Dispositifs d’intermédiation marchande et politique des marchés. La modernisation du marché des fruits et légumes en France, 1950-1980

As this study of experiments with organizing the fruit and vegetable market from the 1950s till the end of the 1970s shows, there were alternatives to the principle of distribution, for instance: the modernization of traditional wholesale marketplaces (carreau) or the establishment of veilings (marchés au cadran) controlled by producers. After exposing the rationale underlying each of these arrangements, the empirical conditions are examined for actually modernizing markets. Attention is drawn to the factors that weigh on players in the market, in particular the tensions, on the one hand, between homogenization and concentration and, on the other hand, the singularity of products and transactions.     

Arrangement institutionnel et fonctionnement du marché du travail. Le cas de la chasse de tête

Do head hunters firms improve the matching process, and therefore contribute to the efficiency of the labour market of top executives? Far from being a passive vector, on one hand they contribute to shape companies' specific demand; on the other hand, they initiate the supply of candidates resorting to their networks. Head hunters implement idiosyncratic categories of evaluation in order to fit as well as possible both parties' preferences. If such a type of transaction reduces information costs, it nevertheless produces distortions with regard to the market efficiency. It introduces a bias in favour of mobility between identical jobs (in terms of occupation and industry) and therefore participates to the labour market segmentation, which impedes substitution mechanisms. As a consequence, they contribute to the inflationary pressures that characterise the top executives' labour market. — Special issue: New patterns of institutions.     

Le marché a dit. Intermédiaires financiers et managers dans le secteur électrique

The role played in the electricity industry by finance analysts, consultants and rating agencies has received too little attention in research on the liberalization of technical networks. Three arguments are brought forward. First of all, despite any rational argumentation, these intermediaries must be seen as ordinary actors with their interests, drawbacks and cognitive limits. Secondly, they have played an important part in transforming what used to be a tightly regulated industry. Their power mainly derives from their ability to influence the definition of the “right” policies and the production of information prior to decision-making. It takes the concrete form of an oligopoly power over two basic links in the information flow: big operations in the capital market and the ability to make comparisons between firms, sectors and countries and thus recommend the “right” allocation of resources. Thirdly, this quite real power does not have mechanical effects since it reflects a state of equilibrium within the firm, as the case of Suez proves. The relation between markets and firms is more interactive that it seems at first glance.     

La signature œnologique: frontières et transferts de réputation chez les consultants vitivinicoles

The category of consultants provides a convenient way to describe how work is organized in the Bordeaux wines classified as grands crus and, also, to study theoretical questions such as the relation between individual and organizational reputations or the incorporation of symbolic assets. Following a presentation of consultancy in the wine industry, questions arise about how the “oenological signature” enters into the operation of the labor market for consultants. This signature, while it is a source of reputation that can be transferred to producer organizations, is an asset that consultants have difficulty assuming because of the importance of the soil and vintage in the making of reputations in the wine industry.