售电侧改革、市场主体变化与电价红利:基于讨价还价博弈

本文通过构建“一对多”和“多对多”讨价还价博弈模型,研究了售电侧改革前后,发电商和售电公司之间关于消费者剩余分配的博弈过程。具体来说,文章从售电侧改革带来的博弈主体与博弈机制变化角度,揭示了售电侧改革对用户电价红利的影响。研究发现:售电侧放开后,电力市场交易机制由“一对多”竞价上网变为“多对多”讨价还价匹配,造成了售电侧博弈主体的议价能力下降,发电侧博弈主体相对议价能力上升。发电商群体将索取更多的消费者剩余,从而推动发电侧整体报价的上涨,挤压了售电侧的利润空间,导致售电公司被迫抬高市场电价,最终剥夺了用户的电价红利。研究揭示了售电侧改革未能带来电价下降的根本原因。     

辩诉交易制度：诉讼效率与公正的取舍

辩诉交易作为一项刑事司法制度,现已成为美国刑事司法制度得以正常运转的制度保障,在英国、加拿大、德国、意大利等许多国家和地区也得到了广泛而深入的发展。笔者通过梳理辩诉交易制度的起源,以诉讼效率与公正为视角来分析辩诉交易制度的价值所在,认为辩诉交易制度通过减少诉讼中的投入和缩短诉讼时间能极大地提高诉讼效率,辩诉交易的实质就是追求刑事司法的相对公正。结合我国的诉讼制度和司法现实,辩诉交易制度的实行需要有相关的制度为保障。     

Fair and efficient division through unanimity bargaining when claims are subjective

In a subjective claims problem several partners have conflicting perceptions on how a jointly produced surplus should be divided fairly amongst them. In a large-scale experiment, we compare the fairness and efficiency of three unanimity bargaining procedures used to reach a consensus in a three-partner subjective claims problem. Under each procedure partners move sequentially, making alternating proposals. The procedures differ in whether they ask for a complete division proposal (Offer and Exit rule) or only for a proposal regarding the partner’s own fair share (Demand rule); and in whether partners have to accept the entire division proposal (Offer and Demand rule) or only their own share (Exit rule). For the fairness assessment partial and impartial fairness views are used and we find that the Offer rule performs best in terms of allocative fairness and no worse in terms of efficiency.     

Bargaining within the Supply Chain and Its Implications in an Industry

Our main objective is to investigate the influence of the bargaining power within a chain on its industry. As a building block, we first discuss the implications of bargaining within a single chain by considering an asymmetric Nash bargaining over the wholesale price (BW). We show that both Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) and vertical integration (VI) strategies are special cases of the BW contract. We then develop the Nash equilibrium in an industry with two supply chains that use BW. We identify the profit‐maximizing (coordinating) bargaining power within this industry. We show that when a chain is not monopolistic, VI does not coordinate the chain and that the MS contract, where the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, is coordinating when competition is intense. We find that the main determinant of the equilibrium in mature industries is to respond well to the actions of the competing chain rather than to directly maximize the profit of each chain. That is, the equilibrium does not necessarily maximize the profit of the entire industry. While a coordination of the industry could then increase the profitability of both chains, such a coordination is likely against antitrust law. Moreover, if one chain cannot change its actions, the other chain may unilaterally improve its profitability by deviating from the equilibrium. Our results lead to several predictions supported by empirical findings, such as that in competitive industries chains will work “close to” the MS contract.     

BARGAINING AND DELAY: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION

This paper examines the notion that delay in reaching agreement in bargaining may be caused by learning that is independent of the bargaining procedure. In particular, learning is not due to inference from the observed offers and responses of the opponent, but derives from observation of an exogenous, costly signal – we call this 'investigation'. First we observe that even if learning is costless and perfectly informative, investigation may not occur in equilibrium. Under more general conditions, however, uninformed agents typically have an incentive to try to manipulate their prior beliefs through investigation. The main result is that investigation by an uninformed agent may result in significant delay occurring before agreement is reached. We show that this delay may be sustained in the limit as the length of time period vanishes, and that this result depends crucially on the properties of the information production technology underlying investigation. Also, the delay we observe is shown to be robust to changes in the bargaining procedure.     

A bargaining model with players' perceptions on the retractability of offers

This paper studies a generalization of Rubinstein's bargaining model with retractable offers. The model incorporates and parameterizes the bargainers' perceptions on the retractability of offers. Our key result characterizes the limiting set of perfect equilibria as the time interval between two consecutive offers tends to zero. In this limit, for any possible players' perceptions on the retractability of offers such that at least one of the players perceives that there is at least a small chance that offers may be retractable, the bargaining game possesses a continuum of perfect equilibria.     

Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining With Outside Options

We study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long‐run player and a sequence of short‐run players. The outside option is not only a disagreement point, but reveals information privately held by the long‐run player. In equilibrium, the uninformed short‐run players' offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long‐run player's payoffs are discontinuous. The long‐run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short‐run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff, but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power. We investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses. In both cases, bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation‐building probabilities are interior.     

Reputational Bargaining With Minimal Knowledge of Rationality

Two players announce bargaining postures to which they may become committed and then bargain over the division of a surplus. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself under first‐order knowledge of rationality is determined (as a function of her probability of becoming committed), as is the bargaining posture that she must announce in order to guarantee herself this much. This “maxmin” share of the surplus is large relative to the probability of becoming committed (e.g., it equals 30% if the commitment probability is 1 in 10 and equals 13% if the commitment probability is 1 in 1000), and the corresponding bargaining posture simply demands this share plus compensation for any delay in reaching agreement.     

Coopetitive Buyer–Supplier Relationship: An Investigation of Bargaining Power,Relational Context,and Investment Strategies

This study proposes an analytical approach combined with a behavioral experiment for a joint examination of the competitive and cooperative (i.e., coopetitive) relationship between a buyer and a supplier. Specifically, the article considers the scenario in which the buyer and the supplier invest in strategic capabilities to increase their relative bargaining power. The article examines how dynamic investments in strategic assets are influenced by the locus of bargaining power and by the underlying context (synergistic vs. adversarial) of the interfirm relationship. The dynamic evolution of bargaining power is also examined. A dynamic game model is considered to examine the evolution of investment strategies in critical resources and to investigate the issues of bargaining power in a buyer–supplier dyad. Equilibrium expressions for the investment strategies of the buyer and the supplier are presented and their implications for buyer–supplier relationships are examined. The behavioral experiment complements the analytical model and examines the correspondence between optimal behavior suggested by the analytical model and the boundedly rational behavior of decision makers in an experimental context. The results from the model and behavioral experiments suggest that the strategies are a function of the risk‐adjusted returns obtained from investments. The experiment shows that, in a synergistic relational context when the buyer maintains bargaining power, the investment shifts of the buyer and the supplier accord well with theoretical predictions. In an adversarial relational context, the results of the experimental study do not correspond well with that predicted by the theoretical model. The implications of the results are discussed and directions for future research are presented.     

An Ethical Interpretation of the Nash Choice Rule

This paper provides an ethical intepretation of the Nash choice rule. In a setting in which (cardinal) utilities are interpersonally comparable, this procedure is characterised by an impartiality requirement and by the assumption that choices are not responsive to the agents' relative ability to convert resources into utility.