交易、风险与所有权——解释中国经济转轨路径及其绩效的一种新视角

本文试图为解释中国经济转轨过程提供一个新的视角 ,并通过强调有效交易和所有权的重要性来恢复与修补一些经典理论对经济转轨过程的解释力 ,以便将其最终整合到日见丰富和成熟的转轨经济理论的一般框架之中。本文的理论贡献可以归纳为:第一 ,阐发有效交易理论 ,认为经典理论所坚守的互利信条只是达成有效交易的必要条件 ,所有权的完整性才是充分条件。在所有权存在缺陷时 ,一种对当事人双方有利的交易极有可能伤及社会。第二 ,提出内生风险命题 ,经典资产选择理论所关注的外生风险主要源自宏观经济政策及企业经营层面 ,而内生风险则与微观经济基础尤其是所有权制度密切相关。第三 ,揭示出所有权、交易与产权之间的逻辑联系 ,并阐明所有权不一定是有效的但必须是完整的和神圣不可侵犯的观点。第四 ,指出内生贸易模型的隐含条件 ,发现在主管政府充当贸易者的场合 ,交易效率条件完全可以被超越 ,国际贸易就不一定非要以国内贸易为前提 ,而这种贸易也就极有可能成为贸易双方合谋算计国家和社会的博弈。本文的政策含义是 ,中国经济转轨的实际绩效与有效交易的规模和市场份额直接相关 ,而有效交易的成长既不依赖于政府推进市场化的决心 ,也不仰仗于法律与行政部门对交易主体的监督和惩罚力度 ,而最终取决于完

Trading,Risks and Ownership

In this article we will attempt to provide a new viewing angle to interpret the process of China's economic transition and will,by underlining the importance of effective trading(ET)and ownership,restore and modify the strength of explanation for economic transition,furnished by some classical theories,so as to integrate this idea into the general framework of the theory of transitional economics,which is being enriched and maturing.The theoretical contributions made in this article may be summed up in the following four aspects.First,we will elaborate the ET theory,viewing the doctrine,upheld by classical theory,of mutual benefit,only as the necessary condition,and considering that it is the wholeness of ownership that is the full condition;while ownership has some defects,a transaction beneficial to both parties concerned is likely to be detrimental to society.Second,we will put forth the proposition of intrinsic risk:the extrinsic risk followed with great interest by the classic theorists of asset choice originates mainly from macroeconomic policies and enterprise managers,but intrinsic risk,as it is,is closely linked with the base of microeconomics,with ownership system in particular.Third,we will reveal the logical relations between ownership,trading and equity,and expound our view that ownership is not necessarily effective but must be complete and sacred and holy.Fourth,we will point out the concealed conditions;and we have found that,when the governments in charge of trade serve as traders,the conditions of trading efficiency can play no role at all,that internal trade may not necessarily be the premise to international trade and that this kind of trade is very likely to turn to a game played by both trading partners in collaboration to scheme against the nation and society. What we mean in this article concerning China's related policies is that the actual achievement in China's economic transition is directly connected with the effective trading scale and market share,and the growth of effective trading does not rely on the determination of the government to propel markeˉtization,nor on the degree in which the law and administrative departments supervise and punish principal traders,but on the appearance of the complete ownership form and the accompanying degree in which the governments concerned withdraw from the market.