Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents: a critique

This paper reviews recent attempts to model cooperation in groups of self-interested unrelated individuals. It concludes that no empirically plausible model has been developed, and the economist's quest for an explanation of human prosociality in terms of self-interested agents has not been successful. We show that the equilibrium criteria employed in standard game-theoretic models have no attractive dynamic properties, and the mechanisms deployed in these models are not generally seen in empirical examples of cooperative groups. We also show that these models are not robust to plausible rates of signaling error and mutation. We present an alternative, involving strongly reciprocal agents, that satisfies all the requirements for a dynamically stable model of cooperation.     

Equality Bargaining: Where,Who, Why?

It is common to identify a role for trade unions in combating sex inequality at work through collective bargaining. This article uses a survey of paid union officers to identify the context in which equality bargaining by unions is likely to occur, using the specific issue of bargaining on equal pay. It concludes that equality bargaining is a function of women’s voice within unions, the characteristics and preferences of bargainers themselves and of a favourable public policy environment. Bargaining on equal pay is also more likely in centralized negotiations that cover multiple employers.     

《洛阳伽蓝记》里的单纯词

本文具体分类研究了《洛阳伽蓝记》中各种类型的单纯词,简要概括了单纯词在汉语词汇史上的地位。     

公司捐赠行为的效力分析--兼谈公司捐赠的立法完善

逾越权能原则在各国立法和司法实践中有日趋衰微的趋势。公司捐赠行为的效力与公司的目的范围具有密切的关系。法院在对公司捐赠行为的效力进行裁判的过程中是基于交易安全理念和对相关主体的利益平衡的基础上进行的。应该在立法中对公司捐赠行为的相关问题做出规定,以期公司法更加完善。     

Asymptotic bias in the linear mixed effects model under non-ignorable missing data mechanisms

Summary.  In longitudinal studies, missingness of data is often an unavoidable problem. Estimators from the linear mixed effects model assume that missing data are missing at random. However, estimators are biased when this assumption is not met. In the paper, theoretical results for the asymptotic bias are established under non-ignorable drop-out, drop-in and other missing data patterns. The asymptotic bias is large when the drop-out subjects have only one or no observation, especially for slope-related parameters of the linear mixed effects model. In the drop-in case, intercept-related parameter estimators show substantial asymptotic bias when subjects enter late in the study. Eight other missing data patterns are considered and these produce asymptotic biases of a variety of magnitudes.     

Influence diagnostics and outlier tests for semiparametric mixed models

Summary. Semiparametric mixed models are useful in biometric and econometric applications, especially for longitudinal data. Maximum penalized likelihood estimators (MPLEs) have been shown to work well by Zhang and co-workers for both linear coefficients and nonparametric functions. This paper considers the role of influence diagnostics in the MPLE by extending the case deletion and subject deletion analysis of linear models to accommodate the inclusion of a nonparametric component. We focus on influence measures for the fixed effects and provide formulae that are analogous to those for simpler models and readily computable with the MPLE algorithm. We also establish an equivalence between the case or subject deletion model and a mean shift outlier model from which we derive tests for outliers. The influence diagnostics proposed are illustrated through a longitudinal hormone study on progesterone and a simulated example.     

论陪审制度对美国诉讼制度的影响

陪审制度对美国诉讼制度的建立和运行有着深远的影响。陪审制度是现代对抗制得以确立和发展的基础,美国陪审制度的盛衰影响着对抗制的发展。陪审团审判机制孕育了美国证据法律制度,证据责任理论是建立在陪审制度基础之上的。随着陪审制度的发展,其自身的复杂性和不可预测性成为导致其他结案方式产生并蓬勃发展的重要因素。     

Strategic Bargaining Over Child Support and Visitation

When parents divorce, child support and visitation must be determined. The 1988 Family Support Act requires all states to have child support guidelines for courts to use in determining child support obligations. However, many divorcing couples arrive at agreements without court intervention, or they simply fail to enforce the court decision ex post. Given that the guidelines provide a starting point for negotiations, couples may be able to find self-negotiated, Pareto-improving solutions. In this paper we model the bargaining process that divorcing couples engage in when coming to agreements on visitation and child support. The model suggests that individuals may arrive at agreements that are Pareto improvements for both parents but that the children's welfare may decline as a result of these self-negotiated settlements. Data from the Stanford Child Custody Study show that the changes made in child support and visitation agreements are consistent with our model in only 30 percent of the cases. Therefore, we consider alternative specifications of the model and show that both significant costs of enforcing the original agreement and alternative assumptions on parental preferences can explain these empirical results.     

The employment contract: A test of the transaction cost theory

This paper tests some predictions derived from Williamson's transaction cost theory of the organization of work, which holds that the form of the employment relationship is determined largely by the idiosyncrasy of work—that is, the nature of skills and knowledge used in production. It examines the occurrence of theoretically relevant provisions in collective bargaining agreements in the United States and finds they are related to a contract-level proxy for idiosyncrasy (based on bargaining structure) as predicted by the theory. An analysis of an individual-level variable, the difficulty of finding a comparable job, provides some additional support. Finally, several alternative explanations of the results are considered, and it is argued that none are consistent with the evidence. The analysis thus finds strong, if necessarily provisional, support for the theory.     

实报还是谎报——双边信息激励与供应链效率

探讨了双边不对称信息下供应链信息真实分享和谎报对效率的影响。首先,给出完全信息下的最优商品交易量和供应链利润作为比较基准。其次,构建双方信息真实分享的激励模型。研究发现激励双方信息真实共享所需的信息租金降低交易量和供应链利润。再次,构建允许信息谎报的交易量谈判模型。研究发现,供销双方都偏好高报自己的信息类型。个体谎报信息的幅度随着谈判力增加而减小。拥有绝对谈判力的一方不会谎报信息。供应链效率与谎报信息的幅度、成本上界以及销售价格相关。最后,通过数值算例对实报信息和谎报信息下交易量、供应链个体利润及效率进行对比分析。研究结果为管理实践提供一定的洞见:供应链企业是否激励双边信息分享可根据双方成本大小进行选择。