Bribing voters without verification |
| |
| Institution: | 1. INTELIGO Research Group, Institución Universitaria Antonio José Camacho, Cali, Colombia;2. IDIS Research Group, Universidad del Cauca, Popayán, Colombia;3. GRHIO Research Group, Universidad de Lleida, Lleida, España, Spain;4. Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, México;5. Bionanoelectronics Research Group, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia |
| |
| Abstract: | This article distinguishes between two types of vote buying mechanisms. If vote choices can be monitored, vote buyers will not discriminate amongst prospective voters, regardless of how they are expected to vote. If voting is secret, a vote buyer will pay opposition voters not to vote which forces the opposition to pay its own voters to ensure they do vote. This implies the secret ballot may be less effective in curbing bribery than originally thought. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
