Studiengebühren und Matchingqualität

Zusammenfassung  Obwohl Studiengebühren an staatlichen Universit?ten in einigen Bundesl?ndern in Deutschland bereits eingeführt wurden, ist bislang unklar, ob Studiengebühren als Signalling-und Screening-Instrument Informationsasymmetrien auf Hochschulm?rkten verringern k?nnen. Basierend auf einem Modell von Bac (2002) wird die Studienplatzvergabe als einmaliges, nicht-kooperatives Matching-Spiel modelliert. Entgegen der allgemeinen Vermutung wird deutlich, dass die Einführung von Studiengebühren keinesfalls immer zu einer Verbesserung des Matchings zwischen Studienbewerbern und Universit?ten unterschiedlicher Qualit?t führen muss, selbst eine Verschlechterung ist denkbar. Die Betrachtung realer Bildungssysteme mit variablen Studiengebühren gibt Hinweise darauf, dass sich in der Realit?t tats?chlich unterschiedliche Gleichgewichte unterschiedlicher Effizienz eingestellt haben: W?hrend sich die Bildungssysteme Italiens und Portugals in einem effizienten Separating/Screening-Gleichgewicht befinden dürften, wurde in den Bildungssystemen Spaniens und der Schweiz offenbar ein Separating/Semiscreening-Gleichgewicht erreicht. In Gro?britannien scheint sich hingegen ein Pooling/Nonscreening-Gleichgewicht eingestellt zu haben. Für Deutschland lie?e sich nach Einführung variabler Studiengebühren ein Separating/Semiscreening-oder ein Separating/Screening-Gleichgewicht II erwarten.

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Tuition fees and matching quality

Summary  Even though tuition fees in German public universities are started to be introduced, it is not yet clear in how far they may indeed help to overcome the informational asymmetries in higher education and serve as a signalling and screening device. Based on a model by Bac (2002), we analyze the application process of university applicants to universities and the subsequent allocation of university places as a non-cooperative matching game. Unlike the regular supposition, the introduction of tuition fees may not necessarily enhance, but may also worsen the matching between students and faculties of differing quality. Our empirical analysis of different European systems of higher education reveals that — for the case of economics — the Italian and Portuguese systems seem to be in an efficient separating/screening equilibrium while the higher education systems of Switzerland and Spain are more likely to find themselves in a separating/semiscreening equilibrium. In Great Britain, however, we have evidence of a pooling/nonscreening equilibrium. For Germany, following the introduction of variable tuition fees, we would expect a separating/ semiscreening or separating/screening equilibrium II.

Arbeitsgebiete: International vergleichende Personal-und Organisations?konomik, Bildungs-und Hochschul?konomik     

假冒伪劣产品与真品共存于市场的信号传递博弈模型

本文构造了一个可解释某些市场上真品与假冒伪劣产品共存现象的不完全信息动态博弈的信号传递模型。根据该模型,具有品牌价值的产品和垄断力量较强的产品易被假冒。模型还指出,政府增大对制假者的打击力度或加大查处制假者的努力,都会有助于迫使制假者退出市场。     

With or Without Forecast Sharing: Competition and Credibility under Information Asymmetry

Forecast sharing among trading partners lies at the heart of many collaborative and contractual supply chain management efforts. Even though it has been praised in both academic and practitioner circles for its critical role in increasing demand visibility, some concerns remain: The first one is related to the credibility of forecast sharing, and the second is the fear that it may turn into a competitive disadvantage and induce suppliers to increase their price offerings. In this study, we explore the validity of these concerns under a supply chain with a competitive upstream structure, focusing specifically on (i) when and how a credible forecast sharing can be sustainable, and (ii) how it impacts on the intensity of price competition. To address these issues, we develop a supply chain model with a buyer facing a demand risk and two heterogeneous suppliers competing for order allocation from the buyer. The extent of demand is known only to the buyer. The buyer submits a buying request to the suppliers via a commonly used procurement mechanism called request for quotation (RFQ). We consider two variants of RFQ. In the first type, the buyer simply shares the estimated order quantity with no further specifications. In the second one, in addition to this, the buyer also specifies minimum and/or maximum order quantities. We fully characterize equilibrium decisions and profits associated with them under symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. Our main findings are that the buyer can use a RFQ with quantity restrictions as a credible signal for forecast sharing as long as the degree of demand information asymmetry is not too high, and that, contrary to above concerns, the equilibrium prices that emerge between competing suppliers under asymmetric information may indeed increase if the buyer cannot share forecast information credibly with its upstream partners.     

对自愿性信息披露的若干思考

管理当局有在强制性披露要求之外自愿披露有关信息的动力。西方企业自愿披露的信息范围较为广泛 ,但我国企业很少自愿披露信息。随着用户信息需求的逐渐增多和准则供给相对不足 ,应当鼓励有条件的企业自愿披露有关信息 ,以提高市场的有效性     

Apparent Overconfidence

It is common for a majority of people to rank themselves as better than average on simple tasks and worse than average on difficult tasks. The literature takes for granted that this apparent misconfidence is problematic. We argue, however, that this behavior is consistent with purely rational Bayesian updaters. In fact, better‐than‐average data alone cannot be used to show overconfidence; we indicate which type of data can be used. Our theory is consistent with empirical patterns found in the literature.     

Long Cheap Talk

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message—even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. (“Cheap talk” means plain conversation—unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff‐irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all two‐person games in which one side is better informed than the other and cheap talk is permitted.     

CDMA数字蜂窝移动通信系统信令研究与仿真

介绍了ＩＳ－９５ＣＤＭＡ数字蜂窝移动通信系统的信道类型、信令类型、信令作用和信令格式，对其信令特点作了分析，并给出了网络信令的计算机仿真方法和结果。     

假冒伪劣产品与真品共存于市场的信号传递博奕模型

构造了一个可解释某些市场上真品与假冒伪劣产品共存现象的不完全信息动态博弈的信号传递模型。根据该模型，具有品牌价值的产品和垄断力量较强的产品易被假冒。该模型刻画了真品市场力量与被假冒可能性的正相关关系，提出增大对制假者的打击力度或努力加大查处制假者，这样有利于迫使制假者退出市场。     

Building interpersonal trust within organizations: a relational signalling perspective

This article develops the foundations for a theory of interpersonal trust-building based on relational signalling theory (RST). RST is based on the assumptions that rationality is bounded through framing, that preferences are partially determined by altruism (through a distinction between foreground and background goals), and that an individual’s action is influenced by the normative context in which he or she operates. The focus is on interpersonal trust in work relations within organizations. Interpersonal trust-building is construed as an interactive process in which both individuals learn about each other’s trustworthiness in different situations. Four conditions for the building of interpersonal trust within organizations are (1) the suspension of all opportunistic behaviour, or the removal of distrust; (2) exchange of positive relational signals; (3) avoiding negative relational signals, i.e., dealing with trouble; and (4) the stimulation of frame resonance, or the introduction of trust-enhancing organizational policies. The proposed theory can explain important characteristics of trust in organizational contexts, such as the interactive nature of trust, the learning required to build trust, the role of psychological mechanisms (such as attributions and perceptions) in decisions to trust, the limits to trust, asymmetries between trust and distrust and the context-dependency of trust.