国有企业高管薪酬激励的有效性与透明性研究

随着我国国有企业的改制,股份制企业的两权分离问题在国有企业中显得更加复杂,出现了“双重代理”、内部人控制或“政企不分”的现象,产生极大的代理成本。因此,委托人必须设计激励性契约来规范代理人行为．使代理人与股东利益相一致,从而增加股东财富。通过对国有企业高管薪酬的有效性和透明性进行实证分析,发现其存在着治理结构、经理人市场建设及信息披露质量等方面的问题,并针对这些问题提出了相应的对策与建议。     

基于公文筐测验的商业银行高层管理人员选拔研究——以商业银行高级人力资源经理岗位为例

在采用文献法、访谈法和问卷法确定了银行高级人力资源管理者胜任力模型的基础上,设计和编制了适用于商业银行人力资源经理岗位的公文筐测验。研究结果表明,公文筐测验具有较高的信度和效度,可以在商业银行高层管理人员选拔中使用,但公文筐测验必须根据具体岗位来设计题目才能保证选拔的效果。     

供应商—客户关系与代理成本

关系交易作为中国企业间交易的典型模式,其对代理成本产生的影响尚不明确。以2012—2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了供应商—客户关系对企业代理成本的影响。研究发现,关系型交易与两类代理成本均呈显著的U型关系。即在关系型交易初期,随着关系型交易的深入,两类代理成本均有所降低;但随着关系型交易深入的程度超过拐点,两类代理成本会上升。进一步研究发现,高管持股会正向调节关系交易与第一类代理成本之间的关系,但对第二类代理成本的调节作用不显著。供应商—客户关系与代理成本之间的关系,为合作双方适度把握关系型交易的深度与频率,最大程度地发挥关系型交易的优势作用提供了经验证据。企业要认识到高管持股对代理成本的影响,充分发挥其对第一类代理成本的抑制作用。     

The management of managers: Disputing in an executive hierarchy

This paper focuses on the relationship between organizational rank and respectability and the way top managers handle their interpersonal grievances, conflicts, and disputes in an executive hierarchy. Formal grievance procedures are rarely used. Downward grievances (from a superior to a subordinate) are often settled unilaterally by the superior. Upward grievances are typically handled covertly by subordinates. Titular equals opt for a range of covert and confrontational tactics, many of which evolve into disputes and are settled by a common superior. Respectability within the executive ranks appears to enhance the ability of superiors to impose outcomes on grievances, conflicts, and disputes between and within subordinates, to decrease the hostility of upward grievances, and to decrease vulnerability of subordinates to sanctions by their superiors.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Washington, DC, June 1987.     

高管激励机制对企业内部控制有效性影响的实证研究简

选取2009--2011年沪深两市A股上市公司作为样本,运用回归分析方法研究了高管激励机制对公司内部控制有效性的影响。结果发现：内部控制的有效性与高管持股比例呈较显著的正相关性,高管年度薪酬与内部控制有效性不存在显著的相关性,此为我国进一步完善高管激励机制提供了理论依据。     

A Study on the Compensation Gap among Executives at Chinese Enterprises*

Based on data for 2005 to 2012, an analysis of the compensation gap between top executives at different Chinese listed companies reveals the following conclusions. (1) The large compensation gap existing among executives at listed Chinese companies—in some years even larger than that between rank-and-file employees—is mainly caused by the exorbitant executive compensation at a minority of companies. (2) Between 2005 and 2012, the compensation gap first widened dramatically and then diminished gradually. The leading factor in this fluctuation was the drastic rise and fall in the level of executive compensation at a handful of financial enterprises. The main reason for the narrowing of the compensation gap is central government regulation, which has helped to curb the excessive growth of executive compensation in society as a whole. (3) Even in the same round of fluctuation, state-owned listed companies differ markedly from non-state-owned listed companies in the way their executive compensation is decided. (4) State-owned listed companies’ executive compensation strategies and their internal governance structure have not played their due role in moderating the overly rapid growth of their executives’ compensation or in reducing the compensation gap.     

上市公司高层管理人员监控的有效性研究

政府作为国有企业的出资人和国有产权的代理人,将政府机构控股转移到国有企业控股,并通过法规和准则来加强公司治理,以此来提高对上市公司监控的有效性。由此,使用公司业绩作为上述2项措施发挥监控作用的替代变量,实证分析其对上市公司监控的有效性。研究结果表明,国有企业控股公司比政府机构控股公司更能监控高层管理人员;同时,高层管理人员的变更对公司业绩有较高的敏感性,但公司治理机制并没有对公司高层管理人员变更与公司业绩的敏感性产生重大影响。在我国,上市公司由于业绩欠佳而更换高层管管理人员时,对控股股东的激励比公司治理机制更重要。     

How public relations executives perceive and measure the impact of social media in their organizations

Decisions about social media in organizations are not made lightly. Corporate executives are faced with an ever changing and in many cases, uncontrollable opportunity with social media. This study provides insights obtained from 25 interviews with communication and public relations executives to identify their opinions about what drives social media in organizations, what challenges they face, and what questions they have about social media and its measurement.     

高管节俭会提升国有企业绩效吗？

自党中央提出“八项规定”以来,我国掀起了建设节约型社会的新风尚。高管节俭作为高管个人特征的重要体现,对企业经营具有重要的影响。基于高阶梯队理论,以2008—2020年沪深A股国有上市企业为研究样本,探讨了高管节俭特质对企业绩效的影响以及女性高管对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现,高管节俭对企业绩效具有显著的促进作用,随着高管节俭程度的提高,企业绩效得到显著改善;女性高管正向调节高管节俭和企业绩效的关系。进 一步研究表明,中央“八项规定”作为外部冲击事件,能够显著促进高管节俭对企业绩效的正向作用;此外,高管节俭对企业绩效的促进作用在中央企业中更大。因此,应继续坚定不移地提升国企高管的节俭意识,加强廉政作风建设,并构建刚柔并济的“政府—国企—高管”互动监督机制。