恐怖主义与反恐对策

恐怖主义被称为"20世纪的政治瘟疫",当代恐怖主义活动越来越猖獗,对世界和平与安全构成严重威胁.对恐怖主义的概念进行界定,通过分析当代恐怖主义的新特点,从而总结当今社会打击恐怖主义的对策,希望能为有效地打击恐怖主义活动提供一些参考.     

沙特柔性反恐措施研究

柔性反恐是刚性反恐的必要补充,沙特在武力反恐的同时采取了一系列柔性反恐措施。“去极端化”是柔性
反恐的重要内容之一,包括预防措施、康复项目和善后安抚。其中,预防措施是指从日常生活、学校教育、社会公共信
息的传播和交流等三大层面着力;康复项目是一项囊括了康复组织、康复项目的实施者及辅导过程三方面的综合性计
划;善后安抚则是旨在帮助囚犯重返社会、预防其重新犯罪,帮助释放犯走上正确的人生轨道。三大措施的目的在于
阻止个人成为恐怖主义者,促进卷入恐怖活动个人的康复,提供善后安抚计划以便于被释放者重返社会等。沙特的柔
性反恐措施取得了显著的成效,产生了很大的国际反响,“9
11”事件后反恐话语的主导者美国对此做出积极的反应
并提供一定的支持。     

‘Gutsy’ Decisions and Passive Processes

Abstract

The Obama administration has positioned itself against the militarized discourse of the Bush-era Global War on Terror (GWOT) by articulating a ‘return to the rule of law’. And yet, the figure of the US decision-maker remains as masculinized and militarily-oriented as ever. I demonstrate this seeming incongruity through an analysis of: first, the decision to render the Christmas Day (would-be) bomber of 2009 to the criminal justice system, a decision for which Obama was labelled ‘weak’ (hence feminine) on terrorism; and second, the killing of Osama bin Laden by the US Navy SEALs special operations team, a decision which reaffirmed Obama's warrior credentials, since it proved that he was the ‘strong’ (hence masculine) commander-in-chief. Both cases demonstrate that the hegemony of the masculine ‘warrior decision-maker’ remains privileged and facilitates the re-emergence of the GWOT ‘war machine’, despite the Obama administration's commitment to change.     

论9·11后巴美对恐怖主义的认知与政策演变

9·11事件是传统安全向非传统安全转变的标志性事件之一,该事件在一定程度上改变了美国对恐怖主义的认知,改变了美国的全球反恐战略以及对南亚地区的政策,也改变了美国对巴基斯坦的政策走向和美巴关系。面对美国要把巴基斯坦炸回到旧石器时代的威胁,穆沙拉夫政府权衡利弊,根据国家利益最大化的原则,调整了美巴关系,支持美国在阿富汗的反恐战争。     

论美国与巴基斯坦的反恐合作机制、过程与成效

9.11事件之后,基于各自的战略考量,美国和巴基斯坦结成联盟,巴基斯坦成为美国全球反恐的前线国家和非北约盟友,双方建立了反恐合作机制并进行反恐合作。但巴基斯坦之所以能够成为美国的"非北约盟国",很大程度上则是基于地缘政治的特殊性。美巴反恐合作机制化程度不高,没有像美印、美国和欧盟之间那样形成长效机制,双方存在一些非长效机制。分析了布什政府时期美巴反恐合作过程与成效、奥巴马政府时期的反恐合作"阿富巴战略"以及后拉登时代的美巴反恐合作,并对美巴之间的反恐合作前景做出展望:尽管龃龉丛生,但美国仍然愿意付出较高的代价以保持和巴基斯坦的合作。     

Drones and fantasy in US counterterrorism

How does US Counterterrorism know that the hundreds of people killed by drones and justified as “signature” strikes (based on their pattern of life), of whom not even the names were known, are in fact actual or potential terrorists? It knows essentially by an act of fantasy. Fantasy is not understood here as equivalent to the “not-real” in some form of representational realism, but rather as constitutive of the very real. The paper examines the ways in which the fantasy surrounding the figure of “the terrorist” becomes a major component of any explanation why the president and the American public can have such a cavalier attitude toward targeted killings.     

Rational choice and the political bases of changing Israeli counterinsurgency strategy

Israeli counterinsurgency doctrine holds that the persistent use of credible threat and disproportionate military force results in repeated victories that eventually teach the enemy the futility of aggression. The doctrine thus endorses classical rational choice theory's claim that narrow cost-benefit calculations shape fixed action rationales. This paper assesses whether Israel's strategic practice reflects its counterinsurgency doctrine by exploring the historical record and the association between Israeli and Palestinian deaths due to low-intensity warfare. In contrast to the expectations of classical rational choice theory, the evidence suggests that institutional, cultural and historical forces routinely override simple cost-benefit calculations. Changing domestic and international circumstances periodically cause revisions in counterinsurgency strategy. Credible threat and disproportionate military force lack the predicted long-term effect.     

Adversarial risk analysis for counterterrorism modeling

Recent large-scale terrorist attacks have raised interest in models for resource allocation against terrorist threats. The unifying theme in this area is the need to develop methods for the analysis of allocation decisions when risks stem from the intentional actions of intelligent adversaries. Most approaches to these problems have a game-theoretic flavor although there are also several interesting decision-analytic-based proposals. One of them is the recently introduced framework for adversarial risk analysis, which deals with decision-making problems that involve intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. We explore how adversarial risk analysis addresses some standard counterterrorism models: simultaneous defend-attack models, sequential defend-attack-defend models, and sequential defend-attack models with private information. For each model, we first assess critically what would be a typical game-theoretic approach and then provide the corresponding solution proposed by the adversarial risk analysis framework, emphasizing how to coherently assess a predictive probability model of the adversary's actions, in a context in which we aim at supporting decisions of a defender versus an attacker. This illustrates the application of adversarial risk analysis to basic counterterrorism models that may be used as basic building blocks for more complex risk analysis of counterterrorism problems.     

The causes of terrorism

Abstract

Terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and after intensified concerns about a global Jihad and other forms of terrorism, and renewed calls to better understand its causes or roots. There have been divergent views on this question, and terrorism has been argued to be caused by increased poverty, rapid urbanization, declining traditional authority, globalization, and so forth. These differences, reflecting philosophical, religious, political and other differences, are not merely academic; they can affect our understanding of both the threat and of responses to terrorism. This article provides an analytic framework for understanding the limits to understanding the causes of terrorism, identifying what can be known about causation and assessing counterterrorism implications.     

Biopolitics of hope and security: governing the future through US counterterrorism communications

This article probes the relationship between hope and security, looking at how hope is appropriated and used by the US security apparatus under President Obama to pre-empt radicalisation. It looks specifically at strategic narratives designed to infuse hope within the global Muslim population – identified in US security discourse as being particularly vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. While critical studies of security often articulate hope and security to be diametrically opposed concepts, this article shows that hope not only is an active and important part of contemporary technologies and logics of security, but also that hope can be productive of the insecurities, fear and exclusions that such politics often is assumed to entail. The use of hope within US counterterrorism communications further indicates that, rather than a subversive force, hope has come to legitimise some of the key facets of post 9/11 politics of security, namely the identification of human nature as a site of potential danger, the invocation of permanent intervention, the radical exclusion of the global Muslim population from political rights, and, not the least, the effective denial of our capacity to imagine another world, free from the insecurities of our political present.