Defending White Scientific Masculinity

While many feminist and postcolonial scholars have analyzed the post-9/11 politic in the United States, few have focused on the anthrax “attacks” that followed the 11 September 2001 World Trade Center disaster. The FBI search for the perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax mailings was an important node in US national security discourse making – it culminated in the fingering of a white male government biodefense scientist and cast doubt on the role of scientific expertise in provisioning national security. This article argues that while “white scientific masculinity” was put into question, it was simultaneously shored up as a nationalist symbol of protection against bioterrorism. This article traces shifts across the three FBI-led profiles of the anthrax perpetrator, along with concomitant news media coverage: the white male “loner” nonscientist, the white male “loner” amateur scientist and finally the white male biodefense scientist. Using a cultural studies approach, this article details how at each successive investigatory stage profilers mobilized hegemonic discourses to re-instantiate the authoritative status of white scientific masculinity in US national security. This analysis offers an important dimension to feminist and postcolonial critiques of the symbolic and institutional investment in white masculinity during the War on Terror.     

Recalibration of the Grunow–Finke Assessment Tool to Improve Performance in Detecting Unnatural Epidemics

Successful identification of unnatural epidemics relies on a sensitive risk assessment tool designed for the differentiation between unnatural and natural epidemics. The Grunow–Finke tool (GFT), which has been the most widely used, however, has low sensitivity in such differentiation. We aimed to recalibrate the GFT and improve the performance in detection of unnatural epidemics. The comparator was the original GFT and its application in 11 historical outbreaks, including eight confirmed unnatural outbreaks and three natural outbreaks. Three steps were involved: (i) removing criteria, (ii) changing weighting factors, and (iii) adding and refining criteria. We created a series of alternative models to examine the changes on the parameter likelihood of unnatural outbreaks until we found a model that correctly identified all the unnatural outbreaks and natural ones. Finally, the recalibrated GFT was tested and validated with data from an unnatural and natural outbreak, respectively. A total of 238 models were tested. Through the removal of criteria, increasing or decreasing weighting factors of other criteria, adding a new criterion titled “special insights,” and setting a new threshold for likelihood, we increased the sensitivity of the GFT from 38% to 100%, and retained the specificity at 100% in detecting unnatural epidemics. Using test data from an unnatural and a natural outbreak, the recalibrated GFT correctly classified their etiology. The recalibrated GFT could be integrated into routine outbreak investigation by public health institutions and agencies responsible for biosecurity.     

Expert Views on Biological Threat Characterization for the U.S. Government: A Delphi Study

Biological threat characterization (BTC) involves laboratory research conducted for the purpose of biological defense. BTC research is important for improving biological risk assessment and informing resource prioritization. However, there are also risks involved in BTC work, including potential for escape from the laboratory or the misuse of research results. Using a modified Delphi study to gather opinions from U.S. experts in biosecurity and biodefense, this analysis explores what principles and safeguards can maximize the benefits of BTC research and ensure that it is conducted safely and securely. Delphi participants were asked to give their opinions about the need for BTC research by the U.S. government (USG); risks of conducting this research; rules or guidelines that should be in place to ensure that the work is safe and accurate; components of an effective review and prioritization process; rules for when characterization of a pathogen can be discontinued; and recommendations about who in the USG should be responsible for BTC prioritization decisions. The findings from this research reinforce the need for BTC research at the federal level as well as a need for continued review and oversight of this research to maximize its effectiveness and reduce the risks involved. It also demonstrates the need for further discussion of what would constitute a “red line” for biothreat characterization research—research that should not be performed for safety, ethical, or practical reasons—and guidelines for when there is sufficient research in a given topic area so that the research can be considered completed.     

On the risk of mortality to primates exposed to anthrax spores.

Current events have heightened the importance of understanding the risks from inhalation exposure to small numbers of spores of Bacillus anthracis. Previously reported data sets have not been fully assessed using current understanding of microbial dose response. This article presents an assessment of the reported primate dose-response data. At low doses, the risk to large populations of low doses of inhaled spores (e.g., < 100) is not insignificant.     

