提高农地利用的效益。目前世界上许多国家都建立了自己的农地抵押金融制度。根据我国实际情况 ,应消除现有法律上的障碍 ,设立类似于外国土地银行的政策性银行 ,主管我国的土地承包经营权抵押贷款金融制度 ,但在具体的抵押权规定方面 ,如对土地附着物的效力及抵押权实现方面应与一般抵押权制度相区别。     

反向抵押贷款:养老保障新视角

我国正快速步入老龄化社会,养老压力日益突出,传统养老模式已不能满足市场经济条件下人们对养老的需求。作为避免老龄化危机的有效途径,反向抵押贷款在美国取得了巨大的成功。文章分析了在我国实施反向抵押贷款的必要性和可行性,并指出了存在的风险。     

Far-sighted equilibria in 2 × 2, non-cooperative,repeated games

Consider a two-person simultaneous-move game in strategic form. Suppose this game is played over and over at discrete points in time. Suppose, furthermore, that communication is not possible, but nevertheless we observe some regularity in the sequence of outcomes. The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation for the question why such regularity might persist for many (i.e., infinite) periods.Each player, when contemplating a deviation, considers a sequential-move game, roughly speaking of the following form: if I change my strategy this period, then in the next my opponent will take his strategy b and afterwards I can switch to my strategy a, but then I am worse off since at that outcome my opponent has no incentive to change anymore, whatever I do. Theoretically, however, there is no end to such reaction chains. In case that deviating by some player gives him less utility in the long run than before deviation, we say that the original regular sequence of outcomes is far-sighted stable for that player. It is a far-sighted equilibrium if it is far-sighted stable for both players.