GET OUT THE (COSTLY) VOTE: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION |
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| Authors: | Dino Gerardi Margaret A McConnell Julian Romero Leeat Yariv |
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| Institution: | 1. 0039 011 67050080039 011 6705082;2. Carlo Alberto Chaired Professor of Economic Organization and Scientific Innovation, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università di Torino, Torino 10024, Italy;3. 203 745 8321617 432 8077;4. Assistant Professor Global Health Economics, Global Health and Population, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115;5. 520 621 1639520 621 8450;6. Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 |
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| Abstract: | We examine two commonly discussed institutions inducing turnout: abstention penalties (used in 32 countries) and lotteries rewarding one randomly chosen participant (as proposed on the 2006 Arizona ballot). We analyze a benchmark model in which voters vary in their information quality and participation is costly. We illustrate that both institutions can improve collective outcomes, though lotteries are a more effective instrument asymptotically. Experimentally, we provide strong evidence for selective participation: lab voters participate more when better informed or when institutionally induced. Lotteries fare better than fines, suggesting that they may be a useful alternative to commonly used compulsory voting schemes. (JEL C92, D72, D02) |
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