Application of a Risk Analysis Tool to Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) Outbreak in Saudi Arabia

The Grunow–Finke assessment tool (GFT) is an accepted scoring system for determining likelihood of an outbreak being unnatural in origin. Considering its high specificity but low sensitivity, a modified Grunow–Finke tool (mGFT) has been developed with improved sensitivity. The mGFT has been validated against some past disease outbreaks, but it has not been applied to ongoing outbreaks. This study is aimed to score the outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in Saudi Arabia using both the original GFT and mGFT. The publicly available data on human cases of MERS-CoV infections reported in Saudi Arabia (2012–2018) were sourced from the FluTrackers, World Health Organization, Saudi Ministry of Health, and published literature associated with MERS outbreaks investigations. The risk assessment of MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia was analyzed using the original GFT and mGFT criteria, algorithms, and thresholds. The scoring points for each criterion were determined by three researchers to minimize the subjectivity. The results showed 40 points of total possible 54 points using the original GFT (likelihood: 74%), and 40 points of a total possible 60 points (likelihood: 67%) using the mGFT, both tools indicating a high likelihood that human MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia is unnatural in origin. The findings simply flag unusual patterns in this outbreak, but do not prove unnatural etiology. Proof of bioattacks can only be obtained by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This study demonstrated the value and flexibility of the mGFT in assessing and predicting the risk for an ongoing outbreak with simple criteria.     

Simulation Modeling of Anthrax Spore Dispersion in a Bioterrorism Incident

Recent events have increased awareness of the risk posed by terrorist attacks. Bacillus anthracis has resurfaced in the 21st century as a deadly agent of bioterrorism because of its potential for causing massive civilian casualties. This analysis presents the results of a computer simulation of the dispersion of anthrax spores in a typical 50-story, high-rise building after an intentional release during a bioterrorist incident. The model simulates aerosol dispersion in the case of intensive, small-scale convection, which equalizes the concentration of anthrax spores over the building volume. The model can be used to predict the time interval required for spore dispersion throughout a building after a terrorist attack in a high-rise building. The analysis reveals that an aerosol release of even a relatively small volume of anthrax spores during a terrorist incident has the potential to quickly distribute concentrations that are infectious throughout the building.     

Risk‐Based Decision Making for Reoccupation of Contaminated Areas Following a Wide‐Area Anthrax Release

This article presents an analysis of postattack response strategies to mitigate the risks of reoccupying contaminated areas following a release of Bacillus anthracis spores (the bacterium responsible for causing anthrax) in an urban setting. The analysis is based on a hypothetical attack scenario in which individuals are exposed to B. anthracis spores during an initial aerosol release and then placed on prophylactic antibiotics that successfully protect them against the initial aerosol exposure. The risk from reoccupying buildings contaminated with spores due to their reaerosolization and inhalation is then evaluated. The response options considered include: decontamination of the buildings, vaccination of individuals reoccupying the buildings, extended evacuation of individuals from the contaminated buildings, and combinations of these options. The study uses a decision tree to estimate the costs and benefits of alternative response strategies across a range of exposure risks. Results for best estimates of model inputs suggest that the most cost‐effective response for high‐risk scenarios (individual chance of infection exceeding 11%) consists of evacuation and building decontamination. For infection risks between 4% and 11%, the preferred option is to evacuate for a short period, vaccinate, and then reoccupy once the vaccine has taken effect. For risks between 0.003% and 4%, the preferred option is to vaccinate only. For risks below 0.003%, none of the mitigation actions have positive expected monetary benefits. A sensitivity analysis indicates that for high‐infection‐likelihood scenarios, vaccination is recommended in the case where decontamination efficacy is less than 99.99%.     

Dose-Response Models for Inhalation of Bacillus anthracis Spores: Interspecies Comparisons

Because experiments with Bacillus anthracis are costly and dangerous, the scientific, public health, and engineering communities are served by thorough collation and analysis of experiments reported in the open literature. This study identifies available dose-response data from the open literature for inhalation exposure to B. anthracis and, via dose-response modeling, characterizes the response of nonhuman animal models to challenges. Two studies involving four data sets amenable to dose-response modeling were found in the literature: two data sets of response of guinea pigs to intranasal dosing with the Vollum and ATCC-6605 strains, one set of responses of rhesus monkeys to aerosol exposure to the Vollum strain, and one data set of guinea pig response to aerosol exposure to the Vollum strain. None of the data sets exhibited overdispersion and all but one were best fit by an exponential dose-response model. The beta-Poisson dose-response model provided the best fit to the remaining data set. As indicated in prior studies, the response to aerosol challenges is a strong function of aerosol diameter. For guinea pigs, the LD₅₀ increases with aerosol size for aerosols at and above 4.5 μm. For both rhesus monkeys and guinea pigs there is about a 15-fold increase in LD₅₀ when aerosol size is increased from 1 μm to 12 μm. Future experimental research and dose-response modeling should be performed to quantify differences in responses of subpopulations to B. anthracis and to generate data allowing development of interspecies correction factors